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CHAPTER I 
 
ABOUT FACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF FACIAL DIFFERENCE 
AND REPAIR  
 
“The face is nothing but an instrument panel registering all the body 
mechanisms: digestion, sight, hearing, respiration, thought.” 
Milan Kundera (1999: 40) 
“The face is the most intimate, most individual characteristic of your 
body.  It’s who you are.”  
     Linda Hogle quoted in Bowen (1999: 2) 
 
Sociology of a Face 
Facial difference circulates through our Western collective imagination.  Stories 
of cutting-edge biotechnologies like face transplantation periodically make their way into 
major newspapers.  Coverage of philanthropic mission work devoted to repairing the 
faces of “third world” children show up in magazine interviews with celebrities and in 
public relations promotion of good works accomplished by medical center teams.  Plastic 
surgery television, featuring dramatic stories about reconstructive and cosmetic 
procedures, saturates the television schedule.  Representations of faces and “facial 
disfigurement” circulate widely, and together these images inform our notions about what 
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it means to be facially variant.1  Yet there is not one single or unitary notion about what 
disfigurement is.  Those with facial differences are positioned as the monster, the cyborg, 
the recluse, the victim, the alien, and the non-human in varying accounts.  While there are 
many stories and images of facial difference, particular stories capture our cultural 
imagination and these stories lend intelligibility to the meanings of facial difference. 
In 1994, writer Lucy Grealy published a memoir, Autobiography of a Face, 
tracing her experience as a self-identified disfigured person.  Autobiography of a Face 
chronicles Grealy’s experiences with facial difference resulting from Ewing’s sarcoma, a 
cancer of the bone and soft tissue.  Grealy’s cancer metastasized in her right jaw.  The 
illness and subsequent surgeries resulted in a highly asymmetrical face. The book was 
celebrated upon its release, earning distinctions as a New York Times Notable Book and 
one of USA Today’s Best Books of the Year.  Reviews of Autobiography of a Face praise 
it not only as an exceptional work of non-fiction but also as an insightful account of the 
experience of facial difference.  But because there is no one “real” story about facial 
disfigurement, I ask: What is the truth of disfigurement that circulates in and through 
Autobiography of a Face?  What is it about this text that so captured critics and readers?  
                                                 
1 The word “disfigurement” is a thoroughly problematic term.  I use “disfigurement” not 
to reify social stigma of atypical faces, but rather to socially and semantically situate the 
faces about which I am talking.  Rather than taking for granted the process of defining a 
face as disfigured, I analyze the construction of “disfigurement” as an operative category 
that shapes social meanings of and responses to atypical faces in various contexts.  
I discuss the tensions implicit in use of the term more thoroughly in Chapter 2.   
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And more broadly, what is the cultural backdrop against which I analytically dissect 
various attempts to “fix” the face?   
Autobiography of a Face explores one young woman’s experience of bodily 
suffering, but more specifically it chronicles her attempts to cope with facial 
disfigurement.  At nine years old, Lucy Grealy was diagnosed.  Following that moment, 
her life was irrevocably changed.  As a child she began a series of treatments both to cure 
the cancer and to repair her face.  Autobiography of a Face offers startling insight into the 
desire (and in moments, the compulsion) to “fix” or repair the human body.  Like many 
others with faces defined as disfigured or non-normative, Grealy’s life could be 
reconstructed through her medical records.  Countless surgeries changed Grealy’s face, 
and her life.  Most dramatically, the use of “pedestals” temporarily restored the facial 
structure lost: 
In the first operation, two parallel incisions would be made in my stomach.  
The strip of skin between these incisions would be lifted up and rolled into 
a sort of tube with both ends still attached to my stomach, resembling a 
kind of handle: this was the pedestal.  The two incisions would be sewn 
together down its side, like a seam.  Six weeks later, one end of the handle 
would be cut from my stomach and attached to my wrist, so that my hand 
would be sewn to my stomach for six weeks.  Then the end of the tube that 
was still attached to my stomach would be severed and sewn to my face, 
so that now my hand would be attached to my face.  Six weeks after that, 
my hand would be cut loose and the pedestal, or flap, as they called it, 
would be nestled completely into the gap created by my missing jaw.  This 
would be only the first pedestal: the whole process would take several, 
plus additional operations to carve everything into a recognizable shape, 
over a period of about ten years altogether (154).  
 
Ultimately, though, each surgery failed to offer any permanent fix.  While Grealy’s 
pursuit of bodily transformation relies on the same kinds of concerted attention and 
constant cultivation employed for all kinds of aesthetic interventions, the significance of 
facial disfigurement imbues Lucy’s bodily repair with a particular weight.   
 3
Interspersed with descriptions of Lucy’s interactions with the medical profession, 
we see Lucy as a child, adolescent, and later as a twenty-something writer.  Lucy 
searches for some sense of normalcy either through the intervention that will repair her 
face or relationships that will lend her some sense of value.  As a child, Lucy works in a 
horse barn.  Of the experience, she writes,  
The horses remained my one real source of relief.  When I was in their 
presence, nothing else mattered.  Animals were both the lives I took care 
of and the lives who took care of me.  Horses neither disapproved nor 
approved of what I looked like.  All that counted was how I treated them, 
how my actions weighted themselves in the world (152). 
 
In her twenties, Lucy attends graduate school at the University of Iowa Writer’s 
Workshop.  There and in the writers’ colonies that follow, Grealy desperately looks for 
the man who will have sex with her and who will remain with her in spite of her 
supposed ugliness.   In adulthood, she is forced to look in the mirror after doctors who 
have promised technological miracles have given up and men intrigued by her tenacity 
and way with words have moved onto the next girl, one not so “different.”  The details 
change, but each of Grealy’s stories centers on her insatiable search for love and 
normalcy.    
The book is about Grealy’s face, specifically, and about her “tragic” life, more 
generally, and throughout, Autobiography of a Face is about how one’s life is predicated 
on one’s face and its relationship to sense of self.  She writes,  
There was only one fact of me, my face, my ugliness.  This singularity of 
meaning—I was my face, I was ugliness—though sometimes unbearable, also 
offered a possible point of escape.  It became the launching pad from which to lift 
off, the one immediately recognizable place to point to when asked what was 
wrong with my life” (7).   
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Despite a promising few final pages, it is clear that Lucy’s deep desire to be normal and 
valued are never to be satisfied as long as her facial difference remains.   
 Autobiography of a Face humanizes Lucy Grealy, and in the process facial 
disfigurement writ large.  The book is a memoir, offering an intimate depiction of 
Grealy’s experiences.  Lucy speaks for herself.  Her voice rises in stark contrast to the 
more common approach of talking about facial difference.  Her voice makes her 
experiences real in a way that runs counter to most representations of facial difference.  
Be it the carnival barker who points to the sideshow performer with facial variance or the 
reconstructive surgeon who describes the techniques used on a face, disfigurement is 
talked about in ways that position people with faces defined as disfiguring as objects, as 
expressly not human.  By contrast, Lucy describes what it feels like to look different and 
how that experience inspires obsession with normalizing interventions. Midway through 
her memoir, Grealy makes the startling admission, “For the first time I wished I were 
dead” (155).  Grealy’s account humanizes disfigurement, but unlike stories that offer an 
insider’s perspective and, in the process, make the extraordinary a bit more mundane, 
Autobiography of a Face is startlingly bleak.  Ultimately, Grealy suggests that 
disfigurement is worse than those with “normal” visages could ever imagine.   
 Perhaps the most compelling detail of Lucy Grealy’s story is one that could not be 
chronicled in her memoir:  Lucy Grealy is dead.  The details of her death, most widely 
publicized in Ann Patchett’s book Truth and Beauty: A Friendship (2004), are vague.  
Lucy was an admitted heroin (ab)user.  Shortly before her death, she was committed to a 
psychiatric facility for clinical depression and suicidal ideation.   On December 18, 2002, 
her body was found in a bathtub in a friend’s New York studio apartment.  Underlying 
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every account of Lucy’s death is the story of her face, or so the story goes, as told in 
Patchett’s acclaimed book.  The drugs and depression may have facilitated her demise, 
but the story of Lucy’s life and death is one about facial disfigurement.  It was her face 
that killed her.  But why is the explanation that Lucy’s face killed her a believable and 
perhaps even appealing account of her death?   The narrative that positions Lucy’s 
disfigured face as the cause of her death rests on assumptions about what disfigurement 
means, the significance of the face in everyday life, and the supposed limits of living with 
facial difference.  If facial disfigurement is unequivocally tragic (as it is in so many 
accounts) and if our faces are, in a very fundamental way, who we are to the world, then 
of course, life as a facially disfigured person is simply not possible.   
Reviews of Autobiography of a Face reveal what critics found compelling about 
the text.2  Over and over again, reviews celebrate three features of Grealy’s story— the 
horror of facial variance, the cultural significance of appearance, and the overcoming of 
great suffering.  In a New York Times book review, A.G. Mojtabai (1994) describes 
Autobiography as an “unblinking stare at an excruciatingly painful subject.”  A 
Mademoiselle review refers to the “horror” of Grealy’s disfigurement, while a Mirabella 
review references her “unbearable fate.”  Reviews also suggest that Lucy’s disfigurement 
gives her significant, expert insights about beauty and attractiveness.   A Seventeen 
magazine review notes, “Grealy beat cancer, but this almost seemed inconsequential 
compared to the horrors of coping in a world that measures a woman’s worth by her 
                                                 
2 I cite reviews that are reprinted on the cover and in the front matter of the 1994 edition 
of the memoir.  I provide citations for the reviews that are cited by critic’s name in the 
bibliography.   
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looks.”  And a Ploughshares review argues that “she makes a lyrical statement about the 
complex relationship between beauty and self-worth in our society.”  While Grealy’s life 
as a person with facial difference is continually positioned as horrific, reviewers 
uniformly celebrate her story as an overcoming narrative or as “a powerful testament to 
the triumph of the human spirit,” as the Detroit Free Press described.  A Booklist review 
notes, “She describes her heroic efforts to transforms her misfortune into a source of 
revelations about the beauty and mystery of life…She saved her own life by telling 
herself stories to live by. Now she’ll change our lives by sharing them.”  Ultimately, the 
story of Lucy Grealy’s life is compelling because it accesses tragedy.  Both 
Autobiography of a Face and Truth and Beauty chronicle the life of a woman who 
searched for a technique that might refigure her face and thereby alleviate her suffering.  
Little wonder that the story of Grealy’s death focuses on her failure to find a satisfactory 
intervention.   
Autobiography of a Face tells one story about the significance of disfigurement 
and our deep desire to repair the human face.  In this dissertation, I tell a sociological 
story about the relationship between bodily stigma—specifically disfigured faces—and 
technical, surgical, and cultural repair of these faces.  As Lucy Grealy’s life and the 
response to her memoir demonstrates, there is something socially and culturally 
significant about facial disfigurement.  It is a physiological state and a morphological 
condition, but it is also a social status in the sense that it informs one’s position in 
society, in Grealy’s case her relative value as a human being.  The power of a bodily state 
to determine a person’s status is not unique to disfigurement.  Status is thoroughly 
informed by the body.  Hierarchies of race and gender, physical mobility and 
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attractiveness are all structures of bodily status.  Particular categories or social locations 
carry more social value; others carry less.  In effect, humans are varyingly defined and 
devalued in accordance with our bodies.  In this study, I explore the specificity of facial 
difference.  I query the ways in which disfigurement not only confers low status but may 
in fact carry such significance that humans defined as disfigured are understood as not 
altogether human.   
The specter of disfigurement saturates our collective imagination.  It appears not 
only in Autobiography of a Face but throughout popular culture as a haunting reminder 
about the fragility of human bodies.  Disfigurement looms not only as one possible 
trauma, but rather as a particularly dreadful and astoundingly horrific bodily threat 
(Kemp 2004).  Because the face is understood to be hugely significant physiologically—
as a mechanism for communication and as a means of eating, breathing, and seeing—
facial disfigurement signifies a highly threatening bodily impairment.  Facial 
disfigurement also threatens our fundamental notions of self and identity.  The disfigured 
face compromises appearance and thus our most public selves precisely because it is so 
difficult to conceal our faces.3  In this way, disfigurement threatens our very way of 
being in the world.  I argue that the specter of disfigurement together with the import
accrued to the physiological functions of the face infuse the material practice of face 
work such that the work of repairing the face is given particular social, political, and 
moral significance.  In short, I argue that face work is not simply a conglomeration of 
reconstructive techniques aimed at the human face but rather the work of making the 
ance 
                                                 
3 Veiling offers one such means for concealing the face, but this, of course, is a culturally 
specific practice and one that is increasingly suspect in a post 9/11 world.   
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disfigured human.  This thesis is simultaneously a cultural and material account of what 
makes repair of the face take on the import that it does, and with what consequences for 
individuals and society.   
 
The Human Face as Sociological Object 
The body is decreasingly an “absent presence” in sociology (Williams and 
Bendelow 1998).  Instead, sociological theories of the body and empirical accounts of 
bodily experience have been on the rise for more than a decade.  Yet for the most part, 
“the body” that appears in sociology often is a referent for embodiment writ large.  
Theories of the body, then, are ironically infused with “the nonfleshiness of social 
constructionism” (Rosengarten 2005).  Following areas like disability studies and 
women’s and gender studies, sociologies of the body wrestle with how to theorize the 
body, as a material and social object. At its founding, disability studies (DS) rested on a 
distinction between disability and impairment (Wendell 2006).  Disability was defined as 
a social, cultural, and political phenomenon.  By contrast, impairment referred to a 
“natural,” and thus taken for granted, bodily state.  This distinction mirrors the distinction 
in women’s and gender studies between sex and gender (Lorber 1993).  Historically, sex 
was conceptualized as the “real” bodily material—genitals and chromosomes, hormones 
and gonads— in which gender was lodged.  By contrast, gender was principally defined 
as the social and cultural meanings attached to sexed bodies.  Because sex was conceived 
as bodily, it was a no “woman’s” land for feminist theorists.  In bracketing impairment or 
sex, disability and women’s studies privileged metaphors of the body rather than bodily 
materiality.  In the last decade, DS and feminist theory, in particular feminist 
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technoscience studies, have made claims that “the natural” is itself a cultural and political 
construction.  Increasingly, then, it is both experiences and meanings of “the social” and 
“the natural” body that are subject to social theorizing.   
While “the body” is increasingly taken up within sociology, accounts often begin 
with the “social” and move to the “bodily.”  In other words, the body is made sense of via 
social processes and practices, but the material body and the relationships between 
materiality and social practice are rarely queried.  As such, it seems curious to premise a 
sociological account on a particular body part, and yet this is precisely where my project 
begins.  I open with questions about the physiological functions and the social meanings 
attributed to the face.  In doing so, I suggest that there is a need both to theorize “the 
body” and to take the body apart analytically, to interrogate “embodiment” and specific 
body parts.  Consider, for example, that aesthetic interventions are disproportionately 
aimed at features like breasts and noses and very rarely at elbows and bellybuttons.  
Understanding why demands not only a social account of medical technologies and 
aestheticization but also a cultural history of breasts, noses, elbows, and bellybuttons.   
The face is a unique body part because it functions in a multitude of ways.  The 
face facilitates vital bodily functions, most obviously eating and breathing, but it is hardly 
just a vital organ.  The face is simultaneously a means of communication, a marker of 
identity and personhood, a signifier of social status, and a form of capital.  Put another 
way, “Faces are the external manifestation of our persons (our souls?).  They provide 
information about age, gender, ethnicity, and emotional states, and help to form the 
image that others have of us.  Indeed, our face often provides the image that we have of 
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ourselves” (Robertson 2004: 32). In these ways, the face is through and through a 
sociological subject.  
 Beyond the functions that the face serves for sustaining life, the face also works 
as a mechanism for communication and as a facet of identity.  In recent work entitled 
Unmasking the Face (2003), psychologists Paul Ekman and Wallace V. Friesen claim to 
have identified seven primary facial expressions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, interest, 
sadness, and surprise.  They argue that these are universal expressions, displayed by and 
recognizable to humans in every culture. Whether or not these facial features are 
biologically derived as Ekman and Friesen suggest, their research points to the pervasive 
ways in which the face is an instrument of communication.   
In addition, the face is a basis for social identity.  By the very fact that the face is 
so accessible as compared to most other parts of our bodies, it is central to our identity.  
Our faces are the primary points of reference for those we encounter.  In this way, the 
face is a symbol which mediates subjectivity and public personhood. Put simply, as 
medical anthropologist Linda Hogle (1999:2) does, the face is “who you are.”  In an 
interview on face transplantation for Salon.com, Hogle suggests that a transplant is 
complicated by that fact that “[y]ou're really transplanting more than the tissue itself. 
You're bringing someone else's identity and overlaying it on the recipient's body.”  
Sociology understands communication as a reality-generating endeavor and identities to 
be constituted through social interaction (Blumer 1969).  As a mechanism for 
communication and as a central point of reference in social interaction, then, the face is a 
deeply compelling sociological object of inquiry. 
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 For a discipline whose big questions often circulate around issues of social 
stratification, the face is a particularly salient point of inquiry towards understanding 
difference and inequality.  The face works as a primary indicator of social status.  While 
it is certainly true that looks can be deceiving—many of the inferences that we make 
based on another’s face may not be accurate—every face-to-face human interaction is 
premised on the “fact” that the face tells us something about one another.  The face 
ostensibly betrays our age, our race and ethnicity, and our gender—as these are 
configured in social contexts.  In this way, what the face tells others about who we are 
determines our status in social relations and systems of power.  Its lines and colors and 
decorations and bone structure are all evidence upon which we actively construct some 
sense of the Other; thus, the face is a social technology through which people are labeled, 
differentiated, and potentially devalued.   
 Clearly the face is a powerful biosocial device, directly affecting what 
sociologists drawing on Max Weber (1978) deem “life chances.”  From this perspective, 
the face, along with the entire body, might be construed as a kind of physical capital, a 
resource that is directly correlated with status.  As sociologist Chris Shilling, drawing on 
Pierre Bourdieu, writes: 
While our physicality has become a possessor of symbolically valued 
appearances, it is additionally implicated in the prosaic buying and selling 
of labour power and the accumulation of other forms of capital…Physical 
capital is most usually converted into economic capital (money, goods, 
and services), cultural capital (e.g. educational qualifications), and social 
capital (interpersonal networks that allow individuals to draw on the 
help/resources of others), and is key to the reproduction of social 
inequalities (Bourdieu, 1978, 1984, 1986) (Shilling 2005: 474).   
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If our bodies are forms of capital, the face is a key form of currency.  Facial appearance is 
powerful.  While attractiveness can translate into high status, so too can facial difference 
compromise one’s value.   
  
Disfigurement as Object of Sociological Inquiry 
 This dissertation offers an interrogation of interventions aimed at repairing facial 
disfigurement. It is an account of the social significance of facial variance—but what is 
facial disfigurement?  In a real sense, there is no there, there.  Disfigurement has no static 
intelligibility, no objective point of reference, no stable shared meaning.  Yet it has a very 
definite, deeply felt social reality.  As a target of intervention for various actors, facial 
disfigurement is an object of inquiry simultaneously in biomedicine and in the social 
sciences.  Via attempts to “know” disfigurement, facial difference takes shape as a 
biomedical condition, as a technoscientific project, as a psychological trauma, and as a 
social problem.  To define disfigurement, I first ask what constitutes disfigurement in 
fields that address the topic and shape intervention.  Then, I explore the relatively limited 
life of disfigurement in sociology.   
 In the biomedical sciences, facial disfigurement operates almost exclusively as a 
condition in need of intervention.  As such, the cause of facial difference is of primary 
importance in calculating how to proceed.  Based on fieldwork conducted in a 
maxillofacial clinic,4 Michael Hughes (1998) offers a typology of the causes of 
disfigurement that captures the ways in which disfigurement is conceptualized in medical 
                                                 
4 A maxilliofacial clinic describes a medical facility that specializes in treatment of the 
head, neck, face, and jaw.   
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contexts.  For the purposes of intervention, facial difference is differentiated between 
those one is born with and those that result from illness or trauma.  Congenital anomalies, 
or those conditions with which one is born, may result in facial difference.  The most 
common example is cleft lip and palate,5 which can in most cases be surgically treated at 
birth.  Facial reconstruction is also aimed at other congenital “diseases” like Down’s 
Syndrome to normalize appearance, though this kind of facial intervention is 
controversial (Frank 2004).  Alongside his list of congenital facial anomalies, Hughes 
adds ethnic facial characteristics, noting that people who seek surgery for ethnic features 
often conceptualize the feature in question as an abnormality.  Burns, accidents 
(automobile accidents, fights, etc.), cancer, and other illnesses can also result in facial 
disfigurement.  Hughes’ research is in part a chronicle of the ways in which 
disfigurement takes shape in biomedical contexts, but like the surgeons that work in the 
clinic, Hughes takes these categories for granted.  While the origin of disfigurement is 
crucial for elaborating techniques of repair, there is certainly more to disfigurement than 
its cause.     
Psychological research on facial disfigurement focuses primarily on the emotional 
costs of having a disfigured face.  The picture of disfigurement painted in psychological 
research is stark—both self-image and social encounters are profoundly and negatively 
impacted by facial differences (Callahan 2004; Kent 2000; Rumsey and Harcourt 2004).  
Wasserman and Allen (1985) find that children with cranio-facial anomalies are more 
                                                 
5 Cleft lip and palate describe a congenital condition resulting when either the lip or roof 
of the mouth do not fuse in utero.  This results in a gap that is often treated with surgery 
at birth.   
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likely to be ignored by their parents, and Barden et al. (1989) demonstrate that facially 
variant children are less likely to be held, played with, and looked at by their mothers.  
Worse yet, Wald and Knutson (2000) suggest that children with facial difference 
experience more abuse than children with “normal” faces.  Research indicates that life 
chances are affected into adulthood.  For example, people with facial difference are 
significantly less likely to be hired even than those with other physical disabilities 
(Stevenage and McKay 1999).    
 In contrast with what one might assume, research demonstrates that the severity 
of disfigurement does not predict psychological adjustment (Landsdown et al. 1997).   
Rumsey and Harcourt (2004) write, “the extent to which a visible difference results in 
social disability involves a complex interplay of social and individual factors” (84).  
Psychologist and specialist on disfigurement Nichola Rumsey (2004) elaborates on this 
point:  
Severe visible disfigurement does not condemn the affected person to the 
life of a social recluse.  Powerful elements of adjustment include levels of 
self-esteem (and the extent to which esteem is derived from qualities other 
than outward appearance), a person’s disposition (in particular an 
optimistic outlook on life, the quality of a person’s support network, and 
the effectiveness of his/her social interaction skills (Rumsey and Harcourt 
2004).  Those who are most distressed by their appearance are more 
anxious and depressed, lack self-confidence, feel they cannot control 
social encounters, and do not believe they can use other techniques to 
compensate for their visible difference (22).   
 
In this way the “trauma” of disfigurement cannot be nailed down conceptually or 
practically, making the project of facilitating coping particularly difficult.  Psychological 
research conveys the personal trauma of disfigurement, but it does little to explain the 
social or cultural significance of facial disfigurement or the meaning of interventions 
designed to “fix” atypical faces. In a sense, psychological work explores facial 
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disfigurement in a vacuum, as if sociocultural context does not inform experiences of 
embodied trauma.  
Facial disfigurement has taken shape as a sociological object in only a very 
limited way.  Frances Cooke Macgregor, a social scientist who worked as a graduate 
student under Margaret Mead and as a photographer, began exploring facial 
disfigurement during World War II.  Soon after the war, Macgregor met a surgeon, Dr. 
John Marquis Converse, who worked on the faces of disfigured soldiers.  After this 
meeting, Macgregor began a psychological and sociological study of facial disfigurement 
using Converse’s patients as data. Her research on facial disfigurement resulted in two 
texts: Facial Deformities and Plastic Surgery: A Psychosocial Study (1953) and 
Transformation and Identity: The Face and Plastic Surgery (1974).  Her later text begins, 
“Facial disfigurement is one of man’s gravest handicaps.”  (1974: xxiii).  Her founding 
premise—like mine—is that the face is so central to human life that having an atypical 
face is a significant social problem and thus an important topic for critical, sociological 
inquiry.  Macgregor’s work is remarkable in that she offers a sociological perspective on 
that which had previously been understood simply as a psychological or physiological 
problem. But her claim that the experience of disfigurement is fundamentally determined 
by our cultural notions of what disfigurement signifies was only the beginning in terms of 
what sociology can offer towards understanding facial difference.  Macgregor’s New 
York Times obituary captured the essence of her work on facial difference:  
As for those whose faces happen to deviate from the norm, there was and 
is, a special irony with which they must contend. Their problems have 
their roots in the inextricable relationship of the face to the person and its 
role in human relations. Moreover, it is a situation made even worse in a 
society whose frenetic efforts to look young and beautiful makes looking 
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different a social stigma—a stigma that has the potential for social and 
psychological death (New York Times 2002).   
 
In the end, Macgregor demonstrated that there exists a complicated relationship 
between disfigurement and suffering and that dissolving it would require a radical 
cultural shift.   
Each disciplinary attempt to know disfigurement wrestles with the suffering 
inextricably linked with disfigurement, though each makes very clear that suffering may 
not resemble what we imagine or that suffering need not be necessarily linked with 
disfigurement.  The attempt to know disfigurement (as a biomedical condition, as a 
psychological trauma, or as a social problem) is always intertwined with the desire to 
alleviate the suffering linked with disfigurement.  Underlying these accounts is a notion 
about how bad disfigurement is. Regardless of how one comes to be disfigured, facial 
difference is routinely positioned as a tragedy.  Such rhetorical framing emphasizes the 
possibility of recovery.  Within such a framework, the work of facial repair becomes a 
miraculous sort of task, one in which the afflicted and their “saviors” can triumph over 
what is taken for granted as a trauma.   
  By contrast, I rely on the emergent meanings of disfigurement that arise in each 
site I analyze.  In this way, I do not employ an a priori definition of disfigurement that 
emphasizes, for example, the loss of facial function or a radical departure of facial 
appearance from some mythic norm.  As a result, the faces that appear in this account 
look quite different from one another, and yet in each site I explore, the faces that 
circulate therein carry a shared meaning.  For the purposes of this account then, 
disfigurement is less about what a particular face looks like and more about the meanings 
conferred onto particular faces.  I suggest that the process of defining a face as disfigured 
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is one in which the humanity of a person is called into question.  While I query the 
consequences of defining a face as disfigured, I take the definition that arises in each of 
the sites I investigate for granted.  That is, I am less interested in pinning disfigurement 
down as a “real” thing than in asking what disfigurement signifies. What, for example, is 
disfigurement made to say about a person, and what does disfigurement cost or make 
possible in certain contexts? 
 
A Brief Note on Facial Interventions 
This is not a story about beauty.  It is not an analysis of cosmetic culture.  It is not 
an inquiry into the ever-expanding markets facilitating aesthetic body projects.  But 
beauty culture—its tools and its effects—is implicated in the story of facial 
disfigurement.  This is a story about normalization and technologies aimed at repairing 
the face. Technically and historically, reconstructive surgery and cosmetic surgery are 
kin.  Contemporary technologies of cosmetic enhancement arise out of techniques 
developed in the service of reconstructive surgery (Haiken 2000, Sullivan 2004). While 
the techniques are similar, the project of reconstructive story is often differentiated from 
the aim of cosmetic surgery.     
Specifically, the subject of reconstructive surgery is often characterized as “in 
(dire) need” of intervention. From this perspective, what makes cosmetic surgery distinct 
from reconstructive surgery is the ends, not the means.  By contrast, cosmetic surgery is 
often distinguished as elective surgery, under the assumption that patients do not need 
surgery but rather want it.  Most sociological and feminist accounts of cosmetic surgery 
take the ends of reconstructive surgery for granted (Blum 2003, Pitts-Taylor 2007).  In 
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other words, these analyses rely on assumptions about what kinds of faces and bodies 
need intervention and that the need is self-evident.   
Yet, doctors and patients alike may understand elective procedures as “needed,” 
and of course those with facial difference often “elect” to undergo reconstructive surgery.  
Clearly, the line between what constitutes reconstruction and what counts as cosmetic is 
not altogether clear, and this messiness is particularly telling.  What distinguishes 
cosmetic surgery from reconstructive surgery is a taken for granted notion of which faces 
need intervention. When is it restoration?  When is it optimization?  When is it both?  
What are the stakes of claiming that something is restorative or optimizing?  How is the 
project of healing related to the project of optimization?   
In the gray area, then, there is the possibility of taking a face that might be 
deemed unattractive and defining it as disfigured.   Given both the significance of the 
face and the specter of disfigurement, positioning particular faces as disfigured animates 
the imperative to repair.  Thus while cosmetic and reconstructive surgery are technically 
similar, this project reveals the ways in which these distinctions are deployed with 
profoundly different consequences.  This dissertation takes up sites of intervention, some 
of which might be alternatively characterized as sites of cosmetic and/or reconstructive 
surgery.  I do not invest in this distinction and instead question the logic upon which this 
distinction rests.    
Given the inordinate amount of scholarly attention paid to cosmetic surgery and 
beauty in the last several decades, it is interesting that ugliness is relatively unaccounted 
for.  There are some exceptions.  In Helen Deustch and Felicity Nussbaum’s “Defects”: 
Engendering the Modern Body (2000), “ugliness as an aesthetic category” is taken up 
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along with other anomalous bodies.  Their text interrogates the cultural work 
accomplished by monstrosity in the eighteenth century in the service of understanding 
modern notions of difference, particularly sexual difference.  While the text inserts 
ugliness and disfigurement into the intellectual conversation, it is largely a historical 
account.  There remains much to be said about how disfigurement operates in the 
contemporary socio-historical moment and how ugliness comes to carry particular 
consequences, specifically the push to repair, and for whom.  By comparison, I situate 
notions of “ugly” and “disfigured” firmly in the context of 21st-century discourses and 
practices of normalization. 
 
 
Sites of Facial Repair 
 I collectively refer to work aimed at repairing the face as “face work.” In Chapter 
Two, “Face Work: Normalizing Human Faces,” I locate the concept within a theoretical 
lineage, namely symbolic interactionism.  My analysis looks at face work not as an 
interaction between a medical provider and a patient but as a social practice through 
which meanings about bodies emerge.  Thus, I ask how is disfigurement produced in 
interaction?  As I demonstrate, face work is a multifaceted, complex, and contradictory 
process wherein the face is technically repaired and what disfigurement means is 
negotiated.  In this way, intervention happens both at the level of how bodies are 
materially managed/produced and at the level of how bodies are thought and talked 
about. As a normalizing technique, face work relies on the ideological links among 
aesthetics, disability, and technoscience.  In other words, technological, cultural, and 
surgical interventions aimed at facial variance rely on meanings about the significance of 
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the human face and the costs of disfigurement, and the interventions elicit deep hope 
about the redemptive effects of science and medicine.  The functional imperative in 
reconstructive surgery is most obviously repairing the human face, but the work 
accomplished by intervention is not entirely self evident.  In her book Future Face, 
Sandra Kemp writes, “Facial surgeons have historically been associated with the 
restoration of physical appearance as opposed to surgery that saves lives” (2004: 73). 
Ultimately, I demonstrate the reverse, that repair of the face takes on profound weight, 
namely the restoration of a disfigured person’s humanity.  Put more simply, to be human 
is to have a face, such that face work is ultimately the work of making the non-human 
human.  In a very real way, face work which is often understood as “just” about 
appearance takes on the significance of life saving work in the sites in which it is 
accomplished.   
Further, I argue that disfigurement is not simply responded to in sites of 
intervention.  Instead, disfigurement is produced in the very sites constructed towards the 
eradication of facial variance.  While biomedicine treats disfigurement as a bodily 
configuration that exists “out there,” the operations of biomedicine rely on the continual 
reproduction of “disfigurement” as a bodily crisis.  The reality of “disfigurement” that is 
situated as the object of intervention cannot be understood outside of the 
technoculturalmedical sites that deal in aesthetic intervention.  Thus even as I write a 
constructivist account of disfigurement, I do not situate intervention as an unequivocally 
avoidable response to facial variance.  Ironically, perhaps, a critical cultural studies 
account of the fleshiness of bodies and materiality of the face requires wrestling with the 
possibilities and promises of technomedical intervention.   
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 At the same time that I critique modes of intervention aimed at disfigurement, I 
recognize certain facts about face work.  Repair of the human face literally saves lives.  
For example, children with cleft palates are often unable to adequately nurse without 
surgery to repair the oral gap.  In addition, repair is often desired by those at whom the 
intervention is aimed.  By analyzing interventions targeting the face, I do not mean to 
suggest that intervention is bad or that repair should not exist as a mode of coping; rather 
I critique face work in order to disentangle the multifaceted work accomplished under the 
guise of reconstructive surgery.  In this way, my work follows Marsha Rosengarten’s 
critique of the technomedical measurement of HIV.  She writes, “How is it possible to 
query the object(s) of matter while contributing to materially necessary interventions?  Is 
it possible to contribute to arresting the virus by not furthering its conceptual stability?” 
(2005: 72).    Similarly, I ask how do we question, and thereby destabilize, a bodily 
matter while elaborating and understanding potential interventions aimed at reshaping the 
realties associated with that very bodily matter?   
I investigate four sites where surgical and other interventions are employed to 
repair faces defined and presented as disfigured.  While each of the four sites is engaged 
in the general project of surgical face work, each is distinct enough to provide a basis for 
generative comparison and rich sociological analysis.   In each, the disfigurement varies 
both in kind and “severity,” as well as in the cultural, social, and bioethical responses to 
the practices.  While all four sites rely on surgery as the primary means for re-making 
disfigured faces, the technical sophistication of procedures used in each site differs as do 
the risks and consequences. Thus, each site offers a compelling data field in which I 
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explore constructions of disfigurement, meanings of “vital” and “non-vital,” and the 
(re)production of cultural definitions and meanings of “human.” 
In Chapter Three, “Facing Off: Debating Face Transplantation and Constructing a 
Disfigurement Imaginary,” I examine an emerging biomedical technology that promises 
to be a revolutionary intervention for severe facial disfigurement.  Face transplantation 
remains an experimental procedure in which a donor face is surgically removed and 
replanted on a recipient’s face.  The procedure remains highly contested, with research 
doctors vying to complete a transplant, bioethicists predicting devastating consequences, 
and a public simultaneously dazzled and horrified by the technology.  The debates 
surrounding face transplantation center on whether or not experimentation should occur.  
Ultimately, critics’ positions rest on how they conceptualize the significance of facial 
intervention.  Some understand face transplantation as non-vital work, that is, work that 
may not be “lifesaving” per se but that improves the quality of life.  Others understand 
face transplantation as a vital, or lifesaving, intervention.  I use debates about face 
transplantation to interrogate the significance of facial disfigurement and to raise 
questions about how we might understand aesthetic interventions as lifesaving work, 
given that the side-effects (including death) are framed as acceptable risks for treating 
facial disfigurement.  In addition, I critically analyze how the work of technological 
innovation rests on the discursive negotiation of the meaning of facial disfigurement, in 
particular a disfigurement imaginary that positions disfigurement as a profoundly 
discrediting condition, one that potentially undermines one’s very humanity.  These ideas 
inform subsequent chapters in which I take up questions related to other types of face 
 23
work.  Throughout this project, I continually ask how facial difference determines one’s 
status as a human being.   
In Chapter Four, “Not a Pretty Face: Facial Feminization in the Service of 
Unremarkability,” I explore another set of procedures aimed at “fixing” the face— facial 
feminization surgery (FFS).  In the 1980s and 1990s, reconstructive and cosmetic 
surgeons developed a set of procedures collectively identified as facial feminization 
surgery.  The procedures are marketed to male-to-female (MTF) transsexuals for the 
purposes of affecting a “feminine” appearing face.  Facial feminization is accomplished 
through a variety of procedures including but not limited to a brow lift, a trachea shave, a 
jawline reduction, a chin reduction, and a face and neck lift at a cost of $20,000 to 
$40,000.  I compare face work with the work of “fixing” other body parts, in this case 
genitals, to arrive at a theory about the particular social significance of the face.  While 
faces subject to facial feminizing procedures are not immediately intelligible as 
“disfigured,” I demonstrate that what counts as disfigurement is contextual.  I describe 
processes through which “the male-to-female transsexual face” is taken apart, both 
literally and figuratively, resulting in a theory of facial sex difference. Even as “the 
female face” is described and sought after, I argue that this is an ideal that it is ultimately 
unattainable through surgery.  I argue that technically repairing the face works to make 
the MTF face merely “less masculine” or, more precisely, unremarkable.  
 In Chapter Five, “Making Faces: Extreme Makeovers and the ‘Reality’ of 
Disfigurement,” I take on another set of faces that are relatively unremarkable but that are 
displayed in a spectacular context, the world of reality television.  In 2002, ABC pushed 
the boundaries of television by airing Extreme Makeover.  In each of the fifty-five 
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episodes that aired over the course of three seasons, “real-life” people (most often 
women) moved to Hollywood to begin surgical, exercise, dietary, and other cosmetic 
regimens to prepare for their “big reveal.”  Like the faces subject to facial feminization, 
the faces of Extreme Makeover candidates are not, prior to intervention, disfigured in a 
taken for granted sort of way but are continually framed as disfigured in the context of 
the television show.  I examine the narrative structure of the show and demonstrate that 
face work is often conflated with repair of other domains of human life, including 
economic, emotional, social, bodily, and intimate lives, and how appearance is 
positioned as the most important facet of our lives.  I then consider what is accomplished 
via an “extreme” makeover.  I analyze what counts as a successful intervention and 
demonstrate that the erasure of disfigurement is the creation of a new face altogether, a 
face that does not resemble its former self.  I ask what it means to desire the experience 
of non-recognition. 
 In Chapter Six, “Saving Face: The Mission of Face Work,” I consider the work of 
the international not-for-profit organization Operation Smile.  First, I consider how 
“disfigured” children are pictured, talked about, and deployed.  Specifically, I consider 
how children’s lives are described “before” intervention to understand what it means that 
crafting smiles is positioned as the “after”  effect of the face work accomplished by the 
organization.  I question what a smile is in order to understand why it is the most 
consistently relied upon imagery to describe Operation Smile’s work, and I argue that the 
smile is deployed towards the ends of positioning surgery as possessing the capacity to 
transform miserable children into happy recipients and to grant them a facial expression 
that is understood as universally human.  Then, I consider the cultural work 
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accomplished by beautiful celebrity spokespersons, such as Jessica Simpson, on behalf of 
the organization.  I argue that the juxtaposition of uncommon beauty and the grotesque 
body mobilizes hope and simultaneously reifies the very social context that makes facial 
difference the tragedy that it is.  Based on this analysis, I conclude by questioning how 
Operation Smile figuratively “works” on disfigurement in ways that infuse disfigured 
faces with social meaning and positions donors in particular relationships with respect to 
facial difference. Specifically, I query how face work in the form of “missions” relies on 
colonialist notions of the relationships between the “first” and “third” worlds, between 
the global “haves” and the “have-nots.”   
Throughout this dissertation, I suggest that dramatic social transformations of the 
last half-century must be taken into account in any contemporary analysis of facial 
disfigurement.  In the previous half century, an American “makeover” culture has 
emerged and expanded exponentially.  This transformation is detectable in the ever 
growing consumption of cosmetic surgery (Sullivan 2004) and other aesthetic services, 
popular culture like F/X’s Nip/Tuck and ABC’s Extreme Makeover centrally focused on 
cosmetic surgery, and prevalent discourses which increasingly make “body projects” into 
moral enterprises (Brumberg 1998).  We are, in short, experiencing an “aestheticization 
of everyday life” (Turner 2001). Consequently, new ways of understanding and 
contending with disfigurement have emerged. These need to be interrogated to locate and 
assess meanings of disfigurement in this socio-historical moment.  
Based on the four cases I analyze, I make several arguments about the meaning of 
attempts to repair faces defined as disfigured and implicitly about the significance of the 
face, and facial disfigurement.  I show that interventions are embedded in systems of 
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logic.  In order to justify interventions, facts must be employed in the service of 
diagnosing and making meaning out of those diagnoses.  In this way, interventions 
cannot be taken for granted.  Interventions rely on truth claims (Aronson 1984), and in 
order to make sense of these interventions we must query the truth claims upon which 
interventions rely.  I argue that the fundamental truth claim upon which face work is 
based is that disfigurement is inevitably a tragedy, a threat to human existence.  Thus, I 
show that the specter of disfigurement, specifically the idea that human life is not 
possible without a “normal” visage, lends itself to an imperative to repair.  Repair is not a 
mode of coping, rather it is conceived of as an inevitable response; it is an assumed mode 
of being.   
I conclude this thesis by asking what are the consequences of this particular 
arrangement, in which repair equals normalization?  Instead of ending with a prescriptive 
or prohibitive conclusion about face work, I analyze and critique a different response to 
face work, namely the rejection by bioethicists and medical sociologists of 
technoscientific solutions to disfigurement.  I consider the logic upon which calls for non-
intervention rest and suggest that resisting medical intervention is an unsatisfactory 
response. But so, too, is the coercive imperative to repair.  In part, I reject non-
intervention as a solution because of the immense hope invested in face work, as 
illustrated in Lucy Grealy’s profoundly moving memoir.  What does it mean that 
repairing the face is constructed as a lifesaving intervention?  In a new century 
characterized by widespread aestheticization, what does the conflation of facial 
appearance and “life itself” mean?  Finally, I step back and reframe the work 
accomplished in these sites as work aimed at making faces not only not disfigured, but 
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also “not ugly.”  I make this distinction in order to connect the work accomplished in 
these specialized, expensive, labor-intensive, mediagenic sites with the aesthetic body 
projects accomplished by all of us in our everyday lives.     
 
Epistemologies, Methodologies, and Reflections on the Writer’s Face 
 
Epistemologies, Methodologies, and Methods 
We bury strange things in landfills—syringes dripping insulin, toenail clippings, 
old credit cards, and sometimes, dead bodies.  Of course, there are mundane things too—
junk mail, orange peelings, cotton balls, and expired coupons.  If we tried to separate our 
trash into clear categories, we would be hard-pressed to do so.   Unlike the paper, plastic, 
metal, and glass of our recycling, our trash is hard to separate into easily distinguishable 
groupings—Are cotton balls paper?  What if they are saturated with human blood?  Then 
are cotton balls medical waste?  Without a doubt, landfills are a mess.  They are 
composed of a conglomeration of waste—human waste, food waste, chemical waste, 
paper waste, etc.  And yet each item in a landfill tells us something about who we are 
(Alexander 1993; Rathje and Murphy 1992).   
My thesis is an archeological project in the sense that I am attempting to make 
sense of messy, muddled, and disordered data.  I draw on multiple, varied kinds of 
information to understand work aimed at repairing facial disfigurement.  The landfill is 
an excavation nightmare, but taking each piece of garbage into account is incredibly 
revealing.  Likewise, this project is empirically messy, but in the end, I produce an 
account that examines how facial repair operates as a biomedical technology, as a 
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meaning making intervention, as a cultural product, and as a discursive operation for the 
production of the category human.  This work is based on four cases, and in my analysis 
of each I draw on multiple sources of data.  While on its own, each piece demonstrates 
something about the significance of facial repair, taken together the data explored here 
allows for “thick analyses” (Fosket 2002:40).   
 I situate myself epistemologically in constructivist, postmodern, feminist 
perspectives and use various analytic perspectives including grounded theory and 
situational analysis in order to theorize disfigurement and repair.  Likewise, I employ 
multiple methods—multi-sited ethnography, interviewing, content analysis—and rely on 
varying kinds of data—television shows, professional journals, websites, conferences, 
conversations, and consultations.  I analyze my data—fieldnotes, interview transcripts, 
texts—using qualitative methods of data analysis (Clarke 2005). From one perspective, 
then, this dissertation bastardizes carefully conceived methods.  From another 
perspective, this approach—perhaps best termed multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1998; 
Rapp 1999)—employs methodologies as tools rather than as formalist procedures.  As 
Foucault has suggested, “‘All my books… are little tool boxes. If people want to open 
them, to use a particular sentence, a particular idea, a particular analysis like a 
screwdriver or a spanner... so much the better!’” (Foucault in Lindsay Prior 1997: 77).  I 
intend this cobbling of method as a tribute rather than as a form of intellectual trespass.   
Telling a critical story of face transplantation requires entering the sites in which 
face transplantation is taking shape.  This means entering the medical-technological 
complex and becoming acquainted with the key figures working towards solidifying this 
technology in the making.  For my chapter on face transplantation, I rely on fieldwork 
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conducted at weekly meetings of a U.S. based face transplant team, along with interviews 
with key team members to critically analyze how, in this case, the work of technological 
innovation rests on the discursive negotiations of the meanings of facial disfigurement.  
In addition, I employ content analysis of a 2004 issue of The American Journal of 
Bioethics, in which medical researchers, surgeons, bioethicists, and psychologists 
considered and debated the issue of face transplantation.  Through content analysis of the 
AJOB exchange, I highlight the terms of contestation.   
 For my chapter on Extreme Makeover, analysis is based on observations 
collected while viewing 30 episodes chosen at random.  In my fieldnotes, I chronicle the 
show as it unfolds for television viewers, emphasizing the narrative turns upon which 
each episode relies.  In short, I trace the narrative arc embedded in each episode and 
query this pattern to interrogate what kind of storytelling the show accomplishes.  
Specifically, how does the series position disfigurement and cosmetic intervention?   
 Accessing facial feminization requires entering sub-cultural spaces.  I base my 
analysis of facial feminization surgery on fieldnotes collected at seminars held during two 
of the largest transgender conferences in the world—Southern Comfort and the 
International Foundation for Gender Education Conference.  At each conference, the four 
facial feminization surgeons currently practicing in the United States presented 
information sessions to potential facial feminization consumers.  This allowed me to 
observe each surgeon in two different settings.  In addition, I analyze the materials— 
pamphlets, journal articles, and promotional materials—distributed to attendees during 
these seminars.   
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My analysis of Operation Smile is based on content analysis of recent news 
coverage about the organization’s work around the world.  While news media works to 
convey “the facts,” media also does the work of transmitting cultural hopes and fears 
about new technological, and in this case philanthropic, interventions.  Using LexisNexis 
Academic, I gathered newspaper accounts from English international and national 
publications that discussed the work of Operation Smile starting in 2005 and throughout 
2007.  Based on analysis of 132 articles, I analyze the work of the organization.  In 
addition, I consider how the organization represents its work on ita website, particularly 
focusing on the deployment of celebrity spokespersons throughout the organization’s 
own site.   
Throughout the dissertation, I include artifacts from each site.  In some cases, I 
reproduce excerpted text from written materials.  Most often, I insert images of 
disfigurement or repair that circulate in each site.   Cultural theorists including Walter 
Benjamin, Stuart Hall, and Barbara Maria Stafford theorize the postmodern era as an 
“empire of images” (Bordo 2003).  This is a socio-historical moment in which the 
asesthetic is deployed in the service of cultural, political, and technoscientific work.  As 
art historian Stafford contends in her analysis of the Enlightenment-era emergence of 
“visualization of knowledge,” our ways of understanding the body are mediated through 
metaphor and imagery (1991).  Understanding why we intervene in bodily difference in 
the ways we do demands comprehension of the images that circulate in the service of 
intervention.  I reproduce, describe, and assess images of disfigurement and repair that 
feature prominently in each of the cases under review, and I examine the rhetorical work 
accomplished by such artifacts.  Images are increasingly important to analyses of 
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medicine, science, and technology. Many scholars have argued that with the proliferation 
of imaging technologies like ultrasound and computerized tomography (CT) scan, visual 
images are central actors in the making of science (Aronowitz et al. 1996; Downey and 
Dumit 1997).  Things, including images of faces, “talk” (Daston 2004). One central task 
of this project is to ask what images of disfigured faces and repair are saying, and to 
whom.  Thus, the data upon which I base my argument includes not only the words 
transmitted in meetings and interviews and the prose of promotional materials, websites, 
and academic journals, but also the visual artifacts that constitute another means of 
knowing disfigurement.  I include pictures of “disfigurement” not to capitalize on the 
spectacle, but rather to ask how knowledge about disfigurement is created and authority 
to intervene established through the deployment of images of disfigured faces. 
I also insert brief pieces of experimental writing, along with stories about my own 
experiences in the sites I study.  These are offered in an attempt to capture the affective 
experience of research.  I outline the narrative structure of Extreme Makeover but to 
understand the work accomplished by the cultural medium, one must also think about the 
emotional responses elicited by watching the show.  I describe the seminars in which 
facial feminization surgeons outline surgical techniques, but stories about conference 
attendees’ responses to my own appearance are useful for understanding the ways in 
which people are compelled to consume expensive and painful surgery.  Storytelling and 
creative non-fiction are sometimes effective means for conveying ideas, and I do not 
hesitate to employ these genres here.   
Research guided from postmodern perspectives, like my own, looks very different 
than that which might emerge from positivist, realist epistemologies.  First and foremost, 
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I work from the assumption that all knowledge is partial or situated (Haraway 1988).  In 
other words, all knowledge is shaped by a particular perspective and orientation to the 
world and by social location.  No group will be able to tell the “Truth” about facial 
disfigurement.  Rather, I use each site to create a story of repair that represents multiple 
standpoints (Hill-Collins 1990; Harding 1991; Hartsock 1983; Smith 1989).  Particular 
standpoints may complement, contradict, or complicate other standpoints, but my 
intention is to create a story that highlights these tensions in the service of theory rather 
than a crafted narrative that glosses over differences in favor of a unified account.    
It follows, then, that I understand my own project as a critical representation of 
facial repair as opposed to a definitive description of reconstructive interventions.  While 
some sociologists might critique such a project for not attempting to create a 
generalizable social science account, work inspired by feminist and postmodern theories 
recognizes the “crisis of representation” or the problematics of constructing an account 
that claims authority (Rosaldo 1989).  At the same time, I acknowledge the power a 
scholarly representation might have over other versions of the story.  In the end, I 
position my own version as a complex, multi-layered, grounded theory about facial 
repair.   Second, I emphasize both human agency and structural constraints.  As a project 
with methodological ties to grounded theory, I am interested in human action and the 
ways in which actors shape their social locations.  Situational analysis allows me to 
locate human action in broader situations (Clarke 2005).  In this sense, I am attentive to 
the ways in which discursive formations, historical conventions, and institutional 
regulations influence human action.    
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This work is conceived as a volley to both sociology and disability studies to 
seriously take up the experience of disfigurement, a bodily experience and social status 
that is surprisingly overlooked in social theory.  And yet, inquiries into facial 
disfigurement reveal much about who we are, what we fear, and how we recover—and 
even about who “we” may be.  Disfigurement is also a significant sociological topic of 
inquiry for altogether different reasons.  Interrogating appearance is critically important 
because beauty and ugliness determine status in fundamental ways.  It is a wonder that a 
discipline premised on accounting for difference and devaluation does little work towards 
understanding how appearance matters.  Sociologists analyze the practices aimed towards 
producing beauty (most obviously cosmetic surgery) and theorize these as deeply 
gendered practices, but do not query ugliness.  We acknowledge that research indicates 
that those who are more attractive fare better in the world, but we have not developed 
lines of inquiry directed at dismantling aesthetic structures of inequality.  This is a project 
about what people look like, but it is not sociological fluff.  It is a first attempt to account 
for how appearance, specifically ugliness, matters in critical ways.    
 
 
Self Reflections 
 
 How I position myself in relation to my research is inspired by feminist and queer 
theory along with disability studies, interdisciplinary fields that emerge from remarkably 
similar epistemological locations. In each field, difference and devaluation relative to 
gender, sexuality, or the body is redefined, reformulated, and recovered.  All are 
politically motivated intellectual projects.  These are critical theories of the world, 
knowledge bases aimed at social practice.  Put more simply, the point is not simply to 
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understand but to transform.  In addition, these areas of inquiry have traditionally 
celebrated self definition and, by extension, theorizing from the female, queer, or 
disabled subject position.  As a consequence, writing what we are not remains a suspect 
practice.   
 And so there is no way around the question of my own face.  I am not disfigured 
in many senses of the word.  My own face is what most would call unremarkable.  It is, 
for the most part, seen and unnoticed by others.  I have been called ugly more than once.  
But this insult has been hurled at me most often in instances in which I refused to 
conform to the expectations of a stranger or a girlfriend or a mother.  It is the word that 
has been used against me when I stopped to help a woman whose boyfriend accosted her 
on her way onto campus, screaming and shaking her.  It is the word used by a drunk lover 
on our way home from nights that started good and ended badly.  It is the word that my 
mother desperately regrets using when as a teenager I would leave the house dressed 
provocatively, unconventionally.  Leaving aside the question of why ugliness works as 
the ultimate insult, I can claim to know and understand what it means to be temporarily 
devastated by another’s insistence that what I look like is not good enough or unattractive 
and even repulsive.  And I can claim to know what it means to hear those words and to 
take them in, to have the experience of seeing one’s self inexorably determined by the 
worst things you have ever heard about yourself.  I think that most of us know the feeling 
of momentarily glancing in the mirror only to be disgusted with our own reflection.  But 
as Margo Jefferson in a New York Times review of Lucy Grealy’s Autobiography of a 
Face writes, “Suffering is exact. Each kind has its own weight and measure.  Fearing you 
are ugly is not the same as knowing you are.” 
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 Despite my own tenuous relationship with ugliness, I cannot and do not make 
claims about “knowing” disfigurement in any profoundly personal way.  And yet, I dare 
to speak of it.  I am a cautious though not timid speaker, and so I make claims on 
knowing disfigurement in some very real ways.  I know disfigurement as a cultural 
specter in the ways that we all do.  Many claim that they have never seen someone who is 
disfigured.  This is doubtful.  But whether or not we encounter disfigurement in the 
mundane acts of everyday life, we certainly encounter disfigurement in popular culture, 
in spaces of religion and spirituality, in literature, in visual art, and in science.  We are, as 
of this writing, at war for the fifth year, with some 27,000 injured veterans.  We 
encounter disfigurement, and I would argue, routinely produce disfigurement as part of 
our war work.   
I know disfigurement as a work object.  In her account of fetal surgery, 
sociologist Monica Casper (1998) describes the work object as “any material entity 
around which people make meaning and organize their work practices” (19). Through 
this project, disfigurement has taken shape for me as a work object of biomedical 
intervention.  When I speak about disfigurement as an object of repair, I speak as some 
kind of authority.  I have empirically investigated the ways in which disfigurement takes 
shape in surgical wards, in philanthropic literature, in bioethics debates, and in popular 
culture, and I claim to know something about the ways disfigurement is imbued with 
significance in sites that aim to fix faces defined as different.   
And yet I know disfigurement also as a politically tricky subject.  How we speak 
of disfigurement is constitutive of the ways we think about, respond to, manage, and 
represent disfigurement, and so I am cautious about how I speak of disfigurement in this 
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work.  Disability studies has done much to demonstrate how tropes about disability infuse 
discursive formations and social practices (Longmore 1997).  One common response 
when speaking of bodily difference has been to resist the trope of tragedy that so often 
surrounds disability.  This has been a critical move towards recovering the lives of people 
with disability from a monolithic story of suffering and the imperative to overcome.  But 
then what of suffering?  Though politically problematic to acknowledge, can we not agree 
that there is real suffering that is experienced and attributable to our bodies? 
I do not mean to suggest that disfigurement and suffering are the same thing.  
Essentializing narratives of disability imagine that there is nothing to disability outside of 
suffering, and this is certainly an inadequate account.  But there is also a 
phenomenological account of disability that acknowledges that suffering is experienced 
by all of us as a condition of embodiment, and yet that this suffering is not wholly 
constitutive of our human experience.  There is then the possibility of speaking of the 
suffering that comes with disfigurement without producing a totalizing narrative of 
disfigurement.  If we are to acknowledge suffering, which we must do if we seek to 
capture and represent a broad range of human experience, we must deploy narratives of 
suffering in the service of political and social change rather than cultural stagnation.  
Stories of suffering must be told, but they must not be told in order to confirm that what 
we are already doing and how we are already thinking is all that can be done and thought.  
If we speak of suffering, let us come to know how suffering itself and stories of suffering 
activate particular patterns of response, relationships, and thought, and let us ask if these 
patterns alleviate or reify suffering.  Talk about suffering that is couched in terms of pity 
is never in the service of those suffering but rather in the service of voicing the feeling, be 
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it guilt or pleasure, in the experience of pitying another. Let us speak of suffering in the 
service of alleviating suffering.  There is no pity here.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
FACE WORK: NORMALIZING HUMAN FACES  
 
 “Face, of course, is a metaphor.  But it is a very powerful metaphor.”   
Thomas Holtgraves (1992: 156) 
 
Representations of Disfigurement/Images of Face Work 
1. Beside an MSNBC news feature entitled “Face Transplant Woman 
Battled Tissue Rejection” announcing the “success” of the world’s 
first face transplant, a single photograph was featured:  
 
Figure 1. Surgeons at Work on Face Transplant 
The photograph of surgeons at work, as opposed to a “face 
transplant woman” as the title suggests, was accompanied by the 
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following caption: “French surgeons performed a partial face 
transplant operation on a 38-year old woman at Amiens hospital, 
northern France on Dec. 2.”6   
2. From a story entitled “Jessica Simpson in Kenya” featured on 
the Operation Smile website: 
“Operation Smile has been honored to have Jessica Simpson serve 
as its International Youth Ambassador since 2003 when her good 
friend and hairstylist, Ken Pavés introduced her to the 
organization. Helping to spread awareness for the organization, 
Ms. Simpson has performed at Operation Smile's Los Angeles Gala 
in 2003 and gave a benefit concert as part of NBC's reality hit, 
"The Apprentice," in front of a packed house at the Trump Taj 
Mahal in Atlantic City… During the Kenya medical mission, Ms. 
Simpson witnessed the medical volunteers' skills first-hand by 
donning scrubs and joining Operation Smile co-founder, Dr. Bill 
Magee and the surgical team in the operating room. Simpson also 
formed a special bond with one child, 1-1/2-year-old Boke whose 
father had sold one of his six cows, his only source of income, 
for money to travel 12 hours in the hopes of receiving surgery 
for his little girl. Simpson saw Boke through her evaluation and 
surgery - she comforted Boke as she was put under anesthesia, and 
then delivered her back to her father after her recovery.”7 
3. From Vanilla Sky  
                                                 
6 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10906232/> 
7 <http://www.operationsmile.org/aboutus/spokespeople/jessica_simpson/> 
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David (Tom Cruise) meets with a team of doctors to discuss 
options for coping with his facial scarring following a car 
accident.)  
Dr. Pomeranz: We're not cowboys. We can't just wing it…And there 
are things that we'll continue to investigate. However, there are 
so many others who've not had the aesthetic benefit of plastic 
surgery as you have. 
David: This isn't about vanity, Dr. Pomeranz. This isn't about 
vanity. This is about functioning in the world. It's my job to be 
out there functioning. I've got the money. I'll pay any amount. 
Just invent something. Just play jazz. You say you're the best 
face man in New York. Fucking prove it… 
Dr. Pomeranz: Nobody here takes your feelings for granted. We did 
prepare something for you based on the preliminary examination. 
David: Tell me. Bring it on. 
Dr. Pomeranz: It's sometimes useful in the early stages of 
rejection. It's a facial prosthetic. It was two weeks in the 
making… 
David: A facial prosthetic. 
Dr. Pomeranz: The aesthetic replacement does work—emotionally and 
actually…It's a helpful unit. 
David: Good. Because for a minute there, I thought we were 
talking about a fucking mask! 
Other Doctor: It's only a mask if you treat it that way. 
 
 
The preceding are stories about facial disfigurement.  
Simultaneously, these are stories about surgeons and celebrities, 
each working, in their own way, in the service of repairing the 
human face. The resolution in stories about the “tragedy” of 
facial difference is almost always facilitated by a cadre of 
devoted face workers.  In this historical socio-technical moment, 
in the early years of the twenty-first century, can we tell a 
story of disfigurement without [a story] privileging repair?   
 
Recovering Face Work 
One of the few places in sociology where the face has been explored theoretically 
is the work of symbolic interactionist Erving Goffman.  My project is, in part, a 
contemporary reexamination and rearticulation of Goffman’s theoretical work.  I consider 
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the relationship between bodily stigma and repair by taking up Goffman’s concept of 
face-work and his astute analysis of stigma as a social project.   Goffman approaches 
face-work as a technique of interaction focused on saving metaphorical face, specifically 
the version of self projected in social encounters.  I expand the notion of face work to 
consider the social, cultural, and technical interventions aimed at saving material, that is, 
corporeal, faces.8  While Goffman elaborates the significance of stigma in the context of 
social interaction and the interpersonal strategies employed to restore one’s social self, I 
examine technological, surgical, and cultural responses to bodily stigma, specifically 
disfigurement, in a range of contexts to understand how the imperative to repair relies 
upon the ongoing construction of stigma.  In this way, I complicate notions of repair as 
simply the recovery from a stigma, and instead, I examine and reveal the contradictory 
social processes implicit in technical projects of recovery.   
Symbolic interactionism understands social interaction as processes of meaning 
making and negotiation in which our sociality, in essence our very humanity, is 
constituted (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969).  Goffman’s “On Face-Work: An Analysis of 
Ritual Elements in Social Interaction” first appeared in 1955 in Psychiatry: Journal for 
the Study of Interpersonal Processes, and the piece marked Goffman’s initial foray into 
mundane facets of social interaction.  Its reprint in Goffman’s Interaction Ritual (1967) 
introduced to sociology the study of face-to-face interaction.  In Goffman’s social theory, 
                                                 
8 Goffman uses a hyphen when discussing face-work.  In innovating the concept, I omit 
the hyphen.  When the term appears hyphenated, I am making reference to Goffman’s 
ideas.  When the word appears unhyphenated, I am extending the concept towards my 
own theoretical ends.   
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the face circulates as a metaphor for self-image, as a possible marker of stigma, and as a 
central component of human interaction.  Goffman’s concepts of face and face-work are 
analytical devices that capture how practices of everyday social life are constitutive of 
lived realities. 
Goffman’s notion of face follows a theoretical lineage well established in 
symbolic interactionism wherein sociality is conceptualized through metaphors of the 
body generally and reflection more specifically.  Most importantly, Charles Cooley’s 
(1902) theory of the “looking glass self” established a framework for thinking about the 
relationship between the self, and by implication the body, and others.  For Cooley, the 
looking glass self describes a process wherein individuals constitute a sense of self 
through other’s responses, opinions, and feedback.  It is a process that relies on reflection, 
through which a sense of self emerges in relation to community.  In this way, individuals 
incorporate a sense of self thoroughly determined through others via social interaction.  
Goffman’s theory of face-work is an extension of this very premise, and provides a more 
elaborated way of thinking about how self and society are formed in concert.   
Face is understood as “an image of self delineated in terms of approved social 
attributes” (1967: 5).  In other words, symbolic face is the projection of the self as it is 
deployed in social interaction. For Goffman, face is not inherent to an individual.  It 
emerges through collaboration in the sense that others respond to and, in the process, 
affirm the face of others. Face is “on loan to him [sic] from society” (10).  The threat of 
“losing face” demands ongoing attempts to “save face.”  Face-work describes “the 
actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face” (12).  It is 
the social action aimed towards maintaining face.  For Goffman, social actors engage in 
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reciprocal face-work to affirm both one’s own face and others’ faces.  In this way, the 
maintenance of a social situation relies on “tacit cooperation” aimed at preserving the 
self-image and the face of others in a social interaction.   
 Through face-work, humans continually constitute self-image and social 
identities.  In this way, “maintenance of face is a condition of interaction, not its 
objective” (my emphasis, 12).    Face-work is strategic.  Maintaining face relies on 
processes of avoidance, defensive measures (avoiding topics and activities) and 
protective maneuvers (employing discretion and deception), along with corrective 
processes (fixing threats to face).  Face-work involves calculation and social cunning, but 
it is not (necessarily) manipulative work (Manning 1992).  For Goffman, mundane social 
interaction is a deliberative ritual and practice not in the service of personal gain, but 
rather in the service of the interaction itself.  Without face-work, social interaction falls 
apart.   
While Goffman’s work on stigma and dramaturgy retains sociological currency, 
Goffman’s concepts of face and face-work are all but forgotten in sociology.  In several 
sociological surveys of Goffman’s theoretical contributions, face and face-work are 
surprisingly absent (Burns 1991, Smith 1999, West 1996).  Contemporarily, Goffman’s 
concepts of face and face-work are taken up in linguistics, specifically in politeness 
theory.  Brown and Levinson’s classic work on politeness (1987) relies on both Goffman 
and Durkheim, but specifically on Goffman’s concepts of face and face-work. While 
Goffman’s notion of face is a distinctly social concept, Brown and Levinson’s focus on 
Face Threatening Acts (FTAs) puts a distinctly individualistic twist on the concept.  
Rather than emphasizing face-work as an ongoing practice central to the creation of 
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social reality, they understand face-work as a strategy deployed by individuals in the 
service of politeness.   
In a recent re-examination of Goffman’s contribution to linguistics, Francesca 
Bargiela-Chiappini (2003) argues that Brown and Levinson dilute Goffman’s concepts.  
Rather than dispensing with face and face-work, Bargiela-Chiappini offers a sustained 
discussion of face and face-work and argues that the concepts demonstrate the 
“fundamental role” of politeness in creating social order (1453).  In the spirit of Bargiela-
Chiappini’s recovery of Goffman, other linguists and communication researchers 
continue to engage Goffman’s work (Heisler et al. 2003, Merkin 2006a, 2006b).  
Scholars have also employed face and face-work to examine such varied phenomena as 
divination (Wyllie 1970), pornography (MacCannell 1989), presidential billboards (Kusa 
2005), and health care professionals’ management of risk (Myers 2003). These 
extensions of Goffman’s analysis of face and face-work tend to frame face-work as 
simply a communicative process rather than a fundamental reality-generating practice.  
For example, Holtgraves (1992) elaborates a “face management theory of language” to 
account for how linguistic communication facilitates the projection of identity and 
impression management, and cross-cultural (mis)communication.  
Most contemporary examinations of face-work approach communication as a 
disembodied practice.  While Goffman relies on the “face” as a metaphorical concept and 
a symbol, I argue that face-work is also a deeply embodied process enacted through 
expression and articulation.  Not coincidentally, Goffman uses the word face, as opposed 
to any other part of the human body, to connote the public self.  Social interaction relies 
on the human face.  The face functions as a mechanism of communication.  Articulation 
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of language is made possible by facial structures, most obviously the mouth, and eyes, 
brows, and cheeks to facilitate non-verbal communication.  In addition, faces distinguish 
one person from another.  Recognition is made possible largely by the human face which 
we think of like a fingerprint—each might resemble another, but no two are exactly the 
same. It is the face, thus, that acts as a referent in symbolic interactionism for the display 
and conveyance of public self-image.   
My work moves beyond Goffman’s analysis by challenging the idea that “the 
person’s face clearly is something that is not lodged in or on his body, but rather 
something that is diffusely located in the flow of events in the encounter,” in other words 
in the interaction order (Goffman 1967: 7).  While Goffman’s work does not explicitly 
engage face-work as an embodied process, face-work is made possible by a human body 
in a social encounter.9  The face is not merely a rhetorical device; rather, the material 
face plays a central role in interaction rituals.  Even Goffman makes passing reference to
the role of the body: “One objective in dealing with these data is to describe the natural 
units of interaction built up from them, beginning with the littlest—for example, the 
fleeting facial move an individual can make in the game of expressing his alignment to 
what is happening” (1).  My work frames the symbolic processes elaborated in 
Goffman’s interactionism as simultaneously a material social process forged through the 
negotiation of a human body and 
 
language.   
                                                
 The face work identified, described, and analyzed in this account of facial surgery 
is a variation on the face-work that operates in Goffman’s theory of interaction ritual.  At 
 
9 Others have explored the sociology of the body implicit in Goffman’s work (Gardner 
and Gronfein 2006, Waskul and Vannini 2006). 
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their core, both “face-work” and face work are attempts to explain processes through 
which public selves are constructed.  Goffman is interested in the creation and 
maintenance of “face,” a metaphorical representation of identity, whereas I am interested 
in technical interventions aimed at deciphering, diagnosing, transforming, and creating 
human faces.  In both cases, what is at stake is the social self or, in other words, one’s 
status as a human being, a legitimate member of the collective.  In this way, the objective 
of face work is always the construction of a self and the subsequent reality afforded to 
those designated appropriate social beings, human beings.  My articulation of face work 
directly follows Goffman’s examination of face-work in multiple other ways.  Both 
accounts understand the process as a collaborative venture, as a ritual, as a process of 
generation and recovery.   
First, face-work is a collaborative process that involves multiple social actors 
who together are invested in the maintenance of face.  In the social interactions Goffman 
describes, social actors engage in face-work to create and maintain their respective faces.  
This is ongoing work in social interaction, but face work is also an implicit process in 
social interaction without which a shared reality breaks down.  Goffman argues that face 
is a condition for interaction; thus, everyone embedded in an interaction is invested in 
each other’s face.  Social interaction is a collective undertaking, but the face work that 
operates in my account, specifically the repair of the human face, is a cooperative 
endeavor, as well.   Multiple social actors (human and non-human) including surgeons, 
patients, popular culture, technologically generated images, bioethicists, plastic polymers, 
news media, anti-rejection medication, and cultural narratives about the face come 
together to infuse face work with meaning, in short making repair of the face carry 
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symbolically the particular significance that it does.  Thus, the project of face work is 
accomplished literally and symbolically in collaboration.  Neither the surgeon with her 
technical skill nor the patient with his desire for a different appearance accomplishes face 
work in isolation.   Face work only becomes what it is in the give and take among social 
actors. 
 Second, Goffman, drawing on Durkheim, understands face-work as an interaction 
ritual.10  Goffman understands the self as a sacred entity forged through social 
interaction.  Given what is at stake in interaction, ritualistic respect is required in order to 
maintain social order and to forge a collective consciousness (Trevino 2003).  Face work 
aimed towards repairing the human face is imbued with the sacred.  Because the face is 
imagined as so essential to making us who we are and to facilitating everyday life, the 
repair of the human face is approached as sacred work.  In several sites, the work is 
described as a “mission,” a designation that relies on religious overtones.  But it is not 
simply that the language used to characterize face work relies on invocations of revered 
imagery.  Ritual is ultimately oriented towards solidification of the social order.  Face 
work aimed at repairing the face is ultimately aimed towards restoring humans to “basic 
working order” (Spelman 2002).  This process of repair is not simply about giving those 
with facial variance a new face and a new life, but rather about facilitating social 
solidarity.  Because facial difference animates social anxiety about the body, repairing 
facial difference is a project accomplished on behalf of all of society towards the goal of 
solidifying social order.   
                                                 
10 For Durkheim (1965), ritual refers to the sets of practices imbued with sacred meaning 
that societies engage in towards the creation of solidarity.   
 48
Third, Goffman’s discussion of face-work describes the strategies through which 
one maintains social interaction.   Avoidance practices aimed at stabilizing social 
interaction are productive processes that generate social order.  Corrective processes or 
attempts to “save face” in response to what threatens to destroy the face are practices of 
repair wherein the social interaction is recovered.  In large part, face-work accomplishes 
the work of generating a shared reality for interaction participants and repairing the 
interaction order in response to potential threats.  Similarly, the material face work I 
describe is aimed towards generating a certain reality.  In particular, face work produces 
human bodies that correspond to shared notions about what faces should look like and 
how they should act.  In this normalizing process, face work affirms what constitutes a 
“real” (i.e., normal) human face and what visages are not acceptable faces.  The material 
face work practiced in the spaces within which this project unfolds is deployed, then, as a 
technique of recovery and repair.  Face work aims to transform a “disfigured” face into 
an unremarkable—read: acceptable—appearance.  In this way, face work is accomplished 
in the service of normalization.   
Goffman’s face-work is obviously an intrinsically social process, one that all 
human interaction relies upon.  It is a communicative practice in which face (the 
positively valued facets of the social self) is negotiated and maintained.  By contrast, the 
face work that circulates in this account is a material and symbolic practice in which the 
human face is negotiated through diagnosis, intervention, and representation.  What is at 
stake in both Goffman’s face-work and my own articulation of face work is the social 
self.  In short, both are processes through which human beings come into (re)formation.  I 
use the term “face work” not simply to describe the technical intervention accomplished 
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in each of the four sites I analyze, but rather to capture the larger project of human face 
repair.  I interrogate face work as technical work, cultural work, and social work that 
crafts a new visage, infuses this work with meaning, and, in the process, constructs a 
notion of what it means to be human.  
 
Retrieving Stigma 
Whereas Goffman’s discussion of face-work is relatively neglected in sociology, 
stigma, another Goffmanian invention, is continually taken up, most often in the 
sociology of deviance. In a 2001 Annual Review of Sociology essay “Conceptualizing 
Stigma,” Bruce G. Link and Jo C. Phelan write,  
The stigma concept is applied to literally scores of circumstances ranging 
from urinary incontinence (Sheldon & Caldwell 1994) to exotic dancing 
(Lewis 1998) to leprosy (Opala & Boillot 1996), cancer (Fife & Wright 
2000), and mental illness (Angermeyer & Matschinger 1994, Corrigan & 
Penn 1999, Phelan et a1 2000). It is used to explain some of the social 
vagaries of being unemployed (Walsgrove 1987), to show how welfare 
stigma can lead to the perpetuation of welfare use (Page 1984), and to 
provide an understanding of situations faced by wheelchair users (Cahill & 
Eggleston 1995), stepparents (Coleman et a1 1996), debtors (Davis 1998), 
and mothers who are lesbian (Causey & Duran-Aydintug 1997). 
 
Stigma retains theoretical utility even outside sociology, most notably in disability 
studies, an emerging interdisciplinary field that interrogates how social contexts 
determine what disability means and how these meanings determine the shapes human 
lives take.  Through cultural analysis and social critique, disability studies interrogates 
how stigma translates into discreditation, devaluation, and marginalization, in short, 
dehumanization.    
In Goffman’s approximation (1963), a stigma is “an attribute that is deeply 
discrediting within a particular social interaction.”  Stigmas may take one of three forms.  
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“Blemishes of individual character” are those attributes like personality characteristics 
and personal faults that result in stigmatization.  “Tribal stigma” describes those stigmas 
related to group membership including race, nationality, and religion.  “Abominations of 
the body” are those stigmas related to the physical body.   A stigma is not simply an 
undesirable attribute, but one with significant consequences in everyday life.  Goffman 
writes, “By definition, of course, we believe the person with a stigma is not quite human.  
On this assumption we exercise varieties of discrimination, through which we effectively, 
if often unthinkingly, reduce his life chances…” (my emphasis, 5). Through social 
interaction, stigma is negotiated and made real, in some cases resulting in the discrediting 
of one’s very humanity and thus membership in the collective.   
Goffman dissects social interaction to understand how the stigmatized person 
manages social situations and how others, who Goffman terms “normals,” respond to 
stigma.  According to Goffman, the stigmatized constantly anticipate and react to what 
normals think about and how normals respond to stigma, employing self-isolation, 
avoidance, depression, hostility, and defensiveness to navigate social interaction.   While 
Goffman describes normals’ awkwardness in the face of stigma, the theoretical emphasis 
is on how the stigmatized manage social interactions.  What remains less clear is how 
“normals” respond to ever-present stigma.  Specifically, how do so-called normals cope 
with “abominations of the body,” visible markers of difference that abound in everyday 
life?  If social reality is the result of collaborative interaction, what realities do normals 
make possible for those with facial difference?  And most importantly for this project, 
how is face work deployed in the service of managing stigma?   
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Within Goffman’s theoretical project, while face-work is a concept used to 
describe the workings of the interaction order, stigma is a concept that captures the 
relative value of human characteristics and behaviors.  These concepts remain distinct in 
Goffman’s own work, but they are interrelated concepts.  For Goffman, face-work is 
often aimed towards recovering a potential threat to face.  Stigma is one potential source 
of threat.  Thus, one way of approaching face work is to consider it as a technique of 
social interaction, a material practice that serves as a mechanism for coping with bodily 
stigma.  As a practice, face work relies on processes of transformation.  The threat to face 
is neutralized; the contentious social interaction is reordered.  Appearance is transformed; 
facial difference is made unremarkable. But what is threat to face or stigma transformed 
to?  The face work in my account is a not simply a mechanism of transformation, but 
rather principally a technique of normalization.   
 
Face Work as Normalization 
  With modernity, abnormality emerges.  Lennard Davis (1995) situates the 
emergence of the word “normal” around 1840 and its modern usage in 1855. New modes 
of production and governance demanded a new way of classifying, managing, and 
controlling modern citizens.  Thus, a new point of reference emerged in addition to the 
“ideal.”  Aided by modern statistics, specifically Adolphe Quetelet’s normal curve, 
human characteristics were measured and plotted as never before, and in turn, the 
“average man” [sic] is born.  In effect, the mean becomes the point of reference by which 
human variation is judged (Ravard and Stiker 2001). Modernity bears witness to new 
ways for relating to the human body such that the body, as opposed to the mind or the 
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spirit, comes to differentiate human beings from one another.  The normal body, a fictive 
collection of averages, becomes the reference point for constructing subjectivity and 
national identities.  The aggregate is born.   
But normalcy itself is shifting category, historically constituted and determined 
largely through ideological investments.  In his first volume of The History of Sexuality, 
Michel Foucault (1990) argues that modern nation states survey, regulate, and control 
entire populations through the production and disciplining of human bodies.  Central to 
Foucault’s understanding of the operations of the state is biopower.  Via biopower, “an 
explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies 
and the control of populations,” regulation emerges (140).  Biopower is a disciplinary 
power deployed by experts, often medical professionals, in an institutional, often clinical, 
encounter.  As a technology of power, biopower relies on systems of categorization 
organized around the distinction between the normal and the abnormal.  As Deborah 
Lupton writes,  
The central strategies of disciplinary power are observation, examination, 
measurement and the comparison of individuals against an established 
norm, bringing them into a field of visibility.  It is exercised not primarily 
through direct coercion or violence (although it must be emphasizes that 
these strategies are still used from time to time), but rather through 
persuading its subjects that certain ways of behaving and thinking are 
appropriate for them (my emphasis, Lupton 1997: 99).   
 
In short, the “average” works as the point of reference for intervention and the 
subsequent control of human bodies.  In this way, techniques of biopower incite 
normalization.  The process becomes one of intervening for the sake of making modern 
persons as much like the mythic norm, and in the process as much like one another, as is 
possible.   
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 Foucault’s fascination with the regulation of human bodies through notions of 
normalcy was largely shaped by the work of Georges Canguilhem (1991).  In The 
Normal and the Pathological, Canguilhem queries what constitutes normalcy and how 
the normal and the pathological operate through medicine and science.  For Canguilhem, 
the pathological is given meaning through some notion of normalcy.  Put another way, 
the normal has no intrinsic meaning separate and apart from the context in which it 
emerges.  In other words, normalcy does not correspond to any static or predetermined 
way of being.  Although normalcy may have a sort of taken for grantedness, it is 
constructed, negotiated, and manufactured through social practice, specifically operations 
of science and medicine.  At the same time normalcy is deployed in taken for granted 
albeit coercive ways.   
Through “micro-systems of social regulation” facilitated by the medical gaze, the 
body is socially constructed and discursively produced within the bounds of normalcy. 
Pathology is regulated.  For example, medicine becomes not simply the work of saving 
and prolonging life but also intervention accomplished in the service of normalization 
(Foucault 1999). As Deborah Lupton drawing on Nicholas Rose writes,  
Medicine and health have become central to the notion of the ‘normal’ 
person because, in part, medicine: ‘has come to link the ethical question of 
how we should behave to the scientific question of who we truly are and 
what our nature is as human beings, as life forms in a living system, as 
simultaneously unique individuals and constituents of a population’ (Rose 
1994: 67-8) (1997: 100).   
 
Normalization facilitated through medical intervention depends upon notions about what 
constitutes an acceptable and recognizable human being.  Face work, I argue, is the work 
of inscribing or cultivating these bodily norms.     
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The narrative surrounding face work is about making the grotesque unremarkable, 
the abject less abhorrent, and the pathological more normal.  Unlike cosmetic surgery that 
aims (often unsuccessfully) to make the average body extraordinary and beautiful, face 
work is a technique of normalization aimed to transform aberration into something 
ordinary.  In this way, face work is centrally about minimizing human aesthetic variation, 
and it is also about making that which borders on the non-human, human.  But what 
distinguishes a human body from a non-human body (Haraway 1990)?  Particular bodily 
norms become reified as facts about what constitutes a human body.  To carry the 
distinction of human, a body must be sexed and raced (though how sex and race might be 
identified or understood varies according to context).  Embodiment also depends on face.  
In ways akin to, or perhaps even more central than sex, the face is “a principle of 
intelligibility for human beings, which is to say that no human being can be taken to be 
human, can be recognized as human unless that human being is fully and coherently” 
faced (Butler 1992: 352).11  Without a face (or with a face unlike what we imagine a 
normal face to be), the body is ambiguously human.   
 Just as the experience of encountering a dead body devastates our notion that 
bodies are alive, disfigurement calls into question what human embodiment entails.   In 
the case of disfigurement, an embodied state incontrovertibly outside of the “symbolic 
order” (Kristeva 1982), something is needed to cope with the trauma of encountering or 
experiencing it (or the possibility of it).  As I show in this project, abjection in the form of 
facial disfigurement is recovered through various techniques of face work.  In this way, 
                                                 
11 Here I use a quotation from Butler.  While she is speaking of sex in the original, I 
excerpt the quotation and extend her original meaning to speak about the human face.   
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face work is the material process of making a face more visually approximate a “normal” 
face. It is accomplished in the service of restoring humanity to those designated facially 
abnormal.  As a material practice, face work repairs the human face, but as a meaningful 
practice, face work—as a technique of normalization—restores the symbolic order.       
Face work accomplished in the service of normalization is not simply about 
making the subject intelligible. Normalization of the face is intrinsically a social project.  
Disability, in this case facial variance, takes shape as a departure from the bodily norm. 
These differences threaten national identity, specifically our cultural assumption about 
what bodies should populate our imagined community and American ideologies 
surrounding neo-liberal economic production.  As Rosemarie Garland Thomson (1997) 
has written, “The disabled figure calls into question such concepts as will, ability, 
progress, responsibility, and free agency, notions around which people in a liberal society 
organize their identities” (47).  In the American mode of life, disability is something to be 
compensated for because it connotes a loss of productivity, and thus of value and worth.  
Thus, face work in the service of normalization is a project invested in manufacturing and 
enabling productive American citizens.     
Characterizing interventions on the face as normalizing practices emphasizes the 
social investment in the intervention.  By claiming that face work is accomplished in the 
service of normalization, I focus on the biopolitical dimensions of face work in order to 
highlight its coercive operations.  Patients understand their bodies and employ 
interventions in the context of the clinic, but not simply in response to the dictates of 
medical expertise.  Biopower is enacted through social interaction, not forced on a 
relatively less powerful, unknowledgeable public.  For Foucault, power is relational, and 
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often the body is produced and regulated by the self.  Together, expert power and 
subjective experience identify and employ interventions that determine the directions 
embodied life will take.   While face work might be deployed in response to an 
individual’s professed desire for transformation, the intervention is always in the service 
of social norms, and in a broader sense, social and even national and global interests.  In 
this way, there is a coercive dimension to face work.   
As Foucault surmised, normalization is deployed in the production of docile 
bodies receptive to state interests and cultural hegemonies.  Face work may 
simultaneously fulfill individual desires for a more unremarkable face, but because face 
work is premised on normalization, it is typically oriented towards disciplining bodies.   
In most cases, intervention aimed at faces defined as disfigured can only effect a rough 
approximation of an unremarkable face.  Often, disfigurement remains perceptible, but 
because the human face is a normative facet of human experience, bodies are compelled 
to intervene, to attempt normalcy (Clark and Myser 1996).  There is, in short, an 
imperative to “fix” abnormal bodies in accordance with notions of normalcy. 
Technological possibility mixed with cultural norms about what constitutes a 
normal human being make a “fix it” reaction almost unavoidable.  According to 
bioethicist Arthur Frank (2004), the imperative to normalize is facilitated by new 
technologies such that “The possibility of fixing renders inescapable the question of 
whether or not to fix” (18).  Body projects are often facilitated by individual choice 
through capitalist modes of consumption, but normalizing interventions partially stand 
outside of this logic.  Techniques of normalization, from surgery deployed on infant’s 
anomalous genitals to cranio-facial surgery aimed at mending a cleft palate, are deployed 
 57
towards making patients (more) human.  In this way, techniques of normalization like 
face work are not simply biomedical products consumers can purchase but interventions 
aimed at making patients human and subsequently obligatory.  As Frank notes in 
reference to surgery on intersex infants, people are “acceptable only if their anomaly is 
fixed” (24).  The choice to intervene is not made outside of social constraints.  The 
difference between elective body projects and techniques of normalization is that life is 
not made better, but rather in the logic of normalization, life is made possible.  
Even in critiques of the tendency towards normalization in the context of 
biomedicalization (Clarke et al. 2003), normalization techniques aimed at the face are 
taken for granted value whereas techniques like limb lengthening and intersex surgery are 
interrogated more critically.  Frank writes of the Hastings Center project “Surgically 
Shaping Children,” which examined the ethics of interventions aimed at anomalously 
sexed, facially variant, and short stature children:  
[T]his critique of surgical normalization is difficult to apply to the 
craniofacial surgeries that our project group saw.  Our seeing again took 
place through the conventional medical rhetoric of before-and-after slides, 
and these slides like the word deformity, depend on normative visual 
convention, and those conventions need to be contested.  Yet it would 
challenge most observers to see these pictures and not feel the 
appropriateness of this language of deformity. Faced with such faces, it is 
difficult not to affirm the value of surgery as at least an improvement in 
what are readily (perhaps too readily) perceived as life impairing 
conditions…The public visibility of the face and the symbolic importance 
that links faces to character—exemplified by the aphorism attributed to 
Lincoln that after a certain age a person is responsible for his or her own 
face—make facial deformity a problem of a different magnitude, and that 
difference commands our respect (my emphasis, 25).   
 
Frank contests the term “deformity” as a self-evident category and suggests that ways of 
looking and diagnosing, and corresponding ways of intervening, must be critically 
assessed.  At the same time, Frank suggests that, even in the context of a Hastings Center 
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bioethics working group interrogating the ethics of intervention, intervention to affect 
facial difference is essentialized.  Rather than critically examining the complex project of 
intervention, face work is reduced to “fixing” a face in need of repair.  In other words, the 
imperative to fix the face is made self-evident and thereby intervention on the face is 
imagined as outside of critical, ethical analysis.   
 The normalization of facial variance is almost always understood as a form of 
necessary repair, a sort of work that relies on the assumption that things defined as 
broken invariably need fixing.  There is something about facial “disfigurement” that 
makes normalization so taken for granted.  Rosemarie Garland Thomson (2005) writes,  
[A]ppearance tends to be the most socially excluding aspect of disability.  
Bodies whose looks or comportment depart from social expectation—ones 
categorized as visually abnormal—are targets for profound discrimination.  
Bodily forms deemed to be ugly, deformed, fat, grotesque, ambiguous, 
disproportionate, or marked by scarring or so-called birthmarks constitute 
what can be called appearance impairments that qualify as severe social 
disabilities.  Perhaps the most virulent form of body disciplining in the 
modern world is the surgical normalization of bodies that deviate from 
configurations dictated by the dominant order (my emphasis, 1579). 
 
The “fact” that the face is deformed leads to the fact that the face needs repair.   Face 
work conflates a technique of normalization with a technology of repair.  Because face 
work is a form of repair, the face is treated as intrinsically flawed and in need of 
intervention.  In effect, repair obscures the coercive dimensions of bodily intervention in 
favor of a narrative that frames face work as a necessary and unavoidable mode of bodily 
intervention.  It is precisely this narrative that my project seeks to disrupt. 
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Face Work as Repair 
Humans are a kind of “repairing animal.”  Not only do we invest resources in 
repairing our material possessions like cars and houses, we repair ourselves through 
doctors, therapists, and priests.  According to Elizabeth V. Spelman (2002), “Repair is the 
creative destruction of brokenness” (134).  The work of repair is simultaneously the work 
of rehabilitation, restoration, and redemption.  But what and how we repair, along with 
the urgency that infuses the work of repair, reveals something about our cultural values.  
What do we believe needs to be repaired, as opposed to disregarded, and what are our 
reasons for fixing?  What values are implicit in arguments about why we need to repair 
the face?  What lessons about economics, citizenship, family, love, sex, community, and 
humanity are embedded in arguments to repair the face? Identifying what logics inform 
face work—the repair of the human face—reveals what the face, and by implication 
disfigurement, means.    
Spelman distinguishes between two forms of repair work.  Bricolage innovatively 
pieces together both material and non-material remnants to repair an object.  The car is 
rebuilt with salvaged parts and mechanical know-how.  Junkyard finds and the work of 
multiple mechanics restore it to working order.  It does not matter how it got fixed as 
much as that it got fixed.  In contrast, invisible mending aims to fix an object so that it 
appears to never have been repaired.  For example, art restoration and tailoring attempt to 
mend art works or garments in such a way as to conceal decay and damage.  Face work, I 
will show, involves both bricolage and invisible mending.  Face work aims to erase 
disfigurement and in the process make a “grotesque” face unremarkable, but the 
technological limits of surgery along with the complexity of the facial structure mean that 
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face work more often resembles a kind of bricolage in which techniques are cobbled 
together to make for the best possible outcome.  In most cases, people defined as 
disfigured undergo numerous surgeries.  The hope is that a more desirable visage will 
emerge.  In this way, the realties of erasing facial difference fall short of the fantasy of 
face work, as shown in Chapter 1 through the story of Lucy Grealy.     
Repairing humans is often accomplished under the guise of returning people to 
“basic working order” (Spelman 2002).  In this way, repair work is presented as 
necessary and unavoidable.  It is needed not simply desired.  Bodily interventions 
couched in terms of repair are distinct from body projects framed as self-improvement.  
In the latter case, intervention is accomplished in the service of enhancement.  Botox 
injections diminish the appearance of fine lines and, according to some, consequently 
improve one’s appearance.  Few would argue that this is a vital intervention.  In contrast, 
repair work is understood as indispensable.  Surgery aimed at a cleft palate is understood 
as obligatory, an intervention needed to assure basic bodily functions like eating.  As 
Spelman writes,  
Repair is not about the new.  It is by definition about the survival of the 
old.  Repair appears to be not about making progress but about halting 
decay, about sustaining something after it has degenerated from its ideal 
state.  Inventive as repair can be, it is not about creating original objects or 
even about keeping existing objects from breaking (that is maintenance), 
but about responding to the damage they have endured and finding a way 
to continue their existence in the aftermath of such damage (137).   
 
In the context of face work, images of disrepair abound, most often represented 
through the “before” image.   “Before” images almost always appear in conjunction with 
“after” images, displaying the transformation possible through face work.  But “before” 
pictures display the face in its original “disfigured” state, and these images exist in a state 
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of suspended ruin as referential images.  These faces are displayed to mobilize support 
and investment in face work in particular ways.  They are objects that incite fascination 
and horror, and therein support for work aimed at resolving what is displayed as being in 
ruins.  By featuring before pictures of disrepair, sites of face work position intervention 
as vital work, work that facilitates humanization and in the process restores the symbolic 
order.  Spelman writes,  
 To repair is to acknowledge and respond to the fracturability of the world 
in which we live in a very particular way—not by simply throwing our 
hands up in despair at the damage, or otherwise accepting without 
question that there is no possibility of or point in trying to put the pieces 
back together, but by employing skills of mind, hand, and heart to 
recapture an earlier moment in the history of an object or a relationship in 
order to allow it to keep existing (6).   
 
Face work becomes both necessary and critically important as the work of restoring 
human status.   
  Modernist tendencies towards progress (both social betterment and individual 
self-improvement) coupled with an ethic of neoliberal medicine that makes consumption 
of medical intervention possible, result in a social context in which repair is the most 
accessible mode of relating to bodily difference.  Repair circulates throughout this 
analysis of face work. The work accomplished in each of the four sites I describe is 
discursively constructed as a form of repair.  I investigate how face work is the enactment 
of normalization, and thus is laden with social norms about what constitutes a normal 
human, but is also framed as repair, a mode of work understood as neutral and impartial.  
I embed this project in disability studies, sociology of medicine, health, and illness, and 
sociology of the body, three theoretical locations from which to ask questions about 
appearance, disability, and repair.   
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Disability Studies 
 Disability studies is an emergent, interdisciplinary field of inquiry.  What 
demarcates disability studies from other academic explorations of disability is the ways in 
which the field defines and understands disability.  Specifically, disability studies 
approaches disability as a socially situated, culturally mediated bodily experience (Barnes 
1998; Davis 1997; Shakespeare 1998).  It rejects essentialist, biological understandings of 
disability in favor of definitions that illustrate how the body is disabled via social means 
and understandings.  Disability studies works from the assumptions that bodies carry 
different meanings depending on their social location and that disabled bodies are 
hindered by social environments.  From this perspective, the body is not intrinsically 
disabled, rather social environments and cultural attitudes are disabling.  This approach to 
disability rejects medical and religious models, which are critiqued for narrowly focusing 
on the “problem” of disability by treating the individual.   
 As a field of academic inquiry, disability studies has interrogated disability by 
asking questions about how disability is culturally represented, discursively and 
institutionally constructed, and politically determined.  As a site of political struggle, 
disability studies attempts to articulate a viable and transformative disability politic, and 
as such engages with disability rights activists (Linton 2006).  Disability studies offers a 
theoretically nuanced account of bodily difference and devaluation and a framework for 
thinking about responses to challenge that devaluation.  Like other intellectual projects 
that take shape on the margins of the academy, disability studies requires a critical praxis, 
a thought project aimed towards emancipation (Thomson 1994, 2002).       
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Bodily difference includes a wide range of experiences, and disability studies 
seems appropriately situated to think through multiple kinds of bodily experiences.  And 
yet, disfigurement is conspicuously missing from disability studies.  Disability studies 
often focuses on societal and institutional responses to functional impairment—the 
inability of a body to function in the ways we expect bodies to function.  It is not always 
obvious to many how a disfigured face creates functional impairments.  Particular 
disabilities and images (especially the wheelchair) have worked as heuristic devices in 
disability studies to signal questions of mobility and function (Gerschick 1998).  The 
nature of the images routinely invoked rarely includes references to disfigurement.  So 
while disability studies leaves itself open to analyses of disease, disfigurement, and other 
kinds of bodily difference, it is not always clear where these experiences fit within the 
rubric of disability studies.  Where, for example, in an academic field of inquiry that 
values self determination is space made for the theorizing of cognitive disabilities as they 
are experienced?  It makes political and theoretical sense to create a field of 
interdisciplinary studies around bodily difference and bodily oppression, but given that 
the core concept “disability” fundamentally situates “ability” at the center of discussion, 
bodily differences such as disfigurement get pushed to the margins.   
Disability studies has identified the ways in which disabilities compromise 
citizenship.  In the U.S., what it means to be an American relies on notions of self-
reliance and determination.  Yet disabilities sometimes impact people’s ability to function 
in particular ways—to economically provide for one’s self, to care for one’s own body, to 
reproduce other self-sufficient American citizens.  In this sense, disability does not 
conform to what it means to be American.  Independence is an American value imbued 
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with moral significance.   Independence is bound up with function.  And for disabled 
people whose function seems limited in particular architectural, educational, legal, and 
cultural contexts, stigmatization and devaluation seems an almost taken for granted 
American response.  When we recoil from “disfigurement,” a disability that is primarily 
aesthetically compromising, what is the logic that we use to defend that stigmatization?  
What American value is compromised when someone is perceived to be ugly, unsightly, 
or deformed? 
 One area of disability studies has focused on bodies that are visually different.  
Rather than employing the language of disability, this work on “extraordinary bodies” 
explores our cultural fascination and stigmatization of “freaks” and “monsters” 
(Braidiotti 1996; Thomson 1996).  As Rosemarie Garland Thomson has argued, 
extraordinary bodies help us to define what it means to have a “normal” body and how 
significant bodily difference is.  Academic analyses of “freak shows” have highlighted 
how public display of non-normative bodies defines relationships between freaks and 
norms as simultaneously characterized by fear and fascination (Hawkins 1996; Miles 
2004).  While freak shows are rather “politically incorrect,” bodily difference remains a 
subject of intense scrutiny via talk shows, exposés of surgical procedures, and tabloid 
photojournalism.  And congenital conditions, diseases, and “accidents” (especially in an 
age of militarization and technologization) mean that disfigurement will continue to 
define human experience.   
My project uses ideas from disability studies to explicate facial disfigurement.  I 
pose two questions that speak to theoretical issues in disability studies.  First, what is the 
cultural significance of facial disfigurement?  Disability studies locates bodies within 
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cultural and institutional locations, allowing for analysis of the societal significance of 
disfigured bodies.  By analyzing face work, I account for social responses to facial 
variance.  As disability studies demonstrates, the experience and meaning of disability is 
always informed by the social response to particular bodies.  By focusing on responses to 
disability, mine is a critical project that refuses to locate the “problem” of disfigurement 
at the level of individual experience.  Second, how is appearance disabling?  By asking 
this question, I introduce a theory about how aesthetics, in addition to functional 
impairments, matter in significant ways. I demonstrate how the opposite of disability is 
not always ability but rather unremarkability, or a way of being that goes unnoticed in 
everyday life.    
 
Sociology of Medicine, Health, and Illness 
Medical sociology problematizes essentialist and biological notions of the body 
by framing many diseases and disorders as social problems.  By locating the body and 
medical professions in socio-historical-cultural contexts, medical sociology opens up 
topics often perceived as natural or scientific to sociological analysis and critique.  By 
framing disease and disability as social problems, medical sociologists dislocate the 
experience of the body and knowledges about the body from scientific narratives in order 
to articulate how knowledge and experience are always mediated through history, 
politics, and economics.  In doing so, medical sociology destabilizes the practice and 
profession of medicine in order to think about how professional power defines bodily 
experiences and what better ways of coping with disease and disorders of the body might 
look like (Conrad 2005).   
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With the concept of medicalization, sociologists began to understand how various 
human experiences may be defined through medical practices—diagnostic categories, 
assessment techniques, and treatment modalities (Zola 1972).  We now understand 
medicalization as a defining transformation of the twentieth century.  In fact, unveiling 
processes of medicalization has become routine to sociologists.  Much of the work of 
medical sociology in the last twenty-five years has focused on how a variety of human 
conditions (alcoholism, homosexuality, hyperactivity, etc.) became subject to medical 
expertise (Conrad and Schneider 1992).  Yet, the last twenty years have been 
characterized by such dramatic technical, informational, and organizational shifts that 
some theorists argue we need to reconsider how we understand medicalization (Bowker 
and Star 1999; Clarke et al. 2003).  Clarke et al. argue that we are currently experiencing 
biomedicalization— “the increasingly technoscientific, complex, multi-sited, multi-
directional processes of medicalization” (162).  Most importantly, biomedicalization 
signifies a shift from controlling nature to transforming nature (Clarke 1995).   
While Clarke et al. identify five related processes of biomedicalization, two of 
these are particularly pertinent to my own research.  First, biomedicine transforms the 
body and the patient through the “technoscientization of biomedicine.”   Biomedicine is 
increasingly dominated by technoscience through computerization, geneticization, and 
technology design.  Whereas antibiotics destroy (control) microorganisms, new 
biomedical technologies like genetic engineering manipulate (transform) genes.  In this 
context, radically new technologies emerge that rework the very terms of medicine.  
Rather than extending life, new biotechnologies take the human body to the extreme. 
Technoscience allows for technologies that intervene in new physiological processes 
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through radically invasive means.  Second, new bodies and identities are created via 
biomedicalization.  While one-size-fits-all medical treatments persist, we are currently 
experiencing an explosion of customized technologies that seek to transform bodies in 
unique ways.  These technologies rest on the understanding of the human body as flexible 
(Martin 1995).  New biotechnologies “focus on assessing, shifting, reshaping, 
reconstituting, and ultimately transforming bodies for varying purposes, including 
achieving new identities” (Clarke et al. 2003: 181).   
This project follows the logic of the sociology of medicine by framing facial 
disfigurement as a social problem.  From this perspective, technologies of face work 
(face transplantation, facial feminization, and reconstructive surgery) are not simply 
surgical techniques or technological artifacts; rather, they are apparatuses with complex 
histories and social lives.  These practices permeate our imaginings about what science is 
and what contemporary medicine can do.   Rather than understanding these as good or 
bad technologies, I begin with the premise that we are embedded in a society currently 
undergoing unprecedented biomedicalization.  As such, my project engages technologies 
as tools that shape how we see and relate to bodies, especially disfigured bodies.  Medical 
technologies are simultaneously miraculous and problematic.  Part of this project 
involves articulating how face work is both of these things simultaneously.   
This project focuses on two questions of interest to medical sociology.  First, how 
do we conceptualize medical treatments as vital or non-vital, as life saving or life 
enhancing?  As Clarke et al. (2003) acknowledge, what “big science” looks like has 
changed.  Whereas innovations like the artificial heart, the iron lung, and immune 
isolation chambers were primarily oriented towards extending life, I argue that face work 
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is geared towards revolutionizing a patient’s quality of life.  In this way new 
technological innovations, like face transplantation, reorganize medical practice by 
concentrating resources in projects aimed towards “non-vital” ends.  In contemporary 
culture wherein the “makeover” has reached epidemic proportions, medical technologies 
aimed at transformation must be explored further in order to make sense of the ways in 
which medicine is used to make postmodern bodies (Haraway 1991).   
Yet biomedicine oriented towards these ends is contested.  Critics question the 
role biomedicine should play in crafting lifestyles and identities (Frank 2004).  In light of 
these concerns, I ask how human experiences of disfigurement are altered through face 
work.  The assumption underlying face work is that interventions benefit patients by 
transforming the patient’s lived experience and identity.  The logic is: via face work, a 
disfigured face is made into a new, aesthetically “normal” face, and in the process a 
patient’s identity shifts from a highly stigmatized identity to a normalized (if not quite 
normal) identity.  By analyzing the social work accomplished through technologies of 
face work, I complicate the understanding that intervention necessarily leads to progress.   
 
Sociology of the Body 
Historically within sociology, the human body occupies an “absent presence” 
(Shilling 2003, 17).  The body is implicated in the big sociological questions—How is 
human life organized via work, intimate relations, politics?  How do humans cope with 
constraint? What are the possibilities for agency and resistance?—and yet the body has 
only recently been explored as a distinct topic of sociological analysis (Turner 1996, 
Shilling 2007, Waskul and Vannini 2006).  As a modern(ist) discipline, sociology tends 
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to conceptualize human action as a disembodied set of practices emerging from human 
thought.  In solidifying a disciplinary identity distinct from biology and psychology, 
sociology distanced itself from accounts which granted the human body explanatory 
power.  This intellectual move against biological determinism led to a disembodied 
sociology.  Instead, sociology focused on how human thought and ideas, language, and 
behavior facilitated social world-making, but the ways in which the body facilitated, 
disrupted, and influenced these human processes were largely ignored.  As an emerging 
substantive area, the sociology of the body understands bodies and embodiment not 
simply as factors that shape human experience, but rather as theoretically significant 
subjects of inquiry in their own right.  From this perspective, the body is understood as 
not only impacted by but also constitutive of complex social arrangements. 
Sociology of the body is centrally interested in questions about the experience of 
embodiment and how these experiences are embedded in social contexts.  Increasingly, 
analyses of the body focus on bodies that differ from the accepted (and enforced) norm 
(for example, female, queer, disabled, young, and old bodies) and the ways the specific 
histories of these bodies are determined through culture, technology, and politics.  This 
focus on devalued bodies is facilitated by postmodern bodily metaphors that emphasize 
flexibility, hybridity, fragmentation, fluidity, difference, and ambiguity.  Haraway’s 
cyborg, Kristeva’s (1982) abject body, Martin’s (1995) flexible body, Braidotti’s (1996) 
monstrous bodies, Shildrick’s (1997) leaky bodies, and Shabot’s (2006) grotesque body 
are direct, feminist responses to a Cartesian model that emphasizes mind-body dualism or 
an Enlightenment biological elaboration that approaches the body as a uniform, 
intelligible object.  Postmodern figurations are attempts not only to describe embodiment 
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as it is experienced in the twenty-first century but also to imagine a place from which to 
articulate and enact a body politics.  For the disfigured body, postmodern 
conceptualizations of the body, particularly Sara Cohen Shabot’s (2006) “grotesque 
body,” that center difference are useful for thinking about the nature of disfigurement and 
for understanding attempts to normalize facial difference. 
Shabot posits a “grotesque body” as a subversive alternative to Haraway’s cyborg 
(1990).   The cyborg is a postmodern metaphor deployed as a direct challenge to dualisms 
premised throughout Western thought, most notably between humans and machines.   
The cyborg is an optimistic metaphor, a heuristic device intended to aid feminists in 
theorizing the twenty-first century.  Haraway writes,  
Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in which 
we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves.  This is a dream 
not of a common language, but of a powerful infidel heteroglossia.  It is an 
imagination of a feminist speaking in tongues to strike fear into the 
circuits of the super-savers of the new right.  It means both building and 
destroying machines, identities, categories, relationships, spaces, stories 
(39).  
  
Based on an analysis of science fiction, Shabot argues instead that cyborg imagery is 
problematic because even as it operates to break down distinctions between humans and 
technologies, the hypersexualization of cyborg bodies reinforces traditional notions of 
gender and sexuality.  But perhaps even more importantly, in practice the cyborg 
metaphor, perhaps inadvertently, abandons the material body.  As Shabot writes, “The 
[cyborg] is never a meaty body” (226).  In effect, the nitty-gritty of an organic body is 
overcome in cyborg narratives in favor of a techno-fantasy.  Without fleshiness, a politics 
centered on bodily experience, particularly bodily suffering, is not possible.   
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While I contend that Haraway does not imagine her cyborg politics as entirely 
imitative of science fiction, and thus not limited by pop culture failings, Shabot’s 
argument is insightful to the degree that it insists on a metaphor of the body that 
dispenses with hyper-ness in favor of an everyday mediocre-ness that centers meatiness 
or materiality in bodily accounts.  The disavowal of the organic body might work as a 
means of coping with anxiety related to the vulnerability of the human body, but the body 
is a fact of human life that cannot be dreamt away with cyborgs or any other fictive kin. 
For Shabot, then, body metaphors of the twenty-first center must center fleshiness, while 
retaining a postmodern sensitivity to messiness. Drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin (1941), 
Shabot premises the grotesque body as simultaneously fleshy and boundary-less.  Like 
the cyborg, the grotesque body exemplifies hybridity.  
Grotesque bodies are hybrid bodies: mixtures of animals, objects, plants, 
and human beings.  Hence, the grotesque has been recognized as a concept 
evoking monstrosity, irrational confusion, absurdity, and a deformed 
heterogeneity…The grotesque subject, provided with such embodied and 
open subjectivity and constituting a radical deviation from the norm—
mainly by way of exceeding it (Russo, 1994, p. 10)—is unrepresentable or 
unknowable by way of any normal system of knowledge or 
representation…They are not clean, closed, well-defined, clear-cut, 
beautiful bodies striving for symmetry and order.  Rather, the grotesque 
body is a body that defies clear definitions and borders and that occupies 
the middle ground between life and death, between subject and object, 
between one and many (229).   
 
The grotesque body is a particularly apt metaphor for understanding disfigurement.  As a 
“radical deviation from the norm,” facial variance calls into question the distinction 
between what is human and what is non-human, and as a result, disfigured faces routinely 
evoke anxiety and revulsion.    
Yet while the grotesque body is an analytically useful metaphor, it is rhetorically 
problematic.  Postmodern figurations are formulated as means for describing human 
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bodies writ large.  The word grotesque, while provocative in postmodern parlance, carries 
with it a burden of meanings.  My work is about “disfigured” faces and as such 
characterizing these faces as “grotesque” is linguistically and morally problematic.  In 
doing so, I do not intend to reproduce the intense stigmatization of facial variant people.  
Rather, I use the metaphor to highlight the profound ways in which bodies characterized 
by difference challenge modern notions of intelligible subjectivity.   
Sociology of the body has come to focus on the specificity of bodily experience—
the male body, the black body, the disabled body, the child’s body, the aging body—as a 
way of undermining universalizing essentialist narratives about the “nature” of the body 
(Evans and Lee 2002).  The body is given meaning in terms of a number of distinctions, 
including but not limited to gender, race, sexuality, ability, nationality, age, religion, and 
ethnicity.   In this way, postmodern accounts of the body make an attempt to analyze the 
messiness of the body, its reality as shaped by categories that are made real in social 
contexts.  While messiness abounds in sociological accounts of the body, fleshiness does 
not.  That is, sociology interrogates body experience as it is mediated by a multitude of 
social factors but offers little towards making sense of the ways the material body is 
experienced. 
I argue that social categories matter, but so, too, do physiological factors.  While 
the ways the material body determines human experience are always imbued with social 
meanings, these are not entirely reducible to social explanations.  Disfigurement matters 
in the ways that it does because of socially constituted notions of aesthetics, but it also 
matters because different facial configurations can affect the ways people love, see, eat, 
speak, and smell.  In this way, “disfigurement” is socially constructed, but it is also 
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materially significant.  By focusing on the face, a body part, I begin with the fleshy body, 
but I do not take it for granted.  I neither reduce the significance of disfigurement to 
social arrangements nor do I fetishize biological determinism by locating explanatory 
power in the body itself.   Instead, I aim to produce of fleshy account of social relations 
that simultaneously takes material experience, physiological functioning, relations of 
power, and social meanings into account.  
As contemporary accounts of the body repeatedly demonstrate, bodily difference 
is almost never construed simply as a variation of human possibility. Even relative to the 
few bodily characteristics like hair and eye color that are relatively acceptable in their 
variability, there are ideals.  Gray hair does not carry an equivalent meaning to brown 
hair.  In response, multitudes of social practices are aimed at containing difference, which 
is often conceptualized in terms of stigma.  Bodily difference almost always elicits great 
anxiety and immense mobilization of resources aimed at refiguring and resituating it 
(Shildrick 2002).  The variant body is defined as abject and subject to normalizing 
techniques that aim to restore a “clean and proper body (Kristeva 1982). Difference is 
normalized again and again.  From genital surgery for intersexed infants to cosmetic 
surgery that erases ethnic facial characteristics defined as undesirable, medicine routinely 
works as an agent of social control, a technological handmaiden to social norms (Kaw 
1998; Kessler 1998).   
I locate my own work within a sociology of biotechnological interventions aimed 
at normalizing the body, and specifically the human face. Biotechnologies shape 
embodied experience, and in doing so, they help to determine our bodily future. Often 
interventions promise a new body of sorts—a younger body, a stronger body, a more 
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mobile body, a prettier body. But it is not simply the desire for beauty that undergirds the 
imperative to intervene in bodily aesthetics; it is also the haunting specter of ugliness.  I 
analyze interventions aimed at transforming disfigured bodies into unremarkable ones, 
those sociotechnical practices designed to repair a “grotesque” face so that it becomes a 
mundane face.  In pursuing this research, I rely on sociology of the body to ask how work 
on the body is organized not only around progress but also around sufficiency or 
unremarkability.  I demonstrate that the goal is sometimes not to have a better or more 
perfect body, but rather a “good enough” body, one that will ensure membership in the 
human collective.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
FACING OFF: DEBATING FACE TRANSPLANT AND CONSTRUCTING A 
DISFIGUREMENT IMAGINARY12 
 
 
 
“Science and society would be all the poorer if scientists lacked the 
‘courage to fail’, but these risks [of face transplantation] indicate that we 
presently need more caution than courage.”  
Richard Huxtable and Julie Woody (2004: 513) 
 
“An ethical face transplantation that would eventually lead to a failure will 
be remembered as an honorable attempt (as were all the other first organ 
transplantations).  An unethical face transplantation that would eventually 
lead to a technical success will be looked at as a “trick” made by 
mercenaries of science.” 
Francois Petit et al. (2004: 15)     
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 My use of the term “face off” in the title of this chapter is not a reference to the popular 
film of the same name.  I use this term to emphasize the ways in which debates infuse 
face transplantation with meaning.   
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A Face Transplant Story in Images 
 
Figure 2. Face/Off Movie Poster 
The film starring John Travolta and Nicolas Cage tells a story in which 
face transplantation figures in a plot centered on diverting 
terrorists.13 
 
Figure 3. Rat with Transplanted Face 
Images of white rats with the faces of black rats were published in 
Transplantation Proceedings to illustrate the results of animal models 
for face transplantation.   
                                                 
13 From < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Face/Off> 
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 Figure 4. Magazine Cover Announcing the World’s First Face Transplant  
This cover of Paris Match announces the first face transplant and shows 
surgeons at work on the recipients face.14  
 
Figure 5. Face Transplant Technical Diagram  
This graphic published on the BBC’s website graphically represents what 
tissue was transferred in first partial face transplant.15 
                                                 
14 From <http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2005/dec/05120907.html> 
15From 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/cbbcnews/hi/newsid_4680000/newsid_4686000/4686058.stm> 
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 Figure 6. If You Had to Have a Face Transplant, Whose Famous Face Would You Want? 
A People magazine backpage feature asked celebrities to identify the 
face they would most like to receive via face transplantation.16 
 
Figure 7. Third Face Transplant Recipient Post-Surgery 
This photograph was released to publicize the world’s third partial 
face transplant.17 
 
 
                                                 
16 From People magazine 
17 <http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn9010.html> 
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These pictures position face transplantation as a plot device, as a 
scientific experiment, as a news story, as a surgical technique, as a 
topic for celebrity speculation, and as an intervention that restored a 
man’s face.  In other sites, it carries the meaning of life saving 
work.       
 
Spectacles of Innovation 
On November 27, 2005, a team of French surgeons led by Jean-Michel Dubernard 
and Bernard Devauchelle performed the world’s first partial face transplant in Amiens, 
France.  Simply put, face transplantation or FT is an experimental procedure in which a 
face is surgically removed from a donor and replanted on a recipient’s head for the 
treatment of “several facial disfigurement,” the kind of disfigurement that results from 
both congenital conditions and trauma.  News accounts alleged that the recipient’s lips, 
chin, and nose were chewed off by her own dog’s efforts to rouse her after a suicide 
attempt (Bernard and Smith 2006).  Some accounts claimed that the brain-dead donor had 
also attempted suicide.  Initial stories announcing the transplant were followed with 
reports that the recipient’s results were so good that she had regained enough facial 
functioning to resume smoking.  This news was met with derision from other surgeons, 
suggesting that the French team’s choice of patient was less than ideal (Osterweil 
2006).18   
This larger than life story of trauma and repair was followed by a similarly 
outlandish story.  In April 14, 2006, reports confirmed that a Chinese surgical team 
                                                 
18This French surgical team had previously transplanted a hand and forearm to a New 
Zealand man who had lost his own in a chainsaw accident while serving time in prison.  
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working at Xijing Hospital completed the world’s second partial face transplant 
(Macartney 2006).  This time the recipient had been attacked by a black bear two years 
prior, leaving open wounds and visible pink flesh in the place of a recognizable face.  
Press releases following the surgery displayed a man’s face, albeit swollen and stitched, 
but for all intents and purposes intact.   
The third face transplant was again completed in France by different surgeons, but 
unlike the two premiere patients, the third recipient had not experienced an animal 
encounter resulting in facial trauma.  Instead, the experimental procedure was used as a 
last-ditch intervention to treat neurofibromatosis, a condition that causes the growth of 
tumors on the face.  This is the same condition Joseph Merrick, irreverently termed “The 
Elephant Man,” is thought to have experienced. The story of a man with a congenital 
condition is certainly less dramatic than the stories of “animals on the attack,” but 
spectacular in its own right given the rarity and severity of the condition.   
In the United States, clinical researchers affiliated with various medical 
institutions have expressed interest in FT, though as of this writing, no American team 
has actually completed a procedure.  A team at The University of Louisville has 
conducted extensive research to establish the technical, immunological, and ethical 
protocols necessary to completing the procedure.  Much of their research established the 
groundwork that allowed the French and Chinese transplants to occur. Other American 
researchers have announced plans to complete a face transplant.  Most notably, Marie 
Siemionow from the Cleveland Clinic declared in 2005 (even before the first face 
transplant in France) to Katie Couric on NBC’s The Today Show that she was in the 
process of identifying her first patient.  Following Siemionow’s appearance, periodic 
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media outlets have “announced” the Cleveland Clinic’s intention to complete the first 
American transplant (Glaister 2005).  There is no evidence to suggest that any American 
team will actually complete a face transplant in the near future.  Yet, the declaration that 
an American transplant is impending has intensified the media circus surrounding FT in 
the United States.     
 It is not simply the details of the recent transplants or the innovative and emerging 
science of FT that make it so spectacular; fantastic images pervade pop culture accounts 
of FT, too.  Some stories rely on fantasies fed by celebrity culture.  In these stories, the 
hook is that FT makes realizing celebrity-like faces possible.  “Have you ever wished that 
you had the good looks of Halle Berry or Ashton Kutcher or the hottest student in 
school?” (McLaughlin 2003).  On the final page of a 2005 issue of People magazine, 
Hollywood actresses were asked to identify another starlet whose face they would most 
want transplanted onto their own.  These stories of FT couch the technology in a culture 
of glamour and consumption.  In these accounts, FT is treated as the newest, most 
innovative, albeit still “in development” intervention that promises to make the body 
beautiful.  While “experts” repeatedly deny that FT will ever be available as a cosmetic 
procedure, the story persists.19  Other media accounts make reference to science fiction 
themes of wonderment or futuristic horror.  Several recent newspaper articles reference 
                                                 
19 This is a common theme in popular media coverage about experimental surgery.  
Stories question what the routinization of cutting edge technologies and practices, might 
look like in the future, while experts insist that these are specialized, and thus not 
intended for wide-spread use.  Monica Casper (1998) explores this trend in her work on 
fetal surgery.     
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the Hollywood action thriller Face/Off in which a main character receives a face 
transplant in order to thwart a terrorist attack and a 2005 episode of Nip/Tuck in which a 
botched face transplant results in rejection of the new face that is then removed (Hanlon 
2005; La Ferla and Singer 2005).  These are sensationalized media accounts that 
continually rely on “what ifs” to simultaneously glamorize the technology and to titillate 
the public.   
At the same time, FT has been celebrated as scientifically noteworthy.  Dr. L. 
Scott Levin, chief of plastic and reconstructive surgery at Duke University Medical 
Center, has described the procedure as “the single most important area of reconstructive 
research” (Mason 2005).  Yet it is unclear what the future holds for FT.  Experimentation 
may morph into a viable treatment option offered as standard of care, or FT may vanish 
from the scene entirely due to failure or ethical issues. Or, it may be operational in 
limited circumstances but remain a contested “experimental” procedure.  FT is positioned 
strategically by proponents as a revolutionary intervention and by critics as too risky, and 
as such its ultimate trajectory is unknown—and thus deeply interesting analytically.  The 
story relies on hope but cannot help but simultaneously provoke anxiety.   
I began this chapter with a series of images, each representing a piece of the FT 
story.  There are endless images to choose from, and so the work of (re)presenting FT is 
tricky.  There are multiple stories that could be told—the story of an emerging 
technology, the story of hope for cure, the story of media (mis)representation, the story of 
public understandings of science in the making, the story of Dr. John Barker and Isabelle 
Dinoire.  I tell none of these stories in their entirety.  Partially, I represent FT as a product 
of popular culture, a technology of entertainment.  Partially, I represent FT as a 
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technique, forged through scientific knowledge and clinical practice.  Partially, I 
represent FT as an experience, a biotechnical intervention into real lives saturated with 
trauma, suffering, and hope.  Partially, I represent FT as a subject of public inquiry and 
deliberation.  Taken together, I use these images to convey the complex life of a 
technology and to point to the ways in which even an intervention as embryonic and 
uncommon as FT saturates social life.  What is it about FT that has captured our (both 
expert and lay) imaginations?    
This chapter focuses on a technology in the making.  I attempt to make sense of 
the medical and scientific midway that surrounds the technology in order to understand 
its significance both as a technological innovation that raises unique bioethical concerns 
and as an intervention imbued with the promise of erasing facial disfigurement (Miles 
2004).  As I write, the story of FT continues to unfold.  As such, I analyze a key moment 
of contemporary deliberation surrounding FT.  In a 2004 issue of The American Journal 
of Bioethics, experts—including medical researchers, surgeons, bioethicists, and 
psychologists—considered the advent of FT.  Through content analysis of the AJOB 
exchange, I highlight the terms of contestation.  While critics raised numerous bioethical 
concerns, the debate was dominated by questions about whether the physiological, 
psychological, and social risks associated with transplantation were worth the benefits 
accorded to future recipients.  Put more simply and more dramatically, is a new face 
worth the risk of death?  I demonstrate that each position is structured by varying claims 
about risk, conceptions of what constitutes a “vital” intervention, and articulations of the 
relationship between disfigurement and the possibilities of a life “worth living.”  
 84
Underlying these claims is the assumption that the face is a different kind of work object 
than any other bodily part.   
I then turn my focus from broad debates about FT to the specific work of one face 
transplant team.  Drawing on ethnographic research and interviews with key members of 
a U.S. based research team, I critically analyze how, in this case, the work of 
technological innovation rests on the discursive negotiation of the meanings of facial 
disfigurement.  Over the course of several years, the team invested significant resources 
in working through the scientific (surgical and immunological) barriers to FT via 
laboratory experimentation on animals and human cadavers.  While their research made 
human experimentation conducted by other transplant teams possible, the team has yet to 
complete a clinical transplant in a human patient.  Instead, the team has created an 
ongoing research agenda examining the ethical, social, and psychological implications of 
FT.   I demonstrate that, rather than clinical experimentation, the central work of the team 
became the rhetorical work of conveying the significance of facial disfigurement.  In a 
very real way, the Louisville team helped to create a disfigurement imaginary that 
positioned disfigurement as a quality of life affecting condition but rather as deadly and 
as a threat to one’s very humanity.  Ultimately, I demonstrate that this disfigurement 
imaginary calls into question what constitutes “vital” and “non-vital” intervention in 
clinical terms.  I argue that how FT is positioned relative to these technical and moral 
distinctions does much towards imagining what facial disfigurement and medicine mean 
in this socio-historical moment.   
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A Social Anatomy of Face Transplantation 
FT is simultaneously a scientific practice and a cultural object. I approach FT 
from the perspective of science and technology studies, conceptualizing this emergent 
practice as a “socio-technical ensemble” in order to emphasize the ways in which culture 
and science inform one another (Bijker 1995).  Constructivist approaches to science and 
technology do more than illustrate unidirectional relationships between “society” and 
“science.”  Rather, science studies “trace[s] the way[s] in which social interests, values, 
history, actions, institutions, networks, and so on shape, influence, structure, cause, 
explain, inform, characterize, or co-constitute the content of science and technology” 
(Hess 1997: 82).  Science studies simultaneously interrogates the production of 
technoscience from the inside (laboratories, scientific texts, surgery wards, etc.) and 
situates technoscience in social and cultural contexts in order to understand the cultural 
activities of science, the symbolic and political practices at play, and the technical 
goings-on.  Scientists are embedded in “construction machineries” and “cultures of fact” 
(Cetina 1996).  From this perspective, the construction of science is a literary process and 
a representational craft that employs local materials, means, and resources.   
   FT builds upon knowledge and skills from numerous scientific specialties 
including transplantation surgery, immunology, reconstructive surgery, and psychology.  
The technical history of FT begins with reconstructive techniques, or perhaps rather 
dissatisfaction with reconstructive techniques.  For the faces subject to an extreme 
intervention like FT, reconstructive techniques like free tissue transfer, which involves 
the relocation of tissue from one site on a patient’s body to another for the purposes of 
repair, are notoriously ineffective.  Not only do these techniques require surgeries 
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throughout the course of a lifetime, sometimes numbering into the hundreds, but the end 
results of reconstructive techniques rarely erase facial difference altogether.    
Technically, FT is most akin to facial replantation in which a person’s own facial 
tissue is reattached after trauma.  The first case of facial replantation took place in India.  
After a nine year old girl’s face and scalp were torn off after a grass cutting machine 
caught one of her braids, her family packed the tissue on ice and traveled to the nearest 
hospital.  After ten hours of microsurgery, the girl’s face was reattached.  The case made 
reconstructive surgery history, and opened up the possibility for the transplantation of 
one face from a donor to a recipient (Thomas et al. 1998).  While replantation offers 
better results than other reconstructive techniques, it is only available in cases in which a 
facial tissue remains in good condition.  Thus, many kinds of trauma and other congenital 
differences are not treatable through replantation.     
   In addition, FT shares a technical and social history with hand transplantation.  
In 1998, a French team also led by Jean-Michel Dubernard completed the world’s first 
hand transplant, though credit for the world’s first “successful” hand transplant belong to 
a research team at the University of Louisville.  In the French case, the transplanted tissue 
was eventually removed after the patient stopped following his immunosuppression 
regimen.  Many understand hand transplantation and FT as analogous procedures.  Both 
types of transplant are composite tissue allotransplants involving a number of tissues 
including muscle, nerves, blood vessels, arteries, veins, and skin (Baylis 2004).  
Referencing the success of hand transplantation has become a key strategy in arguing that 
surgeons have established the technical skills to begin transplanting human faces 
(Wiggins et al. 2004).  But critics contend that the results of hand transplantation do not 
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necessarily support the continuation of experimentation with composite tissue 
allotransplantation (Caplan 2004).  Critics acknowledge that “a face may be like a hand 
from the perspective of a surgeon interested in the technical problem of repair,” but there 
are “morally significant differences” (Baylis 2004: 30).  As Baylis argues, that idea that 
the hand is just like a face only works as a technical analogy because in the event of 
rejection or failure, the stakes are significantly different.  A hand can be replaced with a 
prosthesis.  A face cannot.20  Analogizing face and hand transplantation highlights the 
technical similarities of the body matter, but the juxtaposition also points to the divergent 
meanings and significance accrued to each body part.  
The move in reconstructive techniques towards transplantation is made possible 
by transplant medicine, an innovative field of health care research with a history shaped 
by ethical debate.  Because FT involves the transplant of a donor organ from a dead body 
onto a living recipient, FT relies on the work of immunology.  Like all kinds of 
transplantation, FT requires that recipients begin a life-long regimen of 
immunosuppressive drugs in order to prevent rejection of the transplanted tissue.  
Debates about FT largely hinge on this fact—immunosuppressive drugs are toxic.21  FT 
                                                 
20 There are some kinds of facial prosthetic devices.  They function by helping patients 
aesthetically but sometimes make facial function like eating or drinking more difficult.   
21 Just how toxic these drugs are is highly contested.  While some critics of FT 
understand the use of these drugs as a death sentence, others including the University of 
Louisville team argue that the risk is grossly overstated since most information about the 
drugs is based on research with people suffering from serious illnesses like kidney 
failure.  In essence, the team contests that the drugs, themselves, are toxic but rather that 
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relies on the technologies of transplant medicine but it also activates ongoing 
conversations within the field of transplantation specifically, and medicine, more broadly.  
Transplant medicine has pushed the bounds of medical intervention by continually 
making possible the seemingly impossible (Fox and Swazey 1974).  With the advent of 
heart transplantation as a technological possibility, bioethicists, medical professionals, 
and lay publics were forced to reconsider what constitutes “life.”  Thus within the 
specialty, there is a well entrenched history of debate around unprecedented bioethical 
questions.  FT calls into question how we balance the benefits of intervention, in this case 
a new face, with physiological, psychological, and social risks, most notably chronic 
illness, death, identity crisis, and public contempt and distrust.   
 
Face Debates: The Contested Risks and Benefits of Face Transplantation 
 
AJOB: A Site of Deliberation 
In 2004, The American Journal of Bioethics, touted on its website as the most 
widely read bioethics journal in the world, featured a series focused on the ethics of FT.  
The commentary, which was published before any attempt by any surgical team to 
complete a face transplant, was structured as a forum in which to consider the issue prior 
to clinical experimentation.  According to the journal’s website, “The mission of The 
American Journal of Bioethics and bioethics.net [AJOB’s complementary website] is to 
provide the clinical, legal, academic, scientific, religious and broad community-at-large 
                                                                                                                                                 
the drugs in combination with a pre-existing condition give the indication of serious side 
effects.  
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with a rapid but comprehensive debate of issues in bioethics” (American Journal of 
Bioethics 2004).  The debate (like others that unfold on the pages of AJOB) was spurred 
by a Target Article, a piece that focused on a single biomedical issue, in this case written 
by the face transplant team at the University of Louisville.  The article, “On the Ethics of 
Facial Transplantation Research” argued that the ethical criteria developed for innovative 
transplant surgery had been satisfied and that it was time to pursue clinical 
experimentation.22  An Open Commentary, a series of pieces written by scholars in 
                                                 
22 Wiggins et al. (2004) rely on Francis Moore’s four criteria to argue that they are 
ethically well positioned to begin clinical experimentation.  Moore, himself a transplant 
surgeon, developed these criteria to aid in the innovation of transplant medicine.  First, 
Moore encourages surgeons to consider the scientific background of innovation. Wiggins 
et al. argue that solid organ and hand transplants provide information about procedures 
and immunosuppressive drugs.  They argue that have reached equipoise wherein the 
uncertainty posed by the innovation can only be resolved by proceeding and that the 
potential benefits are balanced with the risks. Second, Moore considers the skill and 
experience of team “field strength.”  The team at the University of Louisville is 
comprised by specialists including reconstructive surgeons, head and neck surgeons, 
transplant surgeons, immunologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, ethicists, IRB members, 
and organ procurers, and thus they argue that they are primely situated to conduct a face 
transplant.   Third, Moore queries the ethical climate of the institution.  The team argues 
that the motivation of the institution is not self-aggrandizement but rather for benefit of 
patients.  Fourth, Moore encourages open display and public and professional discussion 
and evaluation.  In an attempt to initiate discussion, the Louisville team hosted the first 
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response to the Target Article, followed. The entire debate consisted of fifteen articles.23  
Interestingly, the second response entitled “A Surgeons’ Perspective on the Ethics of 
Face Transplantation” was co-authored by the French surgeons who, within a year after 
publication, completed the world’s first partial face transplant.  The result is, as the 
                                                                                                                                                 
International Symposium on Composite Tissue Allotransplantation in November of 1997 
and in May of 2000 the 2nd International Symposium on Composite Tissue 
Allotransplantation to share and discuss the initial hand transplantation results. In 
addition, the team participated in public discussion concerning face transplants at the 
Dana Center of London Science Museum. Yet, even how the Louisville team employed 
the work of Moore was criticized in the AJOB issue.  Agich and Siemionow (2004) 
respond, “Although Moore’s reading of the ethical obligation to develop innovative 
treatments for desperately ill patients strongly supports innovations like facial 
transplantation, nowhere does he explicitly argue that ‘open display and public and 
professional discussion’ is an ethical requirement for performing an innovative surgical 
procedure (Wiggins et al. 2004).  Is this commitment to publicity simply a misreading of 
Moore or does it reflect deeper program commitments that deserve ethical scrutiny?” 
(25).   
23 The analysis that follows is based on the debate contained in AJOB.  Because 
references to work that appears elsewhere is sometimes cited by critics, a number of 
references to previously published research appear in my account.  These works are not 
subject to my analysis per se, but how they are employed by critics in articulating a 
position in the AJOB accounts shapes my understandings of the debates. 
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website describes it, “a conversation” about pressing bioethical issues.24  And yet the 
hope of actually performing a transplant infused the debate.  As Chambers (2004) writes, 
“They [Wiggins et al.] view the publication of their essay in AJOB as an important 
illocutionary speech act that will permit them to begin performing the surgery” (21).   
The AJOB commentaries represent a unique moment in the development of a 
technological innovation.  While research including animal trials, testing of anti-rejection 
medication, and cadaver experimentation were successfully completed, experimentation 
on human subjects did not commence as is often the case in biomedical research.  In lieu 
of human experimentation, the University of Louisville face transplant team initiated a 
conversation with transplant surgeons, bioethicists, philosophers, immunologists, and 
psychologists to debate “the issues,” a strategy that Arthur Caplan described as 
“prophylactic ethics” (2004: 18).  Institutional constraints, specifically university leaders’ 
refusal to support the team’s work, prevented human experimentation, but the team’s own 
                                                 
24 AJOB attempts to structure the writing and review process in accords with this spirit of 
conversation.  As the website describes, “AJOB does not leave the reader in the passive 
mode of reading. Unique JournalX technology lets the peer commentators respond to 
each other and to the Target article during their writing process. Then bioethics.net opens 
the conversation with additional Open Peer Commentary articles and online Letters to the 
Editor. Live conversations fill out the discussion of each Target Article. With the 
American Journal of Bioethics, Taylor & Francis Group and Penn have implemented a 
publishing system that is truly worthy of bioethics, a way in which scholarship about 
bioethics can reach the widest and most intellectually broad audience, magnifying the 
rigor, intimacy and interdisciplinary value of the discipline.”   
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insistence on deliberating social and ethical concerns spurred a series of publications 
(from 2004 to 2008) aimed at coming to some resolution about the “problems” of FT.  
The Wiggins et al. Target Article came at a particularly contentious moment.  In 2003, a 
Working Party of the Royal College of Surgeons of England, an independent body of 
surgeons, refused to endorse experimental FT, arguing that the requirements it outlined 
for ethical practice had yet to be met (RCS Working Party 2003).      
As a key site of ethical deliberation, The American Journal of Bioethics issue can 
be analyzed as a cultural space wherein questions and critiques about FT are articulated 
and the terms of contestation are highlighted.  Here, I use the AJOB special issue on FT 
as a source of data about the making of a new technology.  I identify and analyze the 
contours of the debate surrounding FT in order to illustrate the ways in which the face, 
more specifically the disfigured face, operates across various accounts to shape possible 
futures for this new technology.  In identifying the salient questions circulating 
throughout the AJOB debates, I position the journal issue as an object of sociological 
analysis.  Specifically, I focus on two seemingly self-evident questions: First, what are 
the risks associated with FT?  Second, what are the benefits associated with FT?   
In enumerating the risks and benefits of FT—or what is at stake—the AJOB issue 
provided a forum in which interested stakeholders interrogated the various and contested 
meanings of the procedure, specifically the technical and moral significance of repairing 
the face.  I argue that FT was cast simultaneously as a vital and as a non-vital 
intervention, a risky and a relatively safe intervention.  Specifically, proponents 
characterized FT as “non-vital” given that it is not “life saving” in the traditional sense of 
the term, but went onto to argue that the consequences of disfigurement are so severe that 
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fixing disfigurement is more akin to life saving work than life enhancing work.  Given 
that disfigurement took on such weight, the risks of FT (including the risk of death) were 
positioned as a reasonable threat to gain the benefits of facial repair.   Ultimately, then, 
debates about the risks and benefits of FT both contain within them notions of facial 
disfigurement as a form of suffering and reveal the individual and collective risks people 
are willing to endure to repair it. 
Most central to the AJOB debates were estimates of/claims about physiological 
risks associated with FT, specifically the rate of rejection of foreign tissue and the side 
effects of immunosuppression.  In addition, psychological risk, most often 
operationalized in terms of “identity crisis,” circulated as an ever-present threat.  Critics 
also debated social risks associated with FT and the institutional protocols necessary for 
ethical experimentation.  Against this litany of risks, proponents relied on a shared taken 
for grantedness that FT promises to assist patients to recover (from) disfigurement in 
ways that greatly exceed other modes of intervention.     
 
Physiological Risks  
Transplantation carries bodily risks.  On this everyone agreed, but among the 
AJOB pieces, there were considerable discrepancies about what these risks entailed.  
Specifically, the rate of rejection emerged as the most contentious issue.  In the world of 
transplant medicine, rejection is a specter to be prevented, feared, and managed.  In a 
sense, transplantation medicine is as much about warding off threats of organ rejection as 
it is about transferring organs.  Sociologically, claims about physiological risk and graft 
rejection are notable in part because they vary so widely both in numerical estimates and 
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in their conceptualization of the significance of “rejection.”  Huxtable and Woodley 
(2004) argue that the face is one of the most antigenic tissues in the body.  They, along 
with Strong (2004) estimate that, at best, one in five faces would be rejected within the 
first three years following surgery.  Maschke and Trump (2004) cite the Royal College of 
Surgeons (2003) report estimating that ten percent of grafts will be rejected in the first 
year and that 30-50 percent of patients will experience graft loss function within the first 
2-5 years, but they concede that estimates about rejection vary widely.  Yet in the Target 
Article, Wiggins et al. (2004) argue that FT is no more risky than other reconstructive 
techniques which use a patient’s own tissue. The Louisville team claims that 
complications related to tissue donation are fewer than critics imagine since the tissue 
comes from a donor as opposed to the patient (as is the case when tissue is harvested 
from another location on the body).  They buttress this claim with the fact that in the case 
of FT, patients experience one major surgical procedure as opposed to traditional means 
of reconstruction, which often require multiple, in some cases upwards of one hundred, 
surgeries. 
While claims about the “actual” risks of rejection vary across accounts, the 
meanings critics attribute to rejection differ as well.  Strong (2004) argues that because 
FT potentially involves transplantation of vascularized skin, subcutaneous fat, muscles, 
facial nerves, and bony facial structures, graft loss would result in major facial wounds.  
Yet proponents argue that graft rejection would “merely” return the recipient to a state of 
disfigurement similar to the disfigurement preceding the intervention (Agich and 
Siemionow 2004)—so disfigurement is specifically NOT a risk because it would simply 
replicate the original state prior to surgery.  The implication is that rejection of the new 
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face is certainly a risk, but not one that should prevent face transplants from occurring.  
Because these journal debates occurred before clinical trials, estimates of the rates of 
rejection operate in place of empirically derived risks calculated post-experimentation.  
These various estimates are the basis upon which contributors oppose or support FT.  Yet 
in all accounts, rejection operates as a significant risk, and one that must be thoroughly 
minimized through immunosuppression.   
Immunosuppression or anti-rejection medication carries significant health risks, 
including infection and end-organ toxicity leading to diabetes and malignancies that can 
result in death.   While contributors agree that there are risks associated with 
immunosuppression, the significance of the risks varies.  While transplantation medicine 
provides a theoretical framework for thinking about how these drugs work on the human 
body, the particulars of FT make the work of identifying the risks of immunosuppression 
an exercise in estimation rather than an empirically grounded project.  The specificity of 
transplantation matters.  Recipients of organs like kidneys are critically ill at the time of 
transplantation.  By contrast, FT recipients are what is often referred to in clinical 
contexts as “grossly disfigured” but not critically ill.  How critics approach FT as similar 
or different than other kinds of transplantation impacts the ways in which they 
conceptualize the risks of immunosuppression. The only empirical evidence upon which 
to estimate risk is research conducted in relation to hand transplantation which explored 
complications related to tacrolimus and mycophenolate mofetil/prednisone combination 
therapy, the drugs the Louisville team argues would most likely be used for FT.  How 
researchers made sense of this data, particularly the fact that information was based on 
cases of life saving transplants, varies.    
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On one side, critics argue that undoubtedly a face transplant would increase 
recipient’s quality of life but that immunosuppression would threaten life itself.  The 
patient may, in fact, be accepting a shorter life in favor of a better life (Petit et al. 2004).  
Yet the Louisville team argues that risks associated with immunosuppression are far less 
significant for face transplant recipients than for other transplant recipients.   They claim 
that recipients of FT will be less compromised than recipients of other kinds of 
transplantation because they have not experienced chronic disease (Wiggins et al. 2004).  
Debates about the risks are sociologically significant for two reasons.  First, these debates 
demonstrate how facts are subject to deliberation and contestation, an insight established 
throughout science and technology studies.  Second, and more importantly, the AJOB 
commentary illustrates that how risk is construed deeply affects the direction of medical 
innovation and the terms upon which ethical debate rests.  In other words, a technology 
comes into formation depending on how risks are construed and represented in ethical 
debate, and at the same time the contours of bioethics shift as new ways of thinking about 
risk emerge.    
Taken together, debates about the physiological risks of surgery, rates of 
rejection, and effects of immunosuppression deeply structured how FT is positioned as a 
risky or safe medical intervention.  In some accounts, FT is imagined as an incredibly 
threatening intervention, specifically a life threatening practice.  Others treat these 
concerns as overblown.  Yet all sides ultimately wrestle with the following question: Is 
disfigurement a condition in which compromised health (or even death) is an acceptable 
risk to be incurred to improve appearance? Clearly, the answer to this question extends 
far beyond physiological factors.   
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Psychological Risks 
 While transplantation always involves a multitude of risks, critics suggest that the 
transplantation of a human face seems to elicit unique concerns about psychological 
risks.25  Thus the physical risks of FT are outlined in conjunction with psychological 
risks.  If the question that informs concerns about physical risks centers on the loss or 
rejection of the graft (and subsequent disfigurement) alongside the risks of 
immunosuppression, then the concerns that dominate debates about psychological risks 
center on the loss of identity and mental stability.  In the AJOB exchange, then, FT is 
positioned as a technology with incredible power not only to reconstruct the face but also 
to undermine the very parameters of the self.   
The Louisville team argues in the lead article that potential psychological risks of 
FT are akin to those faced by solid-organ transplant recipients including:  
“a desperation that creates unrealistic hopes, fears that his or her body will reject 
the transplant, guilt feelings about the death of the donor, difficulty conforming to 
the treatment regimen and its side-effects, and a sense of personal responsibility 
for the success of the procedure (Zdichavsky et al. 1999)” (5).   
Psychologist Nicola Rumsey (2004), who specializes in disfigurement and is a 
contributing member of the Working Party of the Royal College of Surgeons in England, 
                                                 
25 The work of Margaret Lock (2001), Lesley A. Sharp (2006), Linda Hogle (1999) 
demonstrates that psychological risk has long been positioned as a risk of transplant 
surgery.  AJOB contributors suggest that the face elicits unique psychological risks.  In 
this way, critics imply again that something about work on the face is different than work 
on other parts of the body.   
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concurs that the psychological risks of FT are similar to other kinds of transplantation. 
She notes:  
“These include fears relating to the viability of the transplanted organ or limb, 
fear of the aftermath of rejection, the burden of adhering to complex postoperative 
medical and behavioral regimes and associated fears of personal responsibility for 
the success or failure of the transplant, coping with the side effects of 
immunosuppression, the difficulties of integrating the transplant into an existing 
body image, and identity, and emotional responses, including gratitude and guilt, 
in relation to the donor and family” (22).   
Yet Rumsey also understands the psychological risks of FT to be unique because of the 
particular significance of the face and the psychological effects of facial disfigurement 
and wonders about the psychological costs recipients would endure while waiting for a 
facial tissue donation—would life be put on hold in the meantime?  Others reject claims 
that the psychological risks are as serious as many claim, arguing that even in cases with 
terrible outcomes, the patient would be back to where she or he started and not worse off. 
For example,   
“The psychological consequences of graft rejection would undoubtedly be 
significant, but the significance relates to the fact that the patient would return to a 
situation of disfigurement that preceded the facial transplantation.  The graft 
failure would return the patient to a state of disfigurement similar to the pre-
transplant disfigurement” (Agich and Seimenow 2004: 26). 
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In particular, contributors debate how a new face might transform a recipient’s identity, 
the assumption being that the repair promised by FT would be beneficial but 
fundamentally life altering. As Wiggins et al. (2004) claim,  
“What is unique to facial transplantation, however, is that facial appearance is 
intimately and profoundly associated with one’s sense of personal and social 
identity” (5).   
Proponents and critics alike express concern about psychological risks, but they disagree 
about the degree to which FT might alter a recipient’s identity.  Huxtable and Woodley 
(2004) seem to downplay the effects of a new face, arguing that all transplants 
complicate a patient’s identity.  Others, in contrast, imply that FT could lead to an 
identity crisis (Baylis 2004, Strong 2004).   
  
Social Risks 
In addition to the physiological and psychological risks of FT, several 
contributors address the “social risks” of FT, including risks to potential recipients’ social 
support networks and risks to society writ large.  In his response, Strong (2004) raises 
questions about how a new appearance might affect a recipient’s social networks.  
Several critics focus on how the patient’s family will respond to the new face (Agich and 
Siemionow 2004, Wiggins et al. 2004).   Other concerns include the burden of caring for 
someone who has received a face transplant (Rumsey 2004) and impacts on the family of 
donation procedures.  
Concerns about how FT might impact society’s views of science mostly focus on 
how media (mis)representations shape public understanding.  Some critics worry that the 
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media can not be trusted to “accurately” represent the story of FT and that sensationalism 
might result in a demand for cosmetic (i.e., clearly “nonvital”) face transplants (Rumsey 
2004, Wiggins et al. 2004).  Petit et al. (2004: 15) warn that “care should be taken to not 
frighten or repulse the population” given that this is a “Frankenstein story.”  They add 
that “FT is not a weapon of mass distraction” and as such should not be used towards 
entertainment purposes, fearing that these kinds of stories will exacerbate the organ 
shortage.  Huxtable and Woodley (2004) posit that the public may reject the procedure 
based on the “YUK! factor” or on grounds that it meddles with “nature.”  Other teams 
worry about what transplantation conveys about the quality of life with facial 
disfigurement.  These critics worry about sending the message that a good quality of life 
is not possible without radical intervention (Rumsey 2004, Wiggins et al. 2004).  
 Beyond the work of identifying risks, critics inquire about the institutional and 
ethical protocols for FT. In particular, concerns about patient selection, patient and donor 
confidentiality, and donation procedures circulate throughout the AJOB issue.  Most 
commentators agree that the premiere patients need to be psychologically stable and 
understand the risks of the procedure.  In other words, ironically, those who have 
adjusted to their disfigurement would make the best patients (Huxtable and Woodley 
2004; Wiggins et al. 2004).  This leads to a Catch-22 wherein those who might actually 
most want the procedure have been defined by scientific and ethical communities as poor 
patients (Powell 2006).  Critics like Butler et al. (2004) demand that a team develop a 
thorough protocol for psychological assessment of potential patients.  In the Target 
Article, the Louisville team outlines a protocol to obtain informed consent and to institute 
ethical experimentation, suggesting that candidates be assisted by a patient advocate, but 
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they argue that scientific reporting might compromise their ability to assure patient and 
donor confidentiality.  Because they intend to use unaltered photographs in scientific 
contexts, the Louisville team acknowledges that a patient’s identity could be discovered.  
The Louisville team rejects standard ethical protocol in an additional way, proposing that 
patients will not be able to withdraw after they begin treatment (Wiggins et al. 2004). 
(This distinguishes face transplant trials from other clinical trials which are often 
premised on the patient’s ability to withdraw at their discretion.)  Critics argue that it will 
be virtually impossible to ensure the confidentiality of patients and donors, but that 
researchers should attempt to guarantee patient and donor anonymity at all costs (Agich 
and Siemionow 2004; Miles 2004; Rumsey 2004).  In the case of biomedical innovations 
such as FT, there seems to be a tension between preserving patients’ anonymity and 
publicizing medical successes.  The concerns about confidentiality point to a much larger 
question—how do researchers preserve ethical standards, specifically confidentiality, 
while publicly exposing and celebrating biomedical innovation?  
Critics pose multiple concerns about donation procedures, questioning the 
feasibility of face donation given American rituals surrounding death.  Given the 
prevalence of open caskets, how will a donor’s “body integrity” be preserved and/or 
restored (Petit et al. 2004) and how will families contend with the fact that their deceased 
loved ones have been disfigured in death (Caplan 2004, Rumsey 2004, Strong 2004)?  
How will families “say goodbye” when they are left with a faceless corpse (Agich and 
Siemionow 2004)? Others argue that the question of donation must be seriously 
considered since the face signifies a continuation of the deceased in a way that a kidney, 
for example, does not.  Because loved ones tend to think about and remember the 
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deceased in terms of their faces, it is important to consider whether the family will, in the 
case of donation, believe that their loved one is living on (Robertson 2004). And if so, 
what are the consequences?   
 
 Benefits?  
Central to the task of assessing the risks and the benefits of FT is the designation 
of FT as a “non-vital” procedure, but given the significance some critics accrue to work 
aimed at recovering disfigurement, the designation of FT as “non-vital” (and thus 
implicitly “life enhancing”) seems precisely at stake in the debates.  The Wiggins team 
begins with the assertion that FT is a “non-vital” intervention: 
“With the relatively recent advent of human hand transplantation, however, 
ethical reflection has shifted to the need to weigh the risks the patient assumes for 
the sake of receiving a donated organ that, unlike a heart or liver, is not necessary 
for his or her survival” (2004: 1).   
According to the Louisville team, rather than “life,” the aims of FT include  
“a person’s self-image, social acceptability, and sense of normalcy as he or she 
subjectively experiences them” (1).   
The team continues by emphasizing how FT is different from other kinds of 
transplantation precisely because it is life enhancing rather than life saving:  
“While using transplanted tissues to reconstruct facial deformities would 
significantly improve a patient’s quality of life, in most cases these procedures 
would not be life-saving in the strict sense of the word.  This situation stands in 
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contrast to life-saving treatments, like heart and liver transplants, in which the 
risk/benefit ratio is more readily conceptualized” (Wiggins 2004: 3).  
But what does life saving in “the strict sense of the word” mean?  In what ways does face 
transplant stand in sharp contrast to heart and liver transplants?  Is FT inherently different 
from these “life-saving treatments” or, rather, is FT conceptualized differently?  And 
most importantly, what are the consequences to patients, to innovation, to the 
biotechnomedical complex, to lay publics of conceptualizing FT as altogether different 
from life saving interventions?  Conversely, how does a life risking intervention require 
reconfiguring the object of intervention—disfigurement— as life threatening?  In other 
words, how does disfigurement take shape as a life threatening condition in sites aimed at 
fixing the face?  While the Louisville team relies on traditional characterizations of FT as 
“non-vital,” the nature of the intervention calls into question the very terms of the debate.  
Throughout the AJOB debates, critics infer what the stakes of facial disfigurement are 
and subsequently what constitutes a vital and non-vital intervention.       
At the most basic level, the AJOB operated as a forum for risk-benefit assessment. 
Much of the commentary was devoted to identifying, contesting, and questioning the 
physiological, psychological, social, and institutional risks associated with FT.  And yet, 
in the context of procedural deliberation about risks, the benefit of FT was taken for 
granted.  That is, proponents and even many critics resoundingly agree that the 
technology would benefit patients in ways that exceed traditional techniques, despite the 
risks articulated above.     
Butler and his colleagues (2004) ask “To what benefit?” but rather simplistically 
answer,  
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“[T]he desired outcome for this type of surgery clearly [would] be improvement 
in the facial function and appearance and not normality” (16).  
In a similarly reductionistic tone, Robertson (2004) writes,  
“Face transplants are electric because they are aimed not a treating end-stage 
organ disease, but at improving the patient’s quality of life in a central aspect of 
personal identity.  In this case the improvement appears to be so crucial to the 
patient’s well-being that the risks and costs of life-time immunosuppression seem 
justified” (32).   
In this way, the technology is made to speak for itself; that is, its benefit is considered to 
be self-evident.  Despite the multitude of risks identified in the debates, there is a shared 
assumption that biomedical innovation is intrinsically beneficial.     
Only the Louisville team specifically outlined the functional, aesthetic, 
psychological and social benefits of FT:  
“When, as in most cases, the original tissues are not available, autologous tissue 
and/or prosthetic materials are used to reconstruct large tissue defects of the face.  
In these situations, complications caused by prosthetic materials (e.g., infection or 
rejection) are common, donor site morbidity (at the location from which the 
autologous tissues are taken) is almost, always present, and multiple “revision” 
operations and prolonged rehabilitation are usually required.  Moreover, 
functional and aesthetic recovery is usually poor, and the resulting deformity 
almost always leads to major psychosocial morbidity.  The latter in turn often 
prompts these patients to retire to a secluded environment, becoming social 
recluses (Lefebvre and Barclay 1982; MacGregor 1990).  A possible solution to 
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the above scenario is to reconstruct these severe facial deformities with identical 
tissues transplanted from brain-dead human donors (Composite Tissue 
Allotransplantation), as is done in solid organ transplantation (2).”   
In this fragment, the benefits of FT are outlined but not elaborated in any great detail, a 
criticism noted by Goering (2004) in her response to the team’s article.  In fact, the 
benefits are articulated in reference to the effects of other kinds of interventions aimed at 
facial disfigurement.  By juxtaposing FT with traditional reconstructive techniques, it is 
positioned not only as a mode of repair for the face but also as an alternative to the 
additional disfiguring and social isolating effects of other medical interventions.  In this 
account, the primary benefit of FT is that it is not reconstruction.   
In the most specific references to the benefits, authors point to functions of the 
human face, writing that the face is the source of vocal communication and a means for 
non-verbal communication and that FT could restore blinking and improve oral 
continence (Huxtable and Woodley 2004; Wiggins et al. 2004).  In a very real way, then, 
the debate about risks versus benefits leaves open the question about what precisely the 
benefits of FT are.  In effect, FT is taken for granted as a promising intervention, albeit a 
risky one.26   
Ultimately then, infusing the AJOB debates are two spectacular images of FT—
that of severe disfigurement erased and that of incomprehensible consequences—both 
                                                 
26 FT is undeniably a revolutionary procedure.  As the results of the few experimental 
transplants reveal, the results are dramatically better than can be effected by traditional 
reconstructive methods.   
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written on the face. Caplan describes the risks as “staggering” and in the most critical 
analysis that appeared in the issue, he writes,  
“It is not certain that the transplant will result in a functioning or even partially 
functional face. The drugs required to maintain a transplanted face are powerful, 
noxious, and potentially life-threatening.  If the procedure should result in acute 
rejection, then the subject may die with the entire graft sloughing off his or her 
head.  Even if that grim prospect does not occur, chronic rejection problems may 
be such that the recipient is exposed to doses of immunosuppression that lead to 
cancer, kidney failure, and other major problems.  And this presumes the subject 
is compliant with the postsurgical regimen, a state that some patients find very 
difficult to achieve post-transplantation.  Not only are the prospects of 
physiological complications and functional failures very real, but the first face 
transplant recipient will face enormous psychosocial challenges as well.  Their 
ability to retain their privacy will almost certainly be nonexistent” (18-19).”  
In contrast, FT proponents Agich and Siemionow (2004) claim:  
“Arthur Caplan has been widely quoted as saying, ‘What will you do if a face  
transplant fails?..I understand a disfigured face may be terrible to live with.  But if 
a transplant should be rejected you’re basically dying.  That’s a serious, high-
stakes issue’ (Allen 2003).  This is clearly an overstatement , one that Caplan 
would not likely claim in a published article…We think that the inordinate 
suffering of patients with severe disfigurements should be recentered in the public 
ethical discussion (26).   
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In a sense, Agich and Seimenow’s response to Caplan disregards his concerns and instead 
positions FT as a crucial technology for alleviating suffering.  E. Haavi Morreim (2004) 
goes much further, narrating the story of encountering a disfigured taxi driver,  
“This is not the story of someone who would qualify for a face transplant. But it 
hints at the enormous difficulties facing people whose appearance is abnormal.  
What outsiders might categorize in dry academic terms as ‘quality of life’ is for 
some of these people a very real assault on their personhood and their 
membership in society.  Their problems will not be remedied by urging people to 
be more tolerant.  Neither can we downgrade the idea of transplant because facial 
abnormalities are not life threatening.  As autonomous adults we routinely do, and 
must be free to, undergo substantial risks to improve our quality of life and act on 
the many other values we hold dear.  If general anesthesia is an ethically 
permissible risk for a cosmetic face lift, then so, surely, can significant medical 
risks be acceptable in hope of a significantly greater gain for those who are 
grievously disfigured” (28).    
In contrast with Caplan, the latter two accounts forefront the risks in order to position FT 
as particularly incredible.  Each argues that disfigurement is so imbued with suffering 
that the procedure may be worth it, in spite of and because of the significant risks.   It is 
by centering “inordinate suffering” and “enormous difficulties” in the description of what 
life with disfigurement entails that makes the risks associated with FT justifiable.   
 Benefits of FT are not only taken for granted in the AJOB debates, but they are 
taken for granted in a very particular kind of way.  Proponents acknowledge that, 
technically, FT is not life saving.  Morriem characterizes facial disfigurement as “not life 
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threatening.”  He along with other contributors who mention the benefits concede that 
ultimately FT is an intervention aimed at improving “quality of life.”  Yet their accounts 
imply that what FT accomplishes is different than what other life improving interventions 
achieve.  Morriem compares FT with a cosmetic facelift and concludes that FT is 
infinitely more beneficial.  Thus, while critics employ traditional notions of vital and 
non-vital to characterize FT as technically “non-vital,” they also suggest that FT is 
different than other interventions that are “life enhancing.”  Proponents argue that FT 
alters “central aspects” of a patient’s life, yields “crucial improvements,” and ameliorates 
the “assault on their personhood and membership in society” caused by disfigurement.  
These are benefits that are different from the benefits offered by interventions like “life 
saving” transplantations and by “life enhancing” technologies like face lifts.   
FT is simultaneously differentiated from “vital” interventions but positioned as 
more significant than “non-vital” interventions.  Thus, some of the cultural work 
accomplished by the AJOB commentaries is simply imagining the present and future 
possibilities of FT.  On the pages, it took shape not simply as a technological artifact but 
as an actor in the story.27  Across these varied accounts, FT takes shape as a risky 
practice but as one with incredible potential to alleviate human suffering.  Specifically, it 
                                                 
27 It is no surprise to scholars of science and technology that artifacts work as actors.  In 
fact, actor network theory is based on this idea.  In Latour’s (1987) explication of the 
“roles” technologies play in the making of science, he pays careful attention to the ways 
in which non-humans are produced by humans and subsequently shape human action.  
The case of face transplantation demonstrates how non-humans are also imbued with 
personalities that shape the making of science and technology.   
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emerges as something with the potential to make life worth living, to give patients a 
in society, to alleviate deep suffering.  In this way, FT is positioned as a “life saving
practice, albeit life saving in a new sense of the term.       
place 
” 
Ultimately, positions are founded on particular notions about the significance of 
the human face.  Part of what explains the variance among where critics stand in relation 
to FT is how each conceptualizes what the face means.  For example, if the face is 
reduced to appearance (and appearance is conceptualized as non-essential), then it is not 
reasonable to incur the risks of immunosuppression to repair it.  If on the other hand, the 
face is, as contributor Robertson (2004: 32) wrote, “the external manifestation of our 
persons (our souls?)” then the “reasonable” risks might very well include threats to life.  
In other words, if the face is vital to human life then FT can more easily carry the 
designation as a vital intervention.  On the other hand, if the face is extraneous to human 
life then it remains different from “life saving” organ transplants.   
 
We Submit that the Time is (Not) Now   
The debate over risks and benefits of FT demonstrates much more than the cost-
benefit analysis so endemic to the modern biomedical complex.  The debate did not end 
in a position, made possible through calculation and weighing of the risks and benefits.  
This is not particularly unusual.  Bioethics debates often take the form of sustained 
conversation that result in no clear answer about how innovation should proceed.  Yet, 
the specific terms through which the debate unfolds reveal a working set of assumptions 
about how interventions are organized, when they are deemed necessary, and how risk 
and human experience are understood and structured into medical practice.    
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Contributors’ conclusions about the future of FT widely vary, with some calling 
for immediate experimentation, others expressing reservations, and still others rejecting 
the technology altogether.  As would be expected, the University of Louisville team 
endorse immediate experimentation with a relatively simple declaration:  
“There arrives a point in time when the procedure should simply be done.  We 
submit that that time is now” (2004: 11).   
Petit and his collegues were the closest in agreement with the Target Article writing, 
“[O]ur position is that FT could now be performed.  The switch from “could” to 
“should” depends on the ethical conditions surrounding the procedure” (2004: 
15).   
Many others did not agree.  Butler and colleagues (2004) ultimately endorse the 
procedure but call for caution before experimentation:  
“There are a large number of ethical issues that require consideration, and it is 
imperative that this occur before any face transplants are carried out” (my 
emphasis, 17).   
In a more scathing critique, Arthur Caplan contends that the Louisville team had not 
satisfied the ethical standards of experimentation:  
“Any experiment should not only be the subject of moral reflection and 
deliberation prior to its initiation, but also must be able to successfully engage the 
concerns and objections raised as part of that process.  Has this standard been met 
in the case of FT?  I do not think so” (2004:18).   
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The implication embedded in both Butler et al. and Caplan’s responses is that the AJOB 
debates have not sufficiently resolved ethical concerns but that FT is potentially an 
ethically viable intervention.   
By contrast, others conclude by contesting the very idea of FT.  Nichola Rumsey 
writes,  
“The Louisville team feel [sic] that the time is right to undertake face transplants.  
The headline benefits of a normal appearance and fully functioning facial 
communication are certainly seductive, however, the message in the small print is 
much less clear-cut…[S]urgical solutions rarely provide miracle cures for 
complex psychological issues” (2004: 24).   
Sara Goering (2004) echoes Rumsey’s critique, writing,  
“But are their faces truly the source of their suffering? Our faces are intimately 
tied to our identities, and accepting oneself requires coming to terms with one’s 
face…Suffering can be addressed in multiple ways, and we should be careful 
about offering services that frame the problem as primarily an individual deficit.  
Such a focus may exacerbate our tendency to misidentify sources of suffering” 
(38). 
In this way, Rumsey and Goering reject FT altogether as a response to facial 
disfigurement and seem to eschew medical intervention, opting instead for intense 
psychological treatment and a radical restructuring of aesthetics.   
While the questions that circulate throughout the debates are often positioned as 
empirical questions by critics, I argue that the work of posing and debating these points 
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represents a crucial step towards infusing FT with meaning and significance.  One 
contributor, taking note of this tension, writes,  
“The question posed in this commentary is not whether the research team got its 
facts right or jumped through the ethical hoops gracefully, but a deeper one about 
the production and use of ‘objective’ empirical data associated with composite 
tissue allotransplantation (CTA) and the assessment of their ethical relevance to 
the determination of whether this experimental procedure should proceed” 
(Ankeny and Kerridge 2004: 36).  
As a technology in the making, the AJOB debate is characterized by uncertainty and 
fantasy, and ultimately, the debate raises more questions than it answers.  Critics and 
opponents alike argue that several scientific and ethical questions need to be resolved 
before clinical experimentation,28 but these answers are available only through 
experimental practice, and even then “facts” are not self-evident.  “Facts” themselves 
must be given meaning and significance.  The debates, in and of themselves, actually do 
very little to establish the “truth” of FT with which science can proceed, but they act as a 
forum wherein ideas, fears, and hopes about this technology are articulated and, 
subsequently, disseminated.    
Ultimately, the question that guides the debate as a whole centers on whether or 
not FT, even in its most ethical form, should be attempted at all (though several 
contributors frame their positions in technologically deterministic terms—how should FT 
                                                 
28 Proponents of immediate clinical trials argue that uncertainties about the innovation 
can only be resolved by attempting the procedure.  Critics argue that because we do not 
have answers to critical questions clinical trials should not be attempted.   
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proceed?) .  Subsequently, critics wrestle with one central question—do the benefits of 
FT outweigh the risks?  In particular, does a future with a face transplant (as opposed to a 
face repaired through traditional reconstructive techniques) justify the risks associated 
with immunosuppressive drugs?  This question activates an engaged and highly divisive 
set of responses that attempted to work through the significance of deploying a risk-laden 
technique in the service of what has historically been understood as life enhancing, rather 
than life saving, intervention.  In essence, this question about risks versus benefits 
animates concerns about technology, questions about what constitutes life, and worries 
about human suffering.  The debates about the risks of FT contain arguments about life 
itself, particularly what constitutes life saving work    
And yet, the debate opened up big bioethical questions that remain obscured in 
the talk about specifics of FT.  In the final response in the issue, “Medical Ethicists, 
Human Curiosities, and the New Media Midway,” Steven H. Miles analyzes the debate 
that precedes and offers a perspective about the work accomplished via the deliberation 
relative to the field of bioethics.  Miles characterizes the AJOB debate on FT as a 
“medical docu-soap” a form of what Dovey (2000) calls edutainment.  He argues that a 
contract governs the public work of bioethicists.  According to Miles, bioethics is not 
“allowed to reflect publicly on why particular subjects or framings of the issues have 
been chosen” (41).  And yet the framings of a subject have very real effects.  How 
disfigurement is framed seems to be evolving and how it is framed will do much towards 
determining the future of FT.  In an era when life is hardly a stable or unambiguous 
designation (consider that organ donors’ hearts continue to beat until the organ is 
harvested), it is not entirely self-evident what it means to characterize FT as a non-vital 
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procedure.  What is clear is that the AJOB debates contains within it the first echoes of a 
radical reappraisal of disfigurement, specifically as a “life threatening” condition.   
It should be no surprise that no consensus emerges in the AJOB debates.  No 
protocols are formulated.  No timelines are produced.  No funding is attained.  No 
institutional partnerships are formed.  If the debate is conceptualized as a key moment in 
making FT come into its own as an emerging technique, it is arguably a failure.  In a very 
real way, nothing that has transpired relative to FT can be firmly sited as a direct result of 
the AJOB commentary.  But in another sense, the debates are and continue to be 
incredibly momentous.  The debates open a Pandora’s box that promises to be 
increasingly salient as technologies that improve the quality of life while simultaneously 
threatening life emerge.  The question of whether to intervene or not requires some 
interrogation about the circumstances in which life is, in short, not worth living and some 
claims making about whether or not medicine can make such a  determination.   
 
The Disfigurement Imaginary 
As science studies scholars routinely find, the work of innovating technologies is 
more mundane than spectacular “science news” coverage suggests.  Oftentimes, the 
development of medical practices occurs within the university, and as such, the emphasis 
on respectability, protocol, and institutional politics abound.  In the case of FT, and in 
most innovative procedures, what appears to be revolutionary science is built on a 
foundation of mundane scientific tinkering (animal experimentation, immunology 
studies), intellectual labor (scientific theorizing, articulation of ethics arguments), and 
political maneuvering (grant writing, Institutional Review Board submission).  In this 
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way, the everyday reality of the work of a face transplant team is perhaps surprisingly 
ordinary to those unfamiliar with the inner workings of medical innovation.     
 The face transplant team I studied met at a 7 AM Monday morning meeting, each 
week for almost three years.  The meetings were held in a commonplace conference room 
in an ordinary building with an unremarkable name—Med Center One.  At the meetings I 
observed, those who attended varied, but four key members of the face transplant team 
emerged.  The team was led by a leading plastic surgery researcher whose career had 
been spent innovating techniques including hand transplantation.29   In addition, a 
philosophy professor served as the team’s bioethicist, while a sociologist and a 
psychologist offered insights about the social psychological facets of FT.   While the 
team was also comprised of medical students along with additional clinicians and 
researchers, these four comprised the hub around which the team’s work was organized 
and carried out.    
 While the topic of the meetings might be spectacular, the meetings were 
routinized and commonplace.  From the time I first attended a meeting in May 2006 until 
the team disbanded in July 2007, the work of the team was almost entirely focused on 
disseminating results of the team’s research, particularly those based on what the team 
called the LIFT survey and articulating an ethical approach to FT.  The face transplant 
team’s relationship with their institution, specifically hospital administration, is critically 
important for understanding the work of the team.  Although the team had established the 
                                                 
29 I use pseudonyms in place of team members’ names to protect anonymity and to 
emphasize that this account is not about the particular characters that occupy the case but 
rather about the discursive structures deployed within the site. 
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scientific understandings and technical skills needed to complete a transplant, the 
institution had rejected requests from the team to serve as a site for human 
experimentation.  There was to be no face transplant at the team’s home institution nor 
were any team members to participate in any transplant anywhere else in the world.  In a 
strange way then, the team’s immediate goal was not to complete a face transplant, rather 
the central task was rhetorical—professional and lay publics needing convincing that FT 
could and, in fact, should proceed.  The work of the team took two related forms: 
collectively developing arguments based on the team’s research and collaboratively 
completing the mundane tasks of scholarly research, specifically writing articles for 
publication in peer-reviewed journals.  The meetings of the FT team were similar, then, 
to other sites of academic collaboration:   
As is typical, the director opens up his notebook, a bound journal, to review his 
notes on the manuscripts in process.  One by one he goes through the team’s 
writing projects.  The team will talk details.  Who is writing what?  Where are 
they sending it?  Who is its intended audience?  Can the stats be made more 
intelligible?  But in the midst of these details, the team discusses why the team is 
writing the pieces they are writing.  What purpose does each serve?  The goal is 
clear—the team is establishing ethical arguments and extending knowledge for 
the purpose of facilitating FT (fieldnotes April 16, 2007).   
At any one time, the team worked on multiple articles.  Several were aimed at putting 
medical specialties in conversation with one another.  For example, the team submitted 
an overview of FT to a general plastic surgery journal with the aim of introducing the 
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immunological information to professionals with the technical skills to complete face 
transplants.  Other pieces focus on the ethical questions raised by FT.   
Much of the team’s writing examined the psycho-social consequences of FT.     
The most crucial piece of research completed by the team was a survey, known within the 
group as the LIFT questionnaire.  The survey, largely developed by the psychologist who 
worked on the team, was aimed at empirically demonstrating the risks individuals were 
willing to incur in order to receive a face transplant.  From the perspective of the team, 
critics’ claims hinged on the assumption that the risks of FT were too great relative to the 
benefits.  To combat this claim, the team decided to interrogate this operating assumption 
empirically, specifically by asking respondents a series of questions indicating the level 
of risk they would assume in order to receive a face transplant to repair facial 
disfigurement.  The head of the team describes the results of that research:     
“Over the years, we’ve had over 300 people fill that [the LIFT survey] out.  And 
that population that has filled it out are people who are missing their hand, i.e., 
somebody that could benefit from a hand transplant; people that are missing their 
larynx, i.e., somebody that could benefit from a larynx transplant; facially 
disfigured, i.e., somebody that could benefit from a face transplant; kidney 
transplant recipients, i.e., somebody that lived with the risks of 
immunosuppression.  Also we had controls that are healthy individuals who do 
not have direct experience with either with the risks or the benefits and plastic 
surgeons and transplant surgeons… In a nutshell, what came out of all that 
research over the years is that regardless of who you ask everybody (and these are 
people without larynx, hands, with disfigured faces, on immunosuppression), 
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everyone would risk absolutely the most to get a face transplant than any other 
procedure.  Even the kidney transplant recipients would risk more to get a face 
transplant than the kidney that they already have and they are on 
immunosuppression… If I came to you and said that you needed a heart transplant 
otherwise you would die, but that you would have to take very toxic drugs for the 
rest of your life to ensure that the heart does not reject.  You would probably tell 
me that yes, you would take those drugs to get a heart because the alternative is 
death.  There, there is no debate about the risks vs. benefits. Whereas in hand or 
face transplantation, you can live a healthy life without a hand or with a 
disfigured face and so we as physicians are exposing you to the toxicity of 
immunosuppressive drugs and in exchange for that we’re not saving your life 
we’re just improving the quality of your life.  That is the crux of all of our 
research, i.e., analyzing what risks people would be willing to expose themselves 
to for the benefits of one of these non-lifesaving procedures.  That is what the 
LIFT questionnaire addresses exactly …We try not to inject our opinion but the 
opinion of 300 respondents to our questionnaires and these are people with direct 
experience with the benefits and the risks of immunosuppression.  These are not 
our opinions.  These are the opinions of people with real life experiences.”   
Several claims are made using the LIFT research.  First, those with direct experience of 
the risks of immunosuppression agree that a face transplant is worth the side effects of 
the drug regimen.  This is tantamount to arguing that the benefits outweigh the risks.   By 
interpreting the results in light of respondents’ “real life experiences,” the LIFT survey is 
given weight because it captures a kind of authority that critics, with presumably no real 
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life experience, do not have.  Second and related, those already negotiating chronic 
illness and disability understand facial disfigurement as somehow worse than other kinds 
of bodily suffering.  Getting a new face is positioned as more important than many other 
kinds of interventions, including kidney transplantation which has saved the lives of 
some LIFT respondents.  The rhetorical force of the LIFT survey centers on the 
assumption that those with personal experience can say.  What they say is that any risk is 
reasonable for the benefit of a new face in cases of severe disfigurement.   
 The head of the team clearly characterizes FT as non-vital, remarking that FT 
“just” improves quality of life, but the LIFT survey results suggest that the work 
accomplished by FT is anything but “just” another intervention.  By conveying that any 
risk is justifiable for the sake of facial recovery, the LIFT survey positions disfigurement 
as particularly threatening.  The construction of disfigurement as a very particular kind of 
bodily impairment is a significant, albeit unintended, component of the work 
accomplished by the face transplant team.   
In this way, the team’s work is twofold.   Empirical research gives FT shape as a 
medical intervention, a bioethical object, and a social issue.  At the same time, research 
relies on and works to actively infuse facial disfigurement with meaning.  While 
constructing “disfigurement” is not an explicit aim of the team, their work implicitly 
relies on notions about how facial disfigurement shapes human life.  In interviewing the 
four key team members, relationships between disfigurement, human suffering, and the 
hope of intervention are continually discursively negotiated.  Consider the following 
excerpt from an interview with the team’s director:  
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“The hand and the face are very unique parts of our anatomy...As you sit here and 
talk to me and as I respond to you, you are using your hands to express yourself to 
me...Not only do we use them for doing our daily activities, but we also use them 
for expressing ourselves.  That is uniquely human.  If you talk to the hand 
transplant recipients, and you ask them years after they’ve had their transplanted 
hands: what is the most important part of getting a hand transplant?  All of them, 
the first thing they say are things that are more related to being a human being…   
‘Now I can wear a wedding ring.’  That’s something that doesn’t have a lot of 
function.  It’s symbolic.  ‘Now I can walk downtown holding my daughter’s 
hands.’…There are very emotional human aspects of having a hand…With the 
face, it’s the same but times ten.  Our faces, we use to communicate to the world 
around us, it is a window through which people see our emotions.  The perfect 
example of that is to sit across from someone with severe facial disfigurement.  
It’s not only that the person with the disfigurement feels uncomfortable but you, 
we, as human beings it is very difficult to sit across from someone who is severely 
facially disfigured… we feel uncomfortable.  We don’t know where to look.  We 
feel uneasy. All of that emotion comes from the fact that we as human beings 
can’t live without our faces.  We take cues of communication from looking at 
people’s faces.  When that is robbed from somebody because of facial 
disfigurement, it only underlies how important the face is to making us human. 
We’re social animals, without interacting with other human beings our quality of 
life is severely lessened.  To be able to give somebody back normal human 
features is just a tremendous thing.  One of the things that when we talk to people 
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we were considering for face transplantation… we ask them [is] what would you 
like to get out of getting a face transplant?  It’s funny because the answer that I’ve 
heard many times—I just want to be able to walk into a room and have nobody 
notice me. What does that mean?  The face is so central to them that when they 
walk into a room and everybody just changes because they see this horrible facial 
disfigurement.  All these people want is to be not noticed.  To just have a healthy 
looking face. The face is just a tremendous part of us as human beings.  I would 
even venture to say with all the debate about risks versus benefits and that it’s not 
life saving. I would say it is life saving…not just quality of life improving.” 
In the preceding excerpt, the face is characterized as a crucial bodily part, a fundamental 
element of humanity.  Face transplantation is described as such a “tremendous” 
development in reconstructive surgery that its ends are not simply life improving but 
rather “life saving.”   Each of these claims are informed by an idea that circulates 
throughout the interview, namely that facial disfigurement is “horrible.”  More 
specifically, if taken to their logical ends, the notions of the importance of the face and 
the significance of face transplantation rely on conceptualizing facial disfigurement as 
deadly and as a threat to one’s humanity.   
Other interviews echo these sentiments.  When asked to respond to critics who 
suggest that efforts to develop FT should be redirected towards changing society’s view 
of facial disfigurement, the team’s bioethicist explains:   
“The argument goes like this: people who are facially disfigured suffer a lot of 
discrimination, but the problem is with the discriminators.  The problem is not 
with the facially disfigured…It’s the general public who discriminates that needs 
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to do something about themselves…That’s true…but suppose with face 
transplantation people could get a normal face and live better lives….There’s 
certain people we could really help out from doing this, but we’re not going to do 
it.  We’re going to wait twenty years, thirty years, forty years till society changes 
its opinion…  In the meantime these people are going to live out their miserable 
life, behind closed doors, behind curtains, and they’re going to die, but that’s okay 
cause we’re preparing for a better future in which people don’t 
discriminate…That’s using facially disfigured people as a means to an ends in a 
way you shouldn’t do…We told ourselves anytime we get up to talk in public we 
will say, ‘The best solution here is for the public to change it’s attitude towards 
facially disfigured people…but in the meantime there’s people who really suffer 
because they don’t have a normal appearance and we think if you have the means 
to help these people you should use it.  It’s a medical benefit that we shouldn’t 
withhold while we wait for society to change…’  Politically it’s very desirable, 
but it’s unethical.”   
This is a carefully crafted response, one that considers the possibility of social change 
while at the same time affirming the promise of FT.  It is also a highly empathetic 
reaction.  Ultimately, he supports FT because he imagines that it will alleviate profound 
suffering.  Specifically, the bioethicist argues that waiting for social change while 
technologies are available to impact the present moment is an “unethical” response.  Even 
though he imagines social change as a politically preferable response, he characterizes 
such a response as unethical because it allows for the unnecessary continuation of 
suffering.  At the same time, embedded in his response are notions about what suffering 
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FT targets.  Social isolation and, more startling, the specter of death haunt this 
explanation.   
 Death also appears in the narrative of another team member who describes how 
he became compelled to work on the face transplant team.   
“A psychologist named Frances Cooke Macgregor…writing about disfigurement.  
She had a concept called ‘social death.’ She got me to thinking about how we’ve 
come up with different definitions of age.  Age just doesn’t mean chronological 
years anymore.  Now we have an emotional age, a maturation age, a middle age.  
I started thinking similarly along the lines of death.  We can have different kinds 
of death.  We have the death that everybody grieves.  We also have brain death.  
Why can’t we have social death?...The stigma facing these folks, perhaps, is the 
strongest that still exists.  It seems to be universal...It is the most damaging social 
disability that still exists…Reconstructive surgery does not bring them back to 
life.  Face transplantation can do that.”  
This account explicitly positions facial disfigurement as like death and FT as a kind of 
life saving intervention.  The team psychologist, in an effort to characterize the 
importance of FT, analogizes disfigurement to cancer,  
“The face is a primary organ of communication… Clearly, it doesn’t entail the 
same level emergency or immediacy as medication to cause someone to recover 
from an ongoing stroke or heart attack, nor is it a cure for cancer.  But facial 
disfigurements are a form of social cancer given that it’s constantly intruding in 
your social relationships.” 
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Though this explanation somehow positions disfigurement as not as “immediate” as other 
bodily conditions, it nonetheless relies on a link between disfigurement and death.  Taken 
together, the interviews with team members capture a shared way of thinking, and by 
extension, talking about facial disfigurement.     
 Sociologically, it is crucial to ask how ways of thinking shape response or 
intervention.  Sociologist Chrys Ingraham (1994), drawing on Louis Althusser (1971), 
employs the concept of “imaginary” to highlight the ways in which ideas about 
heterosexuality structure gendered relations.  For Althusser the concept of imaginary 
provides a way for understanding how ideology translates into social practice and 
obscures political and economic interests.  For Ingraham, an imaginary is a way of 
thinking about reality that masks material conditions.   She describes the heterosexual 
imaginary as “that way of thinking which conceals the operation of heterosexuality in 
structuring gender and closes off any critical analysis of heterosexuality as an organizing 
institution” (203-204).  I position ways of thinking and talking about facial difference as 
a disfigurement imaginary.  In doing so, I mean to highlight the ways in which how we 
think about facial disfigurement obscures the assumptions underlying responses to 
disfigurement and closes off critique of those responses.   
First and foremost, the disfigurement imaginary presumes the tragedy of facial 
differences.  Employing the disfigurement imaginary positions the experience of 
disfigurement as inherently horrific.  In doing so, it reduces the experience of 
disfigurement to one of suffering.  Second, the disfigurement imaginary naturalizes a “fix 
it” response.  The disfigurement imaginary understands repair as a necessary and 
unavoidable response to facial difference.  Disfigurement is positioned as an emergency 
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necessitating intervention.  In this way, the disfigurement imaginary animates the 
imperative to repair and infuses the work object with meaning.   
Third, the disfigurement imaginary is a way of thinking about faces but also about 
the work aimed at “fixing” faces.  In other words, the disfigurement imaginary 
fundamentally understands facial difference in relation to face work.  Finally, the 
imaginary positions recovery around the most mundane of outcomes—unremarkability.  
If facial difference is so horrific, then it is significantly beneficial to take on just a normal 
face, one that goes unnoticed in a room.  In fact, producing a mundane outcome actually 
carries connotations as life saving work.  Such a framing of face work is only possible 
when facial disfigurement is conceptualized as intrinsically horrifying, profoundly abject, 
and even deadly.   
By positioning ways of thinking about disfigurement as an “imaginary,” I do not 
mean to suggest that the meanings accrued to disfigurement are not real.  To the contrary, 
as W.I. Thomas and Dorothy Thomas (1928) suggest, “If men define situations as real 
they are real in their consequences” (572).  While the disfigurement imaginary is a social 
fiction, it perpetuates a particular social reality.  Faces are made intelligible as objects of 
intervention based on the meanings attributed to them.  Thus, characterizing ways of 
thinking about facial variance as a disfigurement imaginary puts into sharp relief the 
ways in which ideological formations shape material practices and bioethics deliberation.  
Only by questioning the ways that disfigurement is thought about and talked about can 
interventions be critically analyzed.   
As a social practice, face work simultaneously relies on and reinforces the 
disfigurement imaginary.  As the mundane work of one FT team demonstrates, 
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intervention, especially one that is controversial because of the risks it entails, requires 
that disfigurement be positioned in a particular way.  The disfigurement imaginary serves 
those ends, and thus it works ideologically to support the position that FT should proceed.  
Given that FT remains a technology in the making and that much of the work of the team 
is rhetorical in nature, the work of the team is not only giving voice to the disfigurement 
imaginary, which certainly persists in various arenas of social life, but also reifying the 
imaginary by continually relying on it in their work.  It works to position disfigurement 
as deadly, and in the process calls into question the stakes of the intervention, implicitly 
reframing work on disfigurement as a vital intervention.   
 
Bioethics in the Making: Disfigurement as “Deadly” 
FT relies on boundary work of sorts (Gieryn 1983).  In this instance, what is at 
stake is not a boundary between science and non-science but rather a distinction between 
the kinds of scientific work accomplished by FT.  The boundary work currently unfolding 
around FT centers on distinctions between vital intervention as “life saving” work and 
non-vital intervention as “life enhancing” work.  FT is clearly not a life saving or vital 
intervention in the sense that it does not ward off actual death, at least what is 
traditionally thought of as cessation of life.  Yet as a way of thinking that undergirds FT, 
the disfigurement imaginary situates face work as life saving work, warding off what 
might be termed social death.  Boundary work has high stakes.  Characterizing the work 
of FT as “life saving” work relies on a particular notion of disfigurement and carries 
consequences for the project of bioethics.  
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Sociologically, it is important to ask what constitutes an “ethical” practice?  When 
should an intervention be used? How should a new technology be employed? What 
limitations should be placed upon innovations?  These are questions about the everyday 
practice of medicine, and while these conversations take up the nitty gritty of medicine, 
these questions depend on “metaethics”—the theoretical frameworks that infuse a 
particular knowledge and praxis claim (Shildrick 2005).  Constitutive of the metaethics 
that determine ethical medical practice are conceptualizations of human life and notions 
about progress.  Of course, “life,” “death,” and “progress” infuse debates about medical 
intervention, but what life and death and progress mean varies, changing in response to 
new technologies that interfere with how we have traditionally understood what 
constitutes life or death.   
 In the practice of articulating pragmatic ethical positions, bioethics often fails to 
name the metaethics operating in the process of staking an ethical claim.  Yet metaethics 
saturates each and every claim about a particular innovation.  In debates about FT, the 
question about whether or not the procedure is ethical persists.  Bioethics stakes positions 
along a continuum characterized by unqualified support for progressing or unequivocal 
rejection of the technology.  Not surprisingly, most critics, if not all, lie somewhere in the 
middle, supporting FT if (and only if) certain conditions are met and under specified 
limitations.  These debates about whether to do or not to do a face transplant 
fundamentally ignore the metaethics operating and saturating bioethicists claims about 
the technology.  As Shildrick argues, bioethics arising from liberal humanism organizes 
knowledge claims according to binary oppositions that rely on unequivocal boundaries 
between self and other, mind and body, subject and object, health and disease, and life 
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and death.  It is this last binary that operates throughout debates about FT.  Arguments 
over the ethics of FT rely on varied notions about what constitutes life, and they call into 
question how we want to conceptualize “life itself.”  While heart transplantation elicited a 
real need for conversation about what constitutes death, FT demands a reevaluation of 
what counts as life.  Can one “live” with a disfigured face or not?   
 The central task of bioethics is one of claims making (Aronsen 1984).  As the 
AJOB debates reveal, the truth is not self-evident.  A future for FT will take shape in 
accordance with those claims that come to be counted as true.  It is a rhetorical practice, 
wherein arguments are made to defend a particular position.  The “strategic claims 
making processes” that comprise the work of bioethics have significant consequences.  
Each position imagines a different future for medical intervention.  Each set of claims 
relies on implicit definitions of life and death.  Specifically, it begs the question: are we 
to take social death as seriously as biological death?  The history of bioethics reveals that 
while terms like life and death are contested in response to debates about specific 
interventions, how life and death come to be understood extend far beyond the reaches of 
the particular technology at stake.   
There is another story of transplantation that dominated our collective imaginings.  
The emergence of heart transplantation elicited public fascination.  The procedure not 
only signified a technological feat but also required a redefinition of life and death.  
Consider that in the last thirty years, death has been radically reappraised such that new 
interventions are made possible but concomitant with that transformation is a much less 
visible though equally massive development.  How we encounter those most dear to us 
has changed.  Some of us can now easily conceive of the mother/partner/friend whose 
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heartbeat and respiration is made possible with technological support as, in fact, not 
living, as dead, and more specifically as a possible organ donor.  How will situating 
disfigurement as a form of death and framing interventions which traditionally have been 
life enhancing as life saving infuse other domains of life?  How will this radical 
reappraisal of vitality determine our bodily futures?   
FT troubles how we conceptualize life saving and life enhancing work.  If 
disfigurement is merely unfortunate or even tragic, it is not ethically justifiable to pursue 
FT, given its myriad risks.  But if disfigurement is life threatening as the disfigurement 
imaginary presumes that it is, then FT promises to be a revolutionary mode of repair, a 
tremendous innovation in reconstructive surgery.  FT captures our imaginations because 
it is seems so radical, unfathomable, too risky. And yet when we hear the story of a 
French woman awaking from a suicide attempt, a drug overdose to find that her own dog 
in a desperate attempt to rouse her chewed off a third of her face, the question arises what 
kind of life can possibly follow?30    
In a moment in which being beautiful means so much, having an abject face takes 
on particular weight.  The debates about FT and the meaning attributed to the work 
therein are situated within this socio-historical moment, and these debates reveal that we 
are undergoing a dramatic social transformation.  Whereas interventions on bodily 
appearance used to be understood as life improving work, for particular bodily 
                                                 
30 This is an incredibly problematic position to hold.  To assume that no life follows 
disfigurement is to shut down the productive and imaginative ways in which people make 
lives after bodily injury.  I reference this collective imagining not as a justifiable one but 
merely as a common one.   
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configurations, in this case facial disfigurement, work on the aesthetic is understood as 
life saving.  Disfigurement equals death.  As we watch the face transplant story unfold, 
the question arises— what might this conflation of appearance and life, disfigurement 
and death might mean for us all.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
NOT A PRETTY GIRL: FACIAL FEMINIZATION IN THE SERVICE OF 
UNREMARKABILITY 
 
 
“Helping transsexual women to look like women, a healthy mind is a healthy 
soul. The first step to feeling like a human being, FFS is a very big part in 
that process. Looking feminine, appearing as a female, is of course extremely 
important to you.  First impressions are often made based just on your face.  
That which is first seen in an initial contact is what frequently defines you.  
It establishes not only just who you are but frequently what you are as well.  
As a transgender individual, perhaps nothing is more important to you than 
appearing sexually as you feel emotionally.  Facial feminizing surgery can help 
bring these two together.”    
Excerpt from “Feminization of the Transsexual”  
a pamphlet distributed by Dr. Douglas K. Ousterhout 
 
Facial Feminization Defined 
 In the fall of 2007, ABC announced that upcoming episodes of its hit show 
DirtySexyMoney would feature a new guest star.  Candis Cayne, a transgender31 
                                                 
31 I use the word transgender to make reference to a range of non-normative gender 
identities.  Put another way, transgender describes gender identities that challenge 
hegemonic understandings of the relationships between bodies (specifically sex 
characteristics) and gender identity. Transgender and related terms I use throughout this 
chapter to describe the identities of those that appear here are emergent and contested 
terms.  The meaning of these words depends on the context, and much debate ensues 
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performer whose work had been limited to drag venues (albeit at some of the most well 
regarded clubs) and independent films like Wigstock and To Wong Foo Thanks for 
Everything Julie Newmar, would play the role of William Baldwin’s transgendered 
girlfriend.  The casting was celebrated in gay media outlets, such as the Advocate, 
because it marked the first time a real transgendered person had been cast to play a 
transgendered character (Herman 2007).   The decision also alerted outlets like the Los 
Angeles Times and The Boston Globe who publicized the move as a momentous shift in 
attitudes about transgenderism (Catlin 2007; Weiss 2007).   
In media coverage, next to brief articles about Cayne’s role on the show were 
photographs featuring her stunning face.  As Baldwin remarks in a People magazine 
feature about Cayne, “She's an absolute showstopper” (133).  While Cayne admitted to 
the press that she had undergone cosmetic facial surgery, she resisted offering a detailed 
account of her physical transformation.  In the same People feature, Cayne remarks, 
“Like every girl, we don't talk about our surgeries.”  Candis Cayne’s face appears not 
altogether unlike that of A-list pin-ups turned B-list actresses Carmen Electra and Pamela 
Anderson, both of whom are admitted cosmetic surgery consumers.  Her lips have the 
fullness typically effected through injectables like collagen.  Her bone structure is 
impeccably sharp.  Her face is widest across her cheekbones and narrows into a perfectly 
pointed chin.  Her cheeks are full, perhaps through the use of implants or fat injections.  
                                                                                                                                                 
about what is meant by each term.  Language usage is further complicated by issues 
related to self-identification.  People use different words to talk about similar identities.  
These tensions make the act of description which I attempt inherently problematic.  I 
employ these terms cautiously and invite criticism about the language usage herein.    
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Undoubtedly, network television audiences are titillated by the thought of Cayne’s 
surgically crafted vulva, but Cayne’s more visible face certainly contributes to her 
widespread appeal.  Just as genital reassignment surgery for transsexuals relies on 
techniques used in other forms of genital surgery, specifically reconstructive surgery 
aimed at intersexed bodies, face work aimed at transsexual32 faces relies on common 
plastic surgery techniques.  Yet in the case of surgery aimed at transgendering the face 
and body, the goal of surgery is somewhat different than that aimed at cosmetic surgery 
consumers or intersexuals.  Work on Cayne’s face is not simply about creating a beautiful 
visage; rather it is, first and foremost, about making Cayne’s face appear reliably female.   
In the 1980s and 1990s, a Northern California plastic surgeon with extensive 
experience in reconstructive surgical techniques developed a collection of procedures 
identified as facial feminization surgery (FFS).  These procedures are marketed to male-
to-female (MTF) transsexuals for the purposes of changing facial appearance.  In the 
United States, facial feminization surgery is currently marketed and practiced as “facial 
feminization surgery” by four surgeons.33  While FFS consumers may desire a pretty 
face, what distinguishes facial feminization from cosmetic surgery, more generally, is 
that work is expressly aimed at making the face more feminine, rather than simply more 
attractive—although some accounts of what constitutes beauty suggest that the most 
                                                 
32 I use the word transsexual to specifically describe those who pursue medical 
technologies (surgery, hormones, cosmetic surgery, etc.) to craft gendered bodies.  
33 Other surgeons practice techniques akin to facial feminization surgery, but the four I 
discuss in this chapter treat facial feminization as a distinct and intelligible set of 
practices.   
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feminine faces are often perceived as the prettiest (Etcoff 1999).  Facial feminization is 
accomplished through a variety of procedures including but not limited to a brow lift, a 
trachea shave, a jawline reduction, a chin reduction, and a face and neck lift.   While 
surgeons are often vague about how much feminization costs, patients’ websites report 
that FFS can cost between $20,000 and $40,000.    
Other cosmetic surgeons may offer transwomen34 patients a variety of procedures 
that have the effect of feminizing the face, yet facial feminization is intelligible as a 
distinct set of surgical techniques aimed at refiguring the masculine face.  Like other 
forms of reconstructive surgery, the results of facial feminization require intensive 
surgery often lasting hours, sometimes as many as ten.  Because procedures are aimed at 
radically altering multiple facial features, patient’s faces (and skulls) undergo serious 
surgical manipulation.  For example, jawline and chin reduction may require actually 
breaking or severing the bones of the face with a surgical drill.  Facial bones are then re-
secured with screws, wires, and bone pastes.   Brow shave or forehead recontouring 
involves removing a section of the skull, reshaping it with a device that resembles a 
dremel drill,35 and reattaching it to the skull.  To reduce the distance between the hairline 
and the eyebrows, a cut is made along the hairline, a section of skin is removed, and the 
scalp is pulled forward, bringing the hairline down lower on the forehead.  Swelling, 
bruising, and scarring are common.  Some patients experience changes in the face’s range 
of motion, reducing the facility with which one moves one’s jaw, for example.  Others 
report a loss in facial sensation, typically a sort of numbness that leaves a face unable to 
                                                 
34 I use the term transwomen to describe male-to-female transsexuals.   
35 A dremel is a high speed rotary tool used for grinding, drilling, and sanding.     
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perceive human touch or the searing burn of a curling iron.  Like all forms of surgery, 
infection and death loom as potential side effects.   And of course, the resulting face may 
not resemble what one had desired.   
Facial feminization is an invasive, expensive, dubiously successful intervention.  
And yet it remains a highly sought after technology of transgendering for transwomen.  
By contrast, female-to-male transsexuals achieve masculinization of the face through 
hormone therapy, thus there is no such comparable set of surgical practices termed facial 
masculinization surgery.  In this chapter, I interrogate facial feminization as a mode of 
face work for two reasons.  First, I position facial feminization as an example of a site in 
which the specter of disfigurement is employed to incite immediate repair.  In other 
words, defining the face as disfigured becomes a important precursor to positioning FFS 
as needed.  While faces subject to facial feminizing procedures are not obviously 
intelligible as “disfigured,” I demonstrate that what counts as disfigurement is contextual.  
I show that facial feminization is routinely framed as a kind of reconstructive enterprise.  
Second, focusing on the significance of the face in the process of transitioning from 
male-to-female puts into sharp relief the significance of gendered facial appearance in 
everyday life.   
I begin by situating my analysis in scholarly and professional work on genital 
reassignment surgery.  I query the focus of surgery aimed at the genitals and compare 
face work aimed at transwomen with the work of “fixing” genitals. I aim to arrive at a 
theory about the particular significance of the face during the process of transitioning 
genders.  Specifically, I demonstrate that in sites of facial feminization, transwomen’s 
faces are defined as disfigured and facial feminization itself is positioned as a method of 
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reconstructive surgery.  In this way, face work employed in the process of transitioning is 
not simply a mode of “doing gender” but rather a technology of repair.  Using 
ethnography conducted at seminars featuring facial feminization surgeons and content 
analysis of surgeons’ promotional materials, I demonstrate that the ways in which 
transwomen’s faces are positioned as disfigured is informed by a theory of facial sex 
difference.  I describe the processes through which “the male-to-female transsexual face” 
is taken apart, both figuratively and literally. 
Surgeons emphasize the differences between “the female face” and the “the male 
face” through continual references to images, particularly illustrations of human skulls.  
Emphasizing difference brings into formation a way of seeing the face that inspires the 
literal taking apart of the skull through feminization surgery. In this way, the processes 
through which facial sex difference is articulated act as a diagnostic strategy.  Yet even as 
“the female face” is described and sought after, I argue that this is an ideal that is 
unattainable through surgery.  This leads me to pose the following question:  If 
feminization surgery is not successful at crafting the ideal female face, what kind of face 
does facial feminization produce?  More broadly, what is the corporeal objective of such 
face work?   I show that the face work accomplished by facial feminization surgeons is 
aimed at eradicating “masculine” facial features in the service of crafting an 
unremarkable face, a face that goes unnoticed in public, a face that facilitates passing.  I 
conclude by querying the difference between creating a “female” face and crafting an 
unremarkable face.   
Much of the data upon which this chapter is based comes from fieldnotes taken 
through my attendance at conferences featuring seminars on facial feminization.  
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Transgender conferences, including Southern Comfort and the International Foundation 
for Gender Education (IFGE), are unique quasi-public spaces.  Overwhelmingly, most of 
the people who attend and many of the people who present seminars self-identify as 
transgendered.  In this way, conferences offer attendees opportunities to network with 
others with shared interests and concerns and to access specialized information.  
Transgender conferences feature seminars that address a wide range of topics including 
politics, spirituality, mental health, and activism, but a significant number of featured 
speakers address topics related to body modifications made possible by and forged 
through medical technologies.  Not surprisingly, seminars on hormone therapy and 
genital reassignment surgery appear throughout conference schedules.  In addition, each 
of the primary U.S.-based facial feminization surgeons appears at transgender 
conferences to discuss and market facial feminization.36   Seminars are opportunities for 
potential patients to meet and consult with surgeons, to learn more about facial 
feminization techniques, and to view the faces of other transwomen who have undergone 
facial feminization.  Thus, seminars are simultaneously information sessions, commercial 
advertisements, and public spectacles.   
                                                 
36 Each of the surgeons I observed are male.  This should not necessarily be surprising 
given that men disproportionately pursue plastic surgery specialties, but it does make for 
interesting, and sometimes concerning, gendered dynamics between surgeons and 
transwomen patients.  Specifically, male facial feminization surgeons often offer their 
personal opinions about appearance, and sometimes interactions between surgeon and 
patients take on flirtatious overtones.  In the context of medical care, these patterns 
should be thoroughly interrogated.   
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Passing From the Neck Up: Faces Versus Genitals 
In her groundbreaking work on transsexuality, Marjorie Garber (1997) asks, 
“[D]oes a transsexual change subjects?  Or just bodies—or body parts?” (105).  While 
Garber is primarily interested in the category crisis marked by transsexualism, scholars 
who have taken up her work have ignored the complicated question of shifting 
subjectivity and the subsequent crisis around gender this shift signifies.  Instead, 
questions about transgendering have come to focus inordinately more narrowly upon 
body parts, specifically the transformation of genitals through genital reassignment 
surgery (GRS).  In Sander L. Gilman’s Making the Body Beautiful (1999), “transsexual 
surgery” is reduced to surgery aimed at the genitals (and breasts in his discussion of FTM 
transsexuals).  Given that much of Gilman’s book is focused on aesthetic surgery 
targeting the face, it is curious that there is no examination of facial feminization surgery.  
Janice Raymond’s (1979) scathing account of transgenderism, The Transexual Empire: 
The Making of the She-Male, positions sex reassignment surgery as the crucial act, and 
from her perspective the most fetishized by transwomen during the act of transitioning.  
Similarly, social scientific research often queries the “success” of transitioning, focusing 
on genital surgery as the crux of change (Peterson and Dickey 1995; Ines et al. 2006).   
In the aforementioned texts, there are occasional references to the bodily effects 
of hormone usage and even dress or fashion, but relatively little attention to other 
technologies of transgendering.  And there are other technologies employed in the 
process of cultivating a transsexual body.  Recent arrests for “murder by silicone” have 
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led to a growing awareness of the black market silicone industry (Luscombe 2003).37  At 
what the media have deemed “pumping parties,” industrial grade silicone is injected 
subcutaneously, often to affect breasts and hips and to contour the face.  Because the 
silicone is injected directly under the skin and not contained in any protective casing (as 
is the case with silicone breast implants), migrating silicone can result in a number of 
fatal conditions including pulmonary embolism, which results from free floating silicone 
entering the bloodstream and pooling in the lungs (Martinez-Jimenez et al. 2006).   The 
very risk of subcutaneous silicone injections begs the question: what are the benefits of 
such a technology?  Put simply, silicone injections are a cheap means for affecting a 
feminized appearance overall.  Precisely because it is in such a highly risky intervention, 
the use of silicone by transwomen puts into sharp relief the significance of body 
modification aimed not solely at genitals but at the entire body, and the face, in particular.  
What is it about a softer jaw line, rounder cheeks, and fuller lips that inspires 
consumption of a potential deadly material?    
 The overwhelming scholarly preoccupation with genitals is curious for many 
reasons.  First, not all transsexuals choose to undergo genital reassignment surgery.  
Given myriad transgender identifications, inscribing one’s identity on the body may not 
necessitate “bottom surgery.” In fact, some people choose to “do transgender” in a range 
of ways, employing particular technologies and resisting others.  Some transwomen may 
forgo genital surgery in an attempt to retain access to particular sexual practices.  
                                                 
37 Silicone is a cheap means of cosmetic intervention, but given the serious medical 
complications associated with its use, it has not been approved by the FDA for medical 
use.   
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Financial constraints may also mean that one must prioritize medical interventions, and 
for some, genital surgery is deemed less crucial or desired in comparison with other 
costly interventions.   Second, positing genitals, a facet of the human body most often 
hidden in everyday life, as the locus of transgender identity is peculiar.  Social identity is 
less determined by actual genitals and more determined by what we assume is true about 
other’s genitals.   In the course of everyday life, people do not typically have access to 
firsthand knowledge about another’s genitals, as Kessler and McKenna note (1978).  We 
might think that we know about another’s genitals, but in most cases, we have very little 
evidence upon which to base assumptions.   
 Perhaps academic attention to the genitals at the cost of sustained examination of 
other bodily sites of transformation simply mirrors preoccupation with genital surgery in 
the oft-referenced Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association (2001) 
(HBIGDA) Standards of Care.38  The Standards of Care are clinical guidelines 
                                                 
38 Harry Benjamin was a sexologist who pioneered treatment of transsexualism beginning 
around 1950.  Through his work, Benjamin made contemporary modes of transitioning 
possible by encouraging the use of hormones and surgery.  His work forms the basis used 
by most professionals who “treat” transgenderism.  The Harry Benjamin Standards of 
Care have undergone five revisions and updates since they were first released in 1979.  
The Standards are often employed as a protocol, meaning that many surgeons will not 
provide surgery to patients who have not satisfied the suggested route prescribed in the 
document.  Oftentimes, surgeons require that patients receive “permission” from their 
therapists before receiving surgery.  The organization has recently changed its name to 
The World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH).  
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specifically aimed at helping professionals who work with patients diagnosed with 
“gender identity disorders” to develop treatment protocols.  Implicit in the standards is 
that patients will undergo the process of transitioning with the assistance of medical 
technologies.  This assumption is reflected in the outline of the Standards of Care.  The 
initial sections of the document focus on diagnosis, followed by a discussion of 
therapeutic treatment of patients.  Subsequent sections discuss technologies of 
transitioning, with an emphasis on “triadic therapy” involving counseling, hormone 
treatment, and genital surgery.  The Standards are structured as a general model of 
treatment that is comprised of a series of steps—psychological counseling proceeds 
hormone treatment which proceeds genital surgery.  In this way, the Harry Benjamin 
Standards of Care position the renovation of genitals as the pivotal and ultimate step in 
embodying one’s self.  In this way, changing the genitals operates as a litmus test for 
determining if a transition has been completed.   
Feminization of the face appears briefly in the 2001 revision of the Harry 
Benjamin Standards of Care.  A section entitled “Other Surgery for the Male-to-Female 
Patient” reads: “Other surgeries that may be performed to assist feminization include 
reduction thyroid chondroplasty, suction-assisted lipoplasty of the face, rhinoplasty, 
facial bone reduction, face-lift, and blepharoplasty” (21).39   This is the only mention of 
facial procedures in the document.  There is something curious about the fact that the 
standards intended to guide treatment aimed at transitioning largely ignore technologies 
aimed at the face.  While scholarly, professional, and popular interest in transsexualism 
has disproportionately focused on surgery aimed at the genitals, face work is a crucial 
                                                 
39 Each of these procedures is used in feminizing the face.   
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part of transitioning for many, and in terms of navigating everyday social life, the 
appearance of the face is arguably more significant.   
In a June 16, 2006 letter published on her widely accessed and cited website 
www.tsroadmap.com, transgender activist Andrea James encouraged HBIGDA to 
reconsider its position on facial feminization surgery in future revisions of the Standards 
of Care.40  James argues that facial feminization is “medically necessary for male-to-
female transitioners.”   Based on her own experience, James argues that “Vocal and facial 
cues are far more likely to be factors in how others respond to a trans woman and are in 
my opinion the key to being accepted more easily in one’s target gender.  These cues 
affect everything from one’s personal and professional relationships to one’s ability to 
move through the world safely.”  In essence, James argues that contrary to the 
assumption embedded in the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care, feminizing the face 
disproportionately facilitates transitioning.   By the very fact that the face is so visually 
accessible, according to James, it is much more crucial to passing, or to navigating 
everyday life unencumbered by threats to one’s privacy or safety.  It is with such 
concerns in mind that James encourages both medical practitioners and transwomen to 
refocus attention to “passing from the neck up.” 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Tsroadmap.com is an internet resource providing information on all things related to 
transitioning from male-to-female.  James cites her annual traffic at around 4 million 
visitors per year.   
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The Transwoman’s Face as Disfigured 
But how are interventions aimed at “passing from the neck up” a kind of face 
work?  How does facial feminization constitute a case through which we can understand 
repair aimed at disfigured faces?  The faces subject to facial feminization are not 
immediately intelligible as disfigured faces, yet within sites of facial feminization, the 
faces of male-to-female transsexuals are positioned as untenable, and thus the face is in 
need of repair.  Certainly, impetus of repair implicitly mobilizes the specter of 
disfigurement, but explicit references to disfigurement appear frequently in subtle and not 
so subtle ways.   
Faces that might commonly be referred to as ugly are discursively constituted as 
disfigured via brief, but revealing, references.  In one facial feminization seminar, a 
surgeon pointed to a photograph of a seemingly unremarkable face, remarking,  
“You can see her forehead deformity.”41    
Words like deformity mark the face not simply as masculine but rather as fundamentally 
disfigured.  In another seminar, a doctor explained why somebody might choose facial 
feminization: 
“This is the same thing as if you were in a car wreck and you want to look like 
who you really are.” 
Tthe male-to-female transsexual face is equated here with an injury or a trauma, and thus 
in need of repair.  From this perspective, facial feminization is hardly elective surgery but 
                                                 
41 The text that appears throughout as data has been excerpted from fieldnotes taken 
while attending Southern Comfort and IFGE.   
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is rather positioned as unequivocally necessary—especially by those who stand to benefit 
commercially.  
 Perhaps even more revealing is a strategy used by one surgeon, Dr. Peterson42 
who is often referenced as the founder and developer of modern facial feminization 
techniques.  The first time I attended a seminar presented by this surgeon, I watched as 
his assistant connected his laptop to a projector.  As the doctor and his assistant readied 
themselves for the lecture, images flashed on a large screen that appeared at the front of 
the hotel meeting room.  When I saw the photographs, I was sure that his assistant had 
opened the wrong PowerPoint file.  What filled the screen were images of children with a 
range of cranio-facial anomalies.  These images seemed shockingly out of place.  Why 
begin a lecture on facial feminization with the faces of facially variant children?   
Fieldnotes from a second seminar presented by the same surgeon reveal why it 
made precise sense from the perspective of the surgeon to begin with such images: 
Dr. Peterson tells the audience that he spent 20 years running a center focused on 
the repair of cranio-facial anomalies.  He’s worked on hard cases, “horrible” 
facial anomalies.  He flips through slides of people with a variety of congenital 
facial differences. One has a cleft palate.  One has an unusual skull shape.  It is 
not spherical.  The surgeon refers to the photograph as an example of “clover leaf 
skull.”  One picture of a baby illustrates asymmetrical facial features.  The eyes 
and the nose appear randomly placed as if in a Picasso painting.  One has eyes 
                                                 
42 I use pseudonyms when quoting from my fieldnotes.  This attempt at anonymity is a 
move to emphasize that the story is not about the personalities in this site but rather the 
narratives that operate.   
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that upon profile extend dramatically beyond a recessed eye cavity, resulting in 
look of extreme surprise.  You can see the shape of the entire eyeball, and they 
look as though they may fall out of the skull.   Next to each is an “after” picture 
that shows the face post-surgery.  Each face looks remarkably different, more 
“normal.”  Dr. Peterson remarks, “Those three patients show what I do to 
feminization patients.”   
Without a doubt, the images convey technical skill and surgical “successes,” but this 
introduction accomplishes much more than that.  By beginning the presentation with 
images of children with craniofacial anomalies, the audience is immediately engaged 
with representations of disfigurement.  While looking at these pictures, the audience was 
solemn.  The pictures appear within a cultural lineage in which photographs of disabled 
children are to be witnessed as evidence of the tragedy of congenital difference.   By 
claiming that “those three patients show what I do to feminization patients” the faces of 
the transwomen in the audience are positioned as somehow just like the faces of the 
disfigured children—in need of repair.  In addition, such a claim characterizes facial 
feminization as somehow akin to reconstructive surgery, as opposed to elective cosmetic 
intervention.   
 Other surgeons offer a narrative about their own careers that firmly locates their 
facial feminization practices within a trajectory of reconstructive surgery.   
A pamphlet distributed by an East Coast surgeon, Dr. Thomas describes his educational 
history and professional affiliations: 
Advanced training was obtained with fellowship in Facial Plastic and 
Reconstructive Surgery, and Microsurgery through Harvard Medical School.  He 
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currently devotes his practice to facial plastic surgery and head and neck cancer 
reconstruction.  The busiest component of his practice is Facial Feminization 
Surgery (FFS).   
Another, Dr. Adams, emphasizes similar career ties in a handout distributed to potential 
patients entitled “Head of Plastic Surgery of Nation’s Oldest & Busiest Military Hospital 
Relocated to Chicago.”  The feature describes the techniques innovated by the surgeon 
while serving as the chief of the Plastic Surgery Department at Naval Medical Center, 
Portsmouth, VA.  Plastic surgery departments located at military hospitals often function 
to innovate reconstructive techniques that address disfigurement resulting from war 
injuries.  Thus, work as a plastic surgeon in the military locates one’s professional history 
within the domain of reconstructive surgery.   I am not arguing that it is unique for 
cosmetic surgeons to have training in reconstructive techniques; rather, I am interested in 
the ways in which surgeons use that training to communicate something about the work 
they do as facial feminization surgeons.   By positioning facial feminization as a logical 
extension of training accomplished towards the ends of reconstructive surgery, surgeons 
both produce and rely on associations between disfigurement and the male-to-female 
transsexual face.   
It is not simply that facial feminization and reconstructive surgery are discussed 
as technical equivalents and that transwomen’s faces are characterized as disfigured 
faces. More significantly, facial feminization surgeons invoke meanings attached to 
reconstructive surgery to accomplish the work they do to feminize the face.  Just as face 
transplantation is taken up as “life saving work,” facial feminization is described as life 
changing work—both for surgeons and patients.  Dr. Nelson, a surgeon whose practice is 
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divided between facial feminization and genital reassignment surgery begins a 
presentation by explaining to the audience what makes a surgeon trained to “fix” facial 
“abnormalities” decide to start one of the country’s pre-eminent centers for transgender 
related surgery:  
“What deformed people remember is what they looked like before.”  He 
continues, by telling the audience that his patients are happy to be in the hospital.  
His patients are happy to see him.  
In contrast to presumably unhappy “deformed” patients, this doctor suggests that the 
work of facial feminization is about making patients happy.  Rather than being 
preoccupied with their pre-surgical visage, the surgeon suggests that transwomen 
embrace their interventions, and that this gives a particular significance to his work.  Dr. 
Adams goes further.  He replies when asked by an audience member, “Why do you do 
this?”:   
“I came out of the Navy with a great set of tools…As a plastic surgeon, it is rare 
that I can make a difference.  I have profoundly affected their [transwomen 
patients] life so that they can go in society and live their lives.  We all know how 
cruel society can be.”  
This surgeon frames facial feminization as life changing work, as a form of repair that 
allows people to “live their lives.”  The focus is on changing the individual rather than 
the society that presumably makes living life difficult for transwomen.  This echoes the 
sentiment expressed in other sites of reconstructive surgery and other sites of face work 
that appear in this account, namely face transplantation and Operation Smile.   
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By introducing facial feminization as an extension of reconstructive surgery, FFS 
is unequivocally positioned as a kind of repair for disfigurement.  Facial feminization 
surgeons “fix” disfiguring conditions.  This is body modification aimed at specific ends, 
but facial feminization is weighted differently than other gendered bodily practices like 
hair styling or make-up application.  Candace West and Don H. Zimmerman (1987) 
approach gender as a “routine, methodical, and recurring accomplishment” (126).  In 
other words, gender is an iterative process, enacted through dress and style, voice and 
gesture, along with roles and statuses. In short, “doing gender” is the way in which 
gender comes to be seen as a salient and recognizable social category.  To be sure, facial 
feminization is a way of “doing gender.”  It is a way that the transwomen effect 
femininity, but it is unlike other aesthetic means of feminizing.  Make-up, for example, is 
used to give the face a feminine, and thus a more socially valued, appearance.  By 
contrast, FFS is positioned as a mode of repair, not simply a means of “looking better.”  
As a technique for fixing something defined as flawed, in this case disfigured, FFS is 
understood as necessary.  It is not simply gender that gets constructed through facial 
feminization but rather a bodily stigma that becomes managed.  
The stigma, in this case the masculine face, is a product of gendered expectations. 
To a large degree, a masculine appearing face can be defined as disfigured for the 
transwomen because of the stringency of gender.  There are two, and only two, socially 
intelligible gender categories.  As Judith Lorber (1993) writes, 
[I]n Western societies, we see two discrete sexes and two distinguished 
genders because our society is built on two classes of people, ‘women’ 
and ‘men.’  Once the gender category is given, the attributes of the person 
are also gendered: Whatever a ‘woman’ is has to be “female”; whatever a 
“man” is has to be ‘male’ (567). 
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Transwomen, by the very nature of transitioning, already challenge the social prescription 
that one is born sexed and that one’s gender follows from one’s sex assignment at birth.  
Facial feminization is an enactment of gender—both a means of “doing gender” and a 
means of thoroughly and resolutely succumbing to a discrete notion of femininity.  
Because gender is conceptualized as a discrete category, “doing gender” is compelling 
but it is also constraining.  In other words, “doing gender” (and doing it in particular 
ways) is compulsory, unless one is willing to accept the costs of resisting.  In this way, 
facial feminization and other techniques of transitioning from one gender status are not 
simply elective in the sense that they are desired.  Rather, modes of gendering like facial 
feminization get chosen partially because gender difference must be contained.  Facial 
feminization works, thus, as a technique of normalizing gender variance.     
As opposed to elective or optional interventions, techniques of normalization are 
directed towards avoiding consequences related to an undesirable or unsustainable social 
status.  Gender can be the grounds upon which normalization proceeds.  As West and 
Zimmerman note, doing gender is required:  
[D]oing gender is unavoidable.  It is unavoidable because of the social 
consequences of sex-category membership: the allocation of power and 
resources not only in the domestic, economic, and political domains but 
also in the broad arena of interpersonal relationships (145).   
 
In other words, social life depends upon doing gender, and not simply any gender as 
West and Zimmerman seem to suggest, but rather socially acceptable modes of gender.  
Judith Lorber further outlines the consequences related to rejecting or living outside of 
normative gendered statuses.  “Political power, control of scarce resources, and, if 
necessary, violence uphold the gendered social order in the face of resistance and 
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rebellion” (578).  As Lorber asserts, there are consequences for challenges to the 
gendered social order.   
For transwomen, masculine facial appearance is a direct challenge to sexual 
dimorphism, to the cultural dominant model upon which gender relies.  The narrative that 
positions the masculine face as a disfigured face maps gender and normalization onto one 
another.  The masculine face is not simply unattractive; rather, it is untenable.   Put 
simply, because gender is a heavily enforced normative category, facial feminization 
serves as a technique of normalization.  What a surgeon does to facial feminization 
patients is to give them faces that make it possible to lead a “normal” life.  But what 
precisely is disfiguring about the male-to-female transsexual face?  To answer this 
question, I turn my analysis to the theory of facial sex difference that circulates in sites of 
facial feminization.   
 
Sexing the Face 
 Feminist accounts of cosmetic surgery have pointed to the ways in which 
cosmetic surgery consumption is gendered.  Not only are women more prone than men to 
pursue particular interventions, but what men and women hope to accomplish via 
intervention is largely determined by social conventions about men’s and women’s 
bodies (Blum 2003 Pitts-Taylor 2007, Sullivan 2004).  As Diana Dull and Candace West 
(2002) argue,  
This [gender] is the mechanism that allows them to see the pursuit of 
elective cosmetic surgery as “normal” and “natural” for a woman, but not 
for a man.  The accountability of persons to particular sex categories 
provides for their seeing women as “objectively” needing repair and men 
as “hardly ever” requiring it (137).   
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In this way, cosmetic surgery is both an effect of gendered relations and a means of doing 
gender.  Cosmetic surgery consumers employ surgery as a means for more closely 
approximating gendered cultural ideals.  Women purchase faces that might be described 
as beautiful or, perhaps, sexy.  Men consume interventions that result in a good-looking, 
though certainly still masculine, face.  Yet not all women who get cosmetic surgery 
change their bodies in precisely the same ways.  There are a range of possibilities, a 
multitude of means for aesthetic enhancement that one can choose towards more 
desirably doing one’s respective gender.  For example, a woman may choose any number 
of surgically constructed noses—the ski slope, the upturned, or the perfectly angular.  
The desired outcome is gendered, but it is gendered in a very generic sort of way.   
I argue that facial feminization is different.  It, too, is a method of surgically 
inscribing gender onto the body, but facial feminization takes up gender as its very object 
of intervention (and invention).  Facial feminization is not a technology simply employed 
in the process of doing gender.  Rather, facial feminization is about surgically 
constructing gender itself.   It is not, as is the case in cosmetic surgery, directed towards 
helping women achieve a prettier face.  Rather, it is the surgery that inscribes a face that 
is perceived as female at all.  To this end, facial feminization relies on extant, 
essentialized notions about what distinguishes a male face from a female face.   
In a 2007 issue of Clinical Plastic Surgery, in an article entitled “Transgender 
Feminization of the Facial Skeleton,” general plastic surgeons were introduced to the idea 
of facial feminization by a group of Dutch surgeons (Becking et al.2007).  The article 
begins by defining transsexualism and describing multiple modalities employed in the 
treatment of gender identity disorder, specifically genital reassignment surgery and 
 152
hormone therapy. Yet, the authors contend that these are crucial though insufficient 
means of addressing gender identity disorder: “For passing in public as a member of the 
opposite gender, facial features are of utmost importance for the transsexual individual” 
(558).  Beyond suggesting that the face should be conceived as a critical site of 
intervention, the surgeons propose the following:  
There is a need for more objective standardization of the differences in the 
facial features of the two sexes, to facilitate surgical treatment planning 
and more objectively assess the outcome of the facial surgery on 
psychosocial functioning and appearance, not only from the perspective of 
those treating, but also from the patient’s own point of view (563-564). 
    
By calling for “objective standardization,” Becking et al. argue that rigorous scientific 
research aimed at discovering facial sex differences would help in elaborating a basis for 
surgical practice and a standard by which to judge success.  Although there has been a 
limited amount of the kind of research they propose, there are already circulating 
“theories” of sex differences in facial appearance.   
In a pamphlet distributed by Douglas K. Ousterhout, the American surgeon often 
credited with developing facial feminization surgery, entitled “Feminization of the 
Transsexual” and targeted to prospective consumers, techniques of facial feminization are 
described in detail. However, the pamphlet is not simply a list of surgical procedures 
often accomplished in the process of feminization.43  Rather the pamphlet offers a theory 
                                                 
43 The degree to which it makes sense to emphasize the importance of a single pamphlet 
must be contextualized.  First and foremost, Dr. Ousterhout is often attributed with 
articulating facial feminization methods.  His work appears to be the first account 
published in a peer-reviewed medical journal (1987).  Secondly given the fact that there 
are so few doctors from which to choose, there are relatively few sources of information 
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of facial sex difference and a subsequent account of why facial feminization works.  In 
the introductory section, the pamphlet reads: 
“There are basic differences between a male and a female skull, differences long 
appreciated by anthropologists studying skulls but also by artists as well.  Females 
have a more pointed chin, tapered mandible, and less nasal prominence than 
males.  These areas must be modified from those more massive areas on the 
male…You must change the underlying structures to affect a real change.  
Changing the shape of the skull will markedly assist in changing one from 
distinctly male to female….REMEMBER: TO APPROXIMATELY FEMINIZE 
THE FACE, THE SKULL MUST BE APPROPRIATELY REDUCED TO 
FEMININE SIZE AND PROPORTIONS.”  
Ousterhout’s theory is comprised of two central claims.  First, Ousterhout asserts that 
anthropological evidence suggests that on average, the skulls of men and women differ in 
both shape and size. His pamphlet follows a well established pattern of employing 
scientific research in the service of identifying sex differences through cranial 
measurements, hormones, and skeleton size and shape (Gould 1981; Oudshoorn 1994: 
Shciebinger 1986).  In this way, Ousterhout offers an objective, “scientific” explanation 
                                                                                                                                                 
through which potential patients can understand what constitutes facial feminization.  
While I do not have the data to definitely determine the meanings patients attribute to the 
sources of information, there is evidence to suggest that Ousterhout’s pamphlet is widely 
read and discussed by potential patients in that it is routinely mentioned on websites on 
which transwomen chronicle their experiences transitioning and discuss possible 
interventions.   
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that accounts for why face work is important to transitioning from male to female. This 
theory of facial sex difference also posits that changing the skull through surgery will 
alter the appearance of the face, specifically the gendered effect of the facial structure.   
In effect, Ousterhout’s account of facial feminization works to position face work as a 
crucially important intervention for male-to-female transsexuals, at the same time that it 
advances essential, naturalized accounts of sex/gender differences.    
The pamphlet continues by elaborating the differences between male facial 
features and female facial features, including the brow, forehead, hairline, chin, mandible 
(jaw), cheeks, lips, neck, and nose.  First, the differences between male and female 
features are identified.  A single image (reproduced below) appears in the pamphlet.  It is 
a basic graphic used to visually represent dissimilarities between the “male” and “female” 
face.   
 
Figure 8. Graphic Used to Illustrate Sex Difference in Skulls by Facial Feminization 
Surgeon 
 
The pamphlet is a guide for potential patients that identifies the disparity between the two 
skulls.  The image is a reference point that patients can continually consult to confirm the 
claims made in the text that follows.   
 155
Throughout the pamphlet, facial sex differences are identified and surgical 
techniques for addressing these differences are described and prescribed.  In regards to 
the forehead, the pamphlet emphasizes the “prominence” of male bone structure: 
“As the male forehead is so different than the female forehead this may be one of 
the most important areas to modify.  Males have brow bossing with a flat area 
between the right and left areas of bossing while females have a completely 
convex skull in all planes and markedly less prominence.”  
To deal with the masculine forehead, bone contouring is used to reduce the bossing (or 
ridge) that appears across the forehead.  The distance between the hairline and the 
browline also becomes salient: 
“In physical anthropology studies, it has been shown that men have a longer 
distance from the brows to the hairline than do women…A long forehead is 
generally acceptable for the male but not for the female.” 
The pamphlet suggests that this distance be shortened by way of scalp advancement and 
in some cases a brow lift.  The chin also works as a crucial mark of gender: 
“The chin varies markedly between the male and the female.  The male chin is 
generally wide and vertically high while the female chin tends to be more pointed, 
narrow, and vertically shorter…Thus the chin is an extremely important area in 
gender recognition.” 
To address this “important” feature, Ousterhout suggests a sliding genioplasty, which 
involves the cutting and removing of sections of bone to reduce the “squareness” 
associated with male chins.    
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As the preceding excerpts indicate, “Feminization of the Transsexual” follows a 
particular pattern.  In it, each facial feature is dissected for sex differences, and those 
differences are described in detail, further reproducing understanding of such differences. 
These descriptions of facial sex difference are followed by brief descriptions of surgical 
techniques aimed at repairing, specifically re-gendering, faces.  The underlying theory of 
facial sex difference articulated in Ousterhout’s pamphlet structures facial feminization 
seminars, as well.     
As social interactions that inspire face work, facial feminization seminars function 
to position facial feminization and male-to-female transsexual faces in particular ways.  
Specifically, seminars work to forward the theory of facial sex difference that undergirds 
the imperative to repair transwomen’s faces.  One seminar offered at Southern Comfort 
2006 is described in the conference program in the following way: 
“Dr. Ousterhout will discuss his philosophy about facial feminization based on 
anatomical differences between male and female skulls.  There will be discussions 
also about tissue differences between the male and female face.  Examples will be 
shown of these differences via a slide show of long-term results of patients before 
and after surgery.  Dr. Ousterhout will also be holding clinic after his lecture for 
those who desire a consultation.”  
And in fact, seminars very much correspond with this description.  The following excerpt 
from fieldnotes taken during Southern Comfort 2006 describes the format of the seminar.    
Then, the doctor suggests that “anthropological differences” matter, that 
“anthropologists can tell the difference between male and female”…On his 
PowerPoint presentation he clicks to a graphic of two different skulls and two 
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different faces (one male and one female).  He then begins to point out the 
differences between the two skulls, demonstrating how each feature of the face 
varies between men and women… “There are basic differences between the male 
and the female skull.”  The angle of the mandible is different.  The bossing is 
different.  The nose angle is different. The vertical height of the mouth is 
different.  In most of his procedures, the surgeon removes skin to minimize the 
distance between the hairline and the brows…For cheeks, he suggests cheek 
implants which come in different sizes, but he says that not everyone needs them.  
“The cheeks are not male or female.”  He also suggests upper lip shortening.  The 
doctor argues that this is necessary because men only show lower teeth when they 
smile and women show upper teeth… Females, he argues, have a tapered face, 
and males have a square face.  He suggests a sliding genioplasty and a lateral 
mandibular reduction to eliminate squareness.   
This theory about facial sex difference serves as the working framework for approaching 
facial feminization.   
Other surgeons, however, take issue with some of Dr. Ousterhout’s contentions.  
For example, each surgeon puts a varying degree of emphasis on the importance of soft 
tissue work relative to bone work.  But every surgeon relies on similar strategies in his 
seminars.  Each reviews images of male and female faces to emphasize facial differences 
and describes how facial feminization will affect appearance.  An almost identical 
strategy is used by Dr. Adams: 
To illustrate how much bone work is needed to appear female, the doctor posts 
two pictures side by side on the screen.  A male skull and a female skull.  He 
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begins to point out male and female facial characteristics.  “When you look at 
your female counterparts, I’m not trying to be rude, but there are differences.”  
Dr. Adams points a number of facial features--the temporal ridge, facial 
hallowing, the cheeks, the eyebrows—and points out the differences between the 
male skull and the female skull.  “Soft tissue is the magic.”…  “Procedures on the 
upper face are the most feminizing…The forehead is the most critical thing.”  
In this seminar, images of skulls are projected side by side for the audience to see.  One 
by one, each facial feature is examined and in each case, differences are highlighted.  A 
presentation by Dr. Nelson is virtually indistinguishable:   
To understand how Dr. Nelson approaches FFS, he posts pictures of men and 
women in order to identify the differences between male and female faces on the 
PowerPoint screen.   
The same occurs in presentations by Dr. Thomas: 
 
The surgeon poses the following question to the audience: “What is it about the 
face that allows the distinguishing of gender?”  He compares slides of men and 
women’s skulls and argues “the thing that’s really making the difference—the 
bone.  The skin is just the skin” Dr. Thomas goes through parts of the face one by 
one and describes what is needed to make the face appear more feminine.  Using a 
laser pointer, the surgeon riffs on each face that fills the screen, identifying what 
features appear too masculine.  He tells the audience that he feminizes the face 
through neck surgery (tracheal shave), forehead remodeling (osteotomy and 
ostectomy), feminization of the jaw (width reduction), and feminization of the 
nose.   
 159
In every seminar, then, surgeons use images to demonstrate and to foster notions of facial 
sex difference.  Selective images are invoked as “proof” that the male face is 
demonstrably different from the female face.  In this way, facial feminization surgeons 
take a reductionistic approach.  Single images of a male skull and a female skull are 
positioned to represent sex and gender writ large.  In this way, surgeons rely on a theory 
of sexual dimorphism that presumes real, measurable difference between men and 
women and downplays variability in appearance among the categories of men and 
women.  This strategy works to reify the differences between facial appearance in men 
and women, and thus to reproduce sex/gender differences.  Instead of using images as 
representations or examples of male and female faces, they are used as evidence about 
general patterns, which then inform surgical practice and patients’ notions both about 
what is “wrong” with their pre-surgical face and what a new face might look like.    
 In the talk of FFS surgeons, “the female face” is deciphered, dismantled, and 
identified in the service of identifying the truth about what constitutes a feminine face.  In 
the process, a surgical standard is constructed by way of fetishizing facets of femininity, 
in this case feminine facial features, and positioning these features as constitutive, as 
opposed to indicative, of femininity.   “The female face” becomes the symbolic standard 
against which a patient’s real face is compared.  Facial features that do not correspond are 
subject to intervention.  Those features that do not evoke the female face are deemed 
masculine.  In this way, masculinity becomes an empty signifier, a repository for all 
features not defined as female.  This stands in sharp contrast to a long history wherein 
female bodies have been conceptualized simply as not male.    
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 While surgeons publicly dissect the images and point to differences in almost 
every facial feature, in the process male and female faces are positioned not simply as 
dissimilar from one another on average but rather drastically divergent and thoroughly 
problematic for transwomen.  Dr. Thomas articulates the degree of difference in this way:   
“It’s not just bone work and pull some skin, you need a global change.”   
By “global,” the doctor seems to suggest that facial feminization is a surgical overhaul.  
This radical change is not simply desired, that is elective, but rather for the transwoman, 
it is “needed.”  Dr. Adams similarly suggests that the change needed is drastic:   
“In order to look female you must change your skeletal appearance.  To do less is 
absolutely wrong.  Less is not more.”   
To accomplish the objective of facial feminization, that is looking appropriately female, 
requires not only some surgical intervention, but rather, as the previous excerpt suggests, 
a drastic reworking of the skeleton.  By emphasizing how invasive facial feminization 
needs to be, surgeons imply that the male face is untenable.  It is in short, a problem, as 
Dr. Peterson doctor suggests in a seminar:   
He turns to pictures of “real” men and says that the pictures illustrate a “female 
face on males.”  Dr. Peterson says is “not a problem.”  Then he shows a picture of 
a “male face on a female” and says, “but a male face on a female really is [a 
problem].” 
What makes traces of masculinity so unsustainable is not altogether clear in the surgeons’ 
discourse, but the diagnosis is simple enough: if one wishes to live as a woman, then 
one’s face cannot appear masculine.  It is unnatural. It follows then that facial 
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feminization would be aimed at producing a feminine face, but interestingly FFS 
surgeons concede that they cannot actually create a female face.   
 
The Making of an Unremarkable Face 
  Even as surgeons identify differences between male and female faces, they 
recognize variability in facial appearance among “real” women, or as one surgeon puts it, 
transwomen’s “biological counterparts.”  In this way, surgeons acknowledge that, in 
reality, there are a range of faces that may appear female.  Thus, they contradict their own 
assertions about sex/gender. Comments by Dr. Adams surgeon reveal this concession:   
“Everyone else uses a cookie cutter approach but we all know there is a wide 
range of feminine.”  
In accusing other surgeons of using a “cookie cutter approach,” Dr. Adams suggests that 
facial feminization needs to be customized to each individual patient.  According to his 
logic, if there are a wide range of female faces, there must also be a wide range of 
approaches to feminization. Dr. Thomas concludes his discussion of the “significant 
differences between male and female skulls” with the following claim: 
“There are ranges.  However for someone who is transitioning you want to change 
everything you can with surgery to appear feminine.”   
Even as Dr. Thomas relies on a theory of facial sex difference, he acknowledges that 
facial appearance varies for “biological” women.  At the same time, he seems to caution 
transwomen that a limited number of procedures will not sufficiently feminize the face.  
This moment certainly echoes other surgeons who suggest that the change needed is 
“global” or in other words all-encompassing.  But if there is such a range in female facial 
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appearance, as these surgeons suggest, it is not altogether clear why feminization is 
necessary or what FFS literally inscribes on the face.    
Ultimately then, because there is a range of female faces, successful surgery is not 
facial feminization per se, or the crafting of a female face.  Instead, facial feminization 
aims to erase those features defined as masculine.  Dr. Peterson suggests as much to 
patients:   
“I cannot explain completely and exactly why but in my experience the 
transsexual needs to eliminate every remnant of facial masculinity as possible in 
order to pass.”   
In a sense, then, facial feminization is a misnomer.  Rather than feminizing the face, 
facial feminization is more directly aimed at expunging masculinity—the defect— rather 
than inscribing femininity.   
I suggest that facial feminization surgeons are engaged in a precarious enterprise.  
Surgery can never perfectly create “the female face” deciphered by theories of facial sex 
difference, both because the standard is an ideal type and because the results of surgery 
are never fully knowable or predictable prior to surgery.  As Dr. Nelson notes,  
“You can only go so far.  That’s just the way the anatomy is.” 
Yet at the same time, distinguishing between the male and the female face is an 
indispensable element in inspiring intervention.  Thus, facial feminization relies both on 
deploying a theory of facial sex differences and conceding that there are range of faces 
that read as female.     
Such strategic claims seem contradictory at first glance.  In the process of 
deciphering facial sex difference, male and female faces are conceptualized as radically 
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divergent from one another but also as simultaneously coherent and homogenous within 
each category.  This contradiction begs the question: why do surgeons rely on discourses 
seemingly in tension with one another?  Put simply, the theory of facial sex difference 
animates the imperative to repair by locating transwomen’s faces as unacceptable, 
disfigured, and outside the norm.  Elaborating the differences between male and female 
faces undergirds the need for surgery by continually deploying a notion of “the female 
face” that positions the faces of male-to-female transsexuals as untenable.  At the same 
time, recognizing the variability among female faces opens up the standards by which 
surgery might be deemed successful.   
FFS surgeons must walk a fine line between acknowledging variability among 
female faces to insure that surgery is assessed positively, but they cannot risk suggesting 
that any face is acceptable since such a suggestion would undermine the very theory upon 
which their practice rests.   In other words, surgeons must acknowledge the limits of 
facial feminization, while ensuring potential patients that it holds much promise.  But 
what is that promise? 
There is a story in my experiences conducting this fieldwork that stands out.  It is 
a story that I told over and over again as a way of talking about the trickiness of 
ethnography, the complications of positionality, the deception that may be unintended but 
is always already part of the work of the social scientist:   
I am sitting in the hotel lobby.  I am working on my laptop, trying to clean up a 
crappy draft of my Extreme Makeover chapter.  It’s already late to my ethics 
dissertation writing group.  But I’m cutting and pasting hoping that moving one 
paragraph will make the rest of the thing fall into place.  It’s not so much that I’m 
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lost in my argument.  There is no argument.  I notice someone slightly behind me.  
She is not just over my shoulder.  She is on top of me.  Standing too close.  “You 
were in Dr. Adams’ presentation this morning,” she tells me.  “You shouldn’t 
spend the money girl.  You look okay.  You don’t need it.”  Later a friend will tell 
me that the same thing has happened to her at Southern Comfort.  A stranger has 
commented that she doesn’t need the surgery, that she looks okay.  I try to think 
of another context in which strangers can begin a conversation by telling you their 
personal opinion about what you look like.  Generally, offering personal 
judgments about another’s body is agreed to be an egregious invasion of privacy.  
Not here.  In between opportunities to “consult” with surgeons who will tell you 
what exactly is wrong with your face, strangers will offer their two cents.  “You 
shouldn’t spend the money, girl.  You look okay. You don’t need it.”  What is 
okay?  And what do those that get facial feminization need?   
The woman who approached me did not say that I looked good, pretty, or remarkable; 
rather, she indicated that I looked “okay,” that is, acceptable.  But why not good or pretty, 
and why did the fact that I looked merely “okay” to her mean that I did not “need” the 
surgery?  She did not use these specific words—“you look pretty”—because this was not 
the point, nor is it usually the point.  Whether I looked attractive was another issue 
altogether.  The point is that I looked okay.  We all could pursue surgery to have fuller 
cheeks, tapered chins, and shorter foreheads in order to be “prettier”.  But in the context 
of a facial feminization seminar where gender is undone and redone, the relevant question 
was: do we need facial feminization?  But what is it, exactly, that facial feminization 
patients need?   
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Surgeons commonly conclude seminars by demonstrating how successful facial 
feminization can be.  Often this is done with the use of before and after pictures—just as 
in the other sites I discuss in this dissertation.  These photographs work to convey how 
(successfully) facial feminization can alter appearance.  Undoubtedly, patients look 
different post-surgery.  In this way, before and after pictures are a testament to the fact 
that facial feminization can transform one’s face.  Yet many of the after pictures capture 
faces that are not exactly beautiful; most transwomen are not Candis Cayne.  Nor are they 
ugly.  They just simply are.      
In addition to pictures, some surgeons regale the audience with success stories to 
demonstrate what facial feminization can accomplish in the context of a life.  In the last 
few minutes of his IFGE seminar, Dr. Adams talked fast, giving one example after 
another of how facial feminization can benefit patients:     
Dr. Adams begins:  A transwoman post-facial feminization walks into a Chicago 
GLBT bar.  A patron says, “Miss did you know you were in a GLBT bar.”  The 
transwoman replies, “No but I think I’ll stay.”  Here’s another— A trans lawyer 
gets on a train from New York to Philadelphia for this conference.  She sits next 
to a fellow passenger. He asks the lawyer, “Where are you headed?”  She replies 
that she is headed to Philadelphia.  He tells the lawyer that he too is headed to 
Philadelphia to give a presentation at a transgender conference.  The lawyer 
replies, “That’s nice.”  The train arrives and the two depart the station.  Over the 
course of the conference, the lawyer runs into the passenger from the train.  When 
he sees her, his face drops.  He looks at her and tells her, “I didn’t know.”  Dr. 
Adams tells us that he often gets in touch with patients when he travels.  One 
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drove two hours to have breakfast with him in Vancouver.  Another met him on a 
family vacation in Disney World.  He tells us, “It’s amazing how many boys she 
had at the table with her.”  Another met him on the beach in Hawaii.  It was “full 
of hot bikini bodies,” and she walked the beach “turning heads.”  Another has “30 
boyfriends” in Vegas.  An audible gasp rises from the audience.  
These stories of success hinge on one effect of feminization—that “no one will know.”  
In the process, these stories position anonymity as the promise of facial feminization. Dr. 
Adams’ final story of the woman with “30 boyfriends” suggests that facial feminization 
can produce attractiveness, but it is the promise of passing that gives these stories such 
rhetorical force. Other surgeons use passing as the ultimate ends of facial feminization 
surgery.  As Dr. Peterson blatantly says,  
“Our basic objective is for you to pass.  You want to look, appear, and act female.  
Without doing anything else—putting on make-up, fixing your hair— I want you 
to be that female.”   
This surgeon suggests that after facial feminization, no other methods of aesthetic 
enhancement—make-up or hair—will be needed to be taken for granted as female.  
Again, the promise is not that one will be beautiful, but rather that one will look like “just 
another female.”  Dr. Thomas promises “excellent” results:  
“We have the ability to get excellent results.  There is nothing to suggest that 
these are transwomen.”   
By “excellent,” though, Dr. Thomas does not mean to suggest that patients will be 
beautiful.  Rather success is achieved by eradicating that which “suggests” 
transgenderism, the traces of masculine.  “Excellent results” is code for “no one can tell.”  
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In this way, passing is posited as the net benefit of facial feminization.  In rare cases, 
beauty might be a side-effect, but passing is the stated aim.   
 The idea that cosmetic intervention facilitates a kind of passing is not new.  
Sander Gilman’s (1999) work on cosmetic surgery employed by Jews in post-war 
Germany frames his claim that all forms of contemporary cosmetic surgery constitute a 
form of passing.  For example, face lifts allow women to “pass” as younger.  Following 
Gilman, Kathy Davis (2003) in a piece entitled “Surgical Passing: Or Why Michael 
Jackson’s Nose Makes ‘Us’ Uneasy” frames cosmetic surgery on “ethnic” facial features 
as both modes of assimilation and means of upward mobility, and she questions the 
politics of surgery that enable “passing.”  Additionally, Eugenia Kaw’s (1998) work on 
surgery aimed at Asian facial features queries the tensions of passing.  For these scholars, 
passing refers to the taking on of another identity both as a means of distancing one’s self 
from stigma and acquiring privilege accrued to another identity status (Ginsberg 1996).  
In the case of cosmetic surgery aimed at racialized facial features, changing the face is a 
way of approximating dominant (usually white) group’s aesthetic standards.  This surgery 
may or may not actually culminate in identification with or acceptance by the dominant 
racial group, but it typically transfigures stigmatized bodily characteristics into something 
more socially desirable.  
What constitutes passing in the case of MTF transsexuals is being taken for 
granted as a woman.  Passing in this way is different from passing as another race.  
Whereas racial passing is almost exclusively understood in terms of a racial minority 
assuming the identity of the racially dominant group, in the case of transwomen, passing 
involves taking on a devalued status, that of female.  The passing sought after through 
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facial feminization is also different from that which Gilman and Davis describe, in that 
the stakes of “passing” as female for the transwomen are significantly greater than the 
stakes of “passing” as thirty-five for the approaching-fifty cosmetic surgery crowd or, 
perhaps even, “passing” as white.  As the recent murders of Gwen Araujo, Sanesha 
Stewart and many other victims demonstrate, the stakes of being “read” as transgendered 
as opposed to passing are, quite literally, those of life and death.44   
As these cases demonstrate, the burden of passing lies not in being perceived as 
female as much as it lies on not being perceived as male.  It is crucial then that one’s face 
(and body) not suggest masculinity.   In doing gender, one must do gender in corporeally 
appropriate ways. Pursuing facial feminization with the aim of passing is, in essence, a 
method for going unnoticed, for achieving a taken for grantedness.  It is the technical 
work of eradicating those features that might give one away. Practically, then, facial 
feminization produces less masculine faces.   
In sum, “the female face” works as the point of reference for surgical 
intervention.  Of course, there is no such thing as “the female face.”  It is a constructed 
                                                 
44 I cite these names because both cases received relatively large amounts of publicity, 
especially in gay media outlets, but these murders are in no ways unique.  In 2002, Gwen 
Araujo, a 17 year old transwomen, who was brutally beaten with a frying pan and barbell 
before being strangled by four men when they discovered that she was transgendered.  In 
February of 2008, Sanesha Stewart was stabbed to death in the Bronx by a john after he 
“discovered” that she was transgendered.  While stories of violence inflicted upon 
transwomen abounds, it is difficult to locate statistics because “gender identity” is not 
currently a protected class under federal hate crime legislation.    
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conglomeration of measurements, which depends on averages (via references to skulls) in 
its making.  It is an ideal type, in the Weberian sense, an analytic comprised via reference 
to particular characteristics that does not correspond to any individual case.  Given that 
one of the primary goals of facial feminization is passing, it should hardly matter that 
intervention fails to literally inscribe the conceptual ideal onto the face.  For the purposes 
of passing, a less masculine face might very well be sufficient.   
Premising an intervention against any ideal can only be successful in limited 
ways.  In all sites of face work aimed at disfigurement, normalcy operates as a point of 
reference and an unattainable ideal.  In the case of FFS, the standard is a gendered norm, 
“the female face.” Yet norms, because they are ideal types, are tricky points of reference.  
At what point would one be definitely normal?  As the case of facial feminization makes 
evident, the logic that undergirds intervention positions a standard, in this case “the 
female face,” as the reference point around which surgeons organize practices of face 
work and patients understand them.  Yet the female face is a conceptual ideal, as opposed 
to an empirical point of reference; thus, facial feminization can never literally produce the 
female face.  Like the female face, normality is a conceptual ideal that can never be 
surgically produced.  When does one achieve normalcy?  Normalcy is elusive, and as 
such, the technical work of repairing the face might be understood not at producing the 
ideal, but rather at minimizing the abnormal.  If it is impossible to inscribe these ideals 
onto the face, what then is technically accomplished through face work?  If the face 
cannot approximate the female face, what can it exact? 
The female face and normalcy might well be elusive, but passing is not.  
Interventions can and do facilitate passing because passing only requires being taken for 
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granted in specific social settings.  Unlike normalcy, one can approximate how 
successfully one passes based on the ease of social interactions.  In this way, passing is 
tangible in a way that ideals like normalcy and “the female face” never are.  Passing is 
gauged successful to the degree that one is taken for granted.  The case of facial 
feminization puts into sharp relief how taken for grantedness is desired, sought after, and 
crafted.   
Facial feminization specifically, and face work more broadly, takes 
unremarkability as its end point.  The desire for beauty, on the contrary, is the desire to 
appear exceptional, remarkable, fantastic.  There is something besides beauty to be 
attained via face work.  By contrast, the desire for unremarkability is the desire to go 
unnoticed, to blend in, to pass.  As a mode of normalization, face work aims to recover a 
face defined as disfigured.  In practical terms, it crafts a face deemed ugly for a woman 
less ugly, less masculine.  In this line of work, there is little to suggest that beauty is even 
hoped for by potential patients or ever promised by face workers.  There is something 
that exists between or perhaps outside of beauty and ugliness.  To desire unremarkability 
is at the most basic level the desire to live outside of the stigma of ugliness and the 
extraordinariness of beauty.  If one cannot embody the ideal of normalcy, one can at least 
hope to live outside of stigma.  Unremarkability is equally, if not more, compelling than 
the desire for beauty.   This desire for unremarkability is an often unstated but critical 
impetus for the face work I describe throughout this dissertation.  It is, I argue, the 
corporeal objective of face work.  To query unremarkability as an aesthetic puts into 
sharp relief how the desire to be “not ugly” structures bodily interventions, both mundane 
and extraordinary.    
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   Candis Cayne’s casting in a network television drama carries the significance 
that it does because her story is so exceptional.  She has established careers as a 
performer both within the subcultural scene of drag performance and on mainstream or 
“normal” television.  Her story of transition is striking for its lack of dramatic twists.  Her 
family supports her.  She is currently engaged to a New York deejay with whom she 
regularly appears in public, and she is stepmother to his daughter from a previous 
relationship.  Her personal life is, in short, unremarkable but also typically feminine.  Her 
face, on the other hand, is exceptional.  Whatever face work she has undergone has 
accomplished something rare—a face that approximates beauty, at least of the sort so 
desired by conventional men’s magazine subscribers.  By contrast, for others who employ 
face work to transition, the face will not approximate the looks of the celebrity glamazon.  
It may look like just another face, and yet this unremarkability is so often precisely the 
point.    
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CHAPTER V 
 
MAKING FACES: EXTREME MAKEOVERS AND THE “REALITY” OF FACE 
WORK 
 
 
 
“If you had to describe the American mythos in one single word, 
“reinvention” really would not be a bad choice.  One could argue that 
from the time of the Pilgrims’ arriving at Plymouth Rock, a lot of at least 
the European settlement story of America has been about reinvention, 
leaving the Old World for the New.  It’s American culture as the 
annihilation of history, of the past…In a very real sort of way, the history 
of the United States is one big fat makeover show.” 
Robert Thompson (2003: B4) 
 
 
Extreme Face Work 
 
1.  First Name    Middle Name   Last Name 
26.  Why do you feel you should be chosen to receive the Extreme Makeover?" 
27.  If you are selected to receive the "Extreme Makeover," list everything 
you would like to have altered? 
28.  What areas or parts of your body are you most unhappy with? Have you 
always felt that way? If not, what event changed your image of yourself? 
29.  In what ways has your physical appearance affected your life? 
30.  If you were to receive "The Extreme Makeover" in what ways would your 
life be altered? 
31.  Tell us about your relationship with your parents? 
32.  Tell us about your relationship with your siblings? 
33.  Tell us about your relationship with your mate/significant other? 
34.  Tells us about your relationship with your friends? 
37.  Have You Ever Been Treated For Any Serious Physical or Mental Illnesses 
Within The Last Five (5) Years? (Circle One) Yes  No 
39.  Have you ever been treated for Depression? In your opinion, what 
triggered your depression? 
42.  Have You Ever Been Diagnosed With Alcoholism Or Any Other Drug-Related 
Addiction?  
43.  Do you have any sexually transmitted diseases? If so, please describe: 
45.  In A Brief Statement, Tell Us Why We Should Choose You, Over Anyone Else, 
To Receive The "Extreme Makeover"? 
46.  Besides altering your appearance, what is your biggest dream? 
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The videotape must meet the following restrictions: 
1.  Tell us who you are and why you deserve the Extreme Makeover. Explain how 
your looks have affected your life and how they continue to affect you. 
3.   Make sure you shoot a 30-second close up of your face and profile with NO 
MAKE-UP…We need to be able to see what problems you have. 
 
Excerpt from “Extreme Makeover” Application 
     (ABC Television Network 2006) 
 
Cars, dogs, presidential contenders, and nation states are all getting “extreme 
makeovers” (Baker 2007, Hinchcliffe 2007, Marcus 2007, Stanley 2007).  In the five 
years since ABC aired its controversial reality show, “extreme makeover” has entered the 
American vernacular.  Extreme makeovers are the order of the day.  While makeovers are 
not new, extreme makeovers seem to be.  To qualify makeovers as “extreme” points to 
their presumed greatness and their magnificence, but extreme also reeks of excess and 
severity and risk. The aforementioned news accounts of “extreme makeovers” approach 
the subject with awe and derision.  They gloat about the technological, cultural, and 
financial achievements that make extreme makeovers possible, while chastising the 
desire for such makeovers as overindulgent and the experts whose work produces 
extreme makeovers as overambitious. “Extreme makeovers” seem to ignite concerns 
about consumption, technology, desire, industriousness, and human possibility.  The 
stories told about extreme makeovers are moralistic tales that convey a profound fear of 
going too far and an intense desire for seeing how far we can go.   
 In 2002, ABC first aired Extreme Makeover, an innovative and controversial 
reality television show.45  In each of the fifty-five episodes that aired over the course of 
                                                 
45 Reality television is a genre of television that purports to chronicle unscripted 
situations as they are experienced by ordinary people, though celebrities increasingly 
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three seasons on ABC and in subsequent syndication on the Style Network, “real-life” 
people (most often women) moved to Hollywood to begin surgical, exercise, dietary, and 
other cosmetic regimes to prepare for their “big reveal.”46  This moment serves as the 
climax of the show in which participants along with their friends and family see 
candidates for the first time post-makeover.  Under the supervision of the “extreme team” 
(comprised of cosmetic surgeons, dermatologists, cosmetic dentists, eye surgeons, hair 
restoration specialists, physical trainers, stylists, make-up artists, and hair stylists), 
participants’ appearances were radically altered--in many cases making them 
unrecognizable to family, friends, and themselves.   
 While the format of episodes changed slightly over the three seasons, the basic 
structure of the show remained consistent, indeed formulaic.  In fact, while participants 
vary from episode to episode, each episode follows the same narrative structure.47  
                                                                                                                                                 
participate in programs modeled on similar premises.  Later in this chapter, I describe and 
query reality television in more detail.   
46 Emily M. Boyd (2007) analyses the first season of Extreme Makeover in order to 
understand the production of identity via reality television.  She provides descriptive 
statistics about participants from the first season.  Of the thirty-three makeover candidates 
featured, twenty-two are women.  Thirty were white.   
47 In later episodes, the “mini extreme makeover” was introduced.  The “mini” quality of 
these makeovers is striking given the “extreme” quality of most of the other makeovers 
captured by the program.  In these very short segments, which usually comprise no more 
than five minutes of an episode, candidates are restyled using non-surgical techniques 
like wardrobe makeovers, haircuts and coloring, and teeth whitening.  These segments 
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Brenda Weber (2005) argues that Extreme Makeover follows a “strict formula” that 
reflects a “deep structure” embedded in the program that allows viewers to anticipate 
what is coming in each successive episode.  In this way, the meaning making 
accomplished by Extreme Makeover is continually established in each episode.   The 
show opens by describing participants’ backgrounds.  We meet candidates in their 
hometown and get a glimpse of their “real lives.”  Most importantly, we are told a story 
that conveys to the audience why this particular candidate needs an extreme makeover—
in other words, what problems will be fixed by the intervention.  Then, on camera, 
candidates are “surprised” by the announcement that they are leaving for Hollywood.  
Once in Los Angeles, participants meet with the Extreme Team.  During these meetings, 
candidates identify which bodily features they most desperately want to change and 
members of the Extreme Team describe what kinds of interventions can “fix” the 
problem areas.  Within days, participants are admitted for surgery, and each episode 
offers a brief glimpse into what cosmetic surgery entails.  Post-surgery, we encounter 
participants who are experiencing physical pain and often homesickness.  Once 
candidates have healed, they meet with personal trainers and/or stylists for the final 
touches.  Afterward, candidates ride (sometimes in a limousine) to their “big reveal” 
where family and friends will see their new looks for the first time.  Without exception, 
family, friends, and candidates are elated when they see post-makeover candidates.   
Interviews with spouses, parents and children who universally express amazement are 
interjected with images of the big reveal celebration.  Finally, “before” and “after” 
                                                                                                                                                 
mirror other television makeovers like those featured on Queer Eye for the Straight Guy, 
Oprah, or the Today show.   
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pictures fill the television screen.  The announcer outlines each procedure that comprises 
each participant’s extreme makeover.  Participants’ entire bodies are remade over the 
course of their stay, but significantly, procedures overwhelmingly focus on participants’ 
faces.   
In October 2006, ABC aired the first episode of the fourth season of Extreme 
Makeover, but no additional episodes aired during the fall season due to low ratings.  In 
June 2007, the network announced that Extreme Makeover was officially canceled and 
that three pre-recorded episodes would air in summer 2007 to fill a summer time line-up, 
according to a network press release (ABC Television Network 2007).  While Extreme 
Makeover aired on a major network for only three seasons, it irrevocably changed 
American discourse about and, by extension, American’s relationships to cosmetic 
interventions.   
The broadcast of Extreme Makeover animated public debates about cosmetic 
surgery, television, and America’s never-ending pursuit of self improvement. Reviews of 
Extreme Makeover revealed both an infatuation with and contempt for transformations 
that push the boundaries of the possible (Elber 2002, Petrozzello 2002).48  According to 
                                                 
48 What shows like Extreme Makeover do is offer participants the resources to challenge 
the stability of materiality, to subvert the limits of embodiment.   While Americans 
seemed obsessed with self improvement, public response to changing bodies elicits 
policing.  Historically, bodily variance was understood in supernatural terms; one’s moral 
standing, one’s virtuousness, one’s elect status is made manifest in one’s body (Daston 
and Park 1998).  Disabilities and chronic illness, disfiguring conditions and bodily trauma 
are indicative of moral failings and thus, in a sense, deserved. There is a lingering 
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reviews, the results were astonishing, but most agreed that they had exceeded the limits 
of how cosmetic interventions should be deployed.   In a scathing review, New York 
Times television critic Caryn James (2002) wrote, 
As a reality show it’s a flop, with bad casting and the tackiness of a cheap 
syndicated series…As a cultural barometer, though, Extreme Makeover is 
fascinating.  It displays both the voyeuristic excess of reality shows and 
the cultural ideal of creating a purely artificial personality (everyone goes 
to Hollywood)…We all fantasize about changing something, but these 
Frankenstein dreams seem spooky…television is shifting our idea of what 
cosmetic revisions seem normal. 
 
When ABC added the show to its regular line-up, even the Academy of Cosmetic 
Surgery condemned the show, releasing a statement objecting to the glamorization of 
radical cosmetic interventions featured as entertainment (Oldenburg 2003).  These 
critiques rested on the fact that while participants’ wanted to improve their appearance, 
they were not disfigured.  The disgust with Extreme Makeover relied on a shared 
sensibility that cosmetic interventions for unremarkable faces should be kept to a 
                                                                                                                                                 
collective sensibility that our bodies are objects that are expressive of our moral 
transgressions and our admirable asceticism.  The discourse around body weight which 
posits obesity as the result of a lack of willpower clearly relies on such moralism (Bordo 
1993).  We deserve the bodies we have, and makeovers interfere in what seems natural 
and fair.  Interestingly, the public response to Extreme Makeover: Home Edition is 
strikingly opposite, suggesting that offering someone the opportunity to improve their 
class status is much more acceptable.   
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minimum, the assumption being that only in the case of “real” disfigurement would it be 
appropriate to try to effect such radical, transformative results.49        
And yet, participants on Extreme Makeover, prior to intervention, are described 
using words often reserved for the faces of those who have experienced facial trauma and 
congenital difference: Freak. Deformed. Defective. Damaged. Monster. Witch. Cursed. 
Nightmare. Abnormal. Disfigured.50 While most participants are not exceptionally good-
looking (based on Western notions about what constitutes attractiveness), neither are they 
extraordinarily unattractive.  These are faces that would go unnoticed on the street as 
opposed to faces that would elicit public staring indicative of the public’s discomfort with 
facial difference.  Yet the faces of participants are routinely depicted through narration 
and participant’s own voices as grossly disfigured.  What does it mean for Extreme 
Makeover, a site of popular discourse and imagery, to position itself as a mode of face 
work, as a technocultural response to disfigurement (and a legitimate, necessary response 
at that)?   
In this chapter, I locate Extreme Makeover in a long standing history of producing 
distinctly American bodies devoted to self-improvement through makeovers.  Through 
                                                 
49 In the Summer of 2007, a British television network announced that they were looking 
for “disfigured” persons to participate in a show in which they would receive cosmetic 
intervention (Templeton 2007).  The announcement was met with public outrage, but the 
response seemed to be directed towards the idea that broadcasting such an event was 
uncouth.  The idea of intervening in disfigurement with radical means seemed to 
generally be accepted.   
50 Examples of such language can be identified in almost every episode analyzed.   
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content analysis of 30 episodes of Extreme Makeover (2002-2007), I examine the 
narrative embedded in each episode, analyzing these as discourses on bodies, 
disfigurement, and normalcy.  Rather than approaching Extreme Makeover as a site of 
celebrity look-alike production, I argue that Extreme Makeover posits aesthetic 
intervention as a response to traumas in participants’ intimate, economic, bodily, social, 
and emotional lives.  In this way, the “cosmetic” work accomplished on Extreme 
Makeover is akin to other modes of face work in that it is technical work aimed at the 
face but invested with significant promise.  I ask what cultural work is accomplished by 
framing cosmetic intervention as a solution to whatever problem ails, particularly 
problems whose resolution cannot, in fact, be achieved exclusively by changing bodily 
appearance.   
Next, I focus on an unexpected moment but one that routinely occurs when 
participants see themselves for the first time following the completion of the makeover.  
Following social theorists that employ schizophrenia as a metaphor for understanding 
postmodernity, I analyze how participants’ responses mirror the symptoms of 
depersonalization disorder, a kind of dissociative disorder characterized by a disruption in 
self-perception.  In some cases, depersonalization is accompanied by the inability to 
recognize one’s own transformed reflection in the mirror.  I conclude by asking what it 
means to frame consumption of aesthetic interventions as a global solution for the 
problems of modern life, to cultivate a facial appearance that aims to be unrecognizable, 
and to position initially unremarkable faces as disfigured.   
 180
The (American) Makeover 
Makeovers are quintessentially American, with their emphasis on self-
improvement and diligence. They rely, moreover, on thoroughly American values.  From 
Ben Franklin’s Poor Richard’s Almanac to JKF’s calls for volunteerism, Americans have 
been encouraged to embody, oftentimes quite literally, innovation and industriousness 
(Crawley 2006).  Not surprisingly, makeover culture, both of the self-help and aesthetic 
variety, appears to be on the rise.  According to numbers released by the American 
Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, cosmetic surgery rates began rising during the 
same period in which sales of self-help books increased (McGee 2005).  Sociologically, 
two critical questions are: why makeovers, and why now?   
 Makeovers involve two central figures.  They center on an entity (most often a 
person but sometimes a house or a business or a relationship) that is transformed in the 
process of the makeover.  The object of transformation is a work object (of sorts), a 
“material entity around which people make meaning and organize their work practices” 
(Casper 1998: 19).  The second key figure is the expert who possesses the skills and 
know-how to transform the person or room or relationship into something else.  Experts 
or transformers rely on tools.  Both material apparatuses like scalpels, hammers, and 
television network finances and knowledge including physiology, architectural design, 
and therapeutic insight aid the process of transformation.  Each makeover requires the 
“right tools for the job” (Clarke and Fujimura 1992). 
But why are Americans increasingly obsessed with transformation?  Sociologist 
Micki McGee in her analysis of self-help culture argues that this is an era of “new 
insecurity” (Wallulis 1998).  Lifelong careers are the exception rather than the rule.  
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American work life is now characterized by stagnant wages and erratic employment 
opportunities.  Family life is more unpredictable than in previous periods.  With divorce 
as a very real option, marriage no longer lasts until death, and flexibility around socially 
acceptable family configurations means that what intimate life looks like over the course 
of a lifetime has become increasingly difficult to predict.  In addition, social welfare 
programs that promised a safety net in the case of hard times have been severely cut.  
These changes are not necessarily indicative of grim times, as conservative social 
commentators suggest. To the contrary, divorce and job flexibility make it possible for 
many to pursue more desirable lives.  Setting aside the question of whether these are 
positive or negative social transformations, what is the effect of living in a time 
characterized by flexibility, insecurity, and unpredictability?  McGee understands the 
consumption of self-help literature as a social imperative in this new world.  Self-help, 
indeed makeover culture, provides an avenue for making one’s self increasingly desirable 
in both economic and intimate spheres that are constantly changing.  In short, a makeover 
is one way of securing desired outcomes—a job we want, a partner we like, or a sense of 
psychological or financial stability.   
While self-help involves a variety of projects centered on the self (yet often, 
ironically, in relation to others), makeovers commonly focus on appearance.  Makeovers 
promise endless choice and the fantasy of transformation. Often, these aesthetic 
makeovers are not about getting what we want, at least directly.  Rather, aesthetic 
intervention is also about ridding ourselves of what we do not want—acne, cellulite, 
wrinkles, jowls, “defects,” markers of ethnicity, and other undesirable features.   
Individuals, seemingly ineffective in changing society, make a decision to 
change themselves.  In makeover and plastic surgery narratives, choice 
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typically involves discarding the past, be it an old sofa or, as in the case of 
cosmetic procedures, an ‘old’ face.  This shedding of personal history 
expresses the self through the body (Corvino 2004: 56).    
 
In fact, the cosmetic surgery industry, a key transformer in aesthetic makeovers, 
understands its work as largely aimed towards the resolution of psychological pain. 
According to Corvino, patients understand their pre-surgical body as an abject body.  
Cosmetic surgery then acts as a means for keeping abjection, those parts of ourselves that 
we do embrace as constituting our subjectivity and identity, under control. Through 
cosmetic surgery, patients attempt to rid themselves of abjection in favor of identification 
with clean and proper bodies (Kristeva 1982).  
And of course, self improvement through work on the body is a highly gendered 
enterprise.  The burden of body maintenance and improvement compels women in ways 
that are different from men.  Women are embedded in longer histories of intense body 
surveillance facilitated through the consumption of cosmetic products and services 
(Bartky 2003).  Even as men are increasingly subject to a new aesthetic which 
increasingly positions men’s bodies as subject to appearance interventions, women’s 
lives are changing (Bordo 2000).  The “second shift” has expanded (Hochschild and 
Machung 2003).  Not only are women maintaining busy work and family lives, but rather 
the expectations for how women will manage the time bind with style and grace mean 
that success is largely determined by how coiffed one appears at work, how quickly the 
baby weight is lost, and how well one maintains a youthful aesthetic.   
But just like becoming a “highly effective” person (as Steven R. Covey’s 1989 
extraordinarily popular bestseller puts it) is often in the service of becoming a more 
efficient and thus successful worker, aesthetic interventions are often about ridding the 
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body of what is unwanted in the service of others’ desires.  For example, erasing the signs 
of aging might be accomplished by eradicating fine lines and age spots, but this is often 
done in the service of remaining a competitive force in the labor market or an attractive 
mate in the dating pool.  In short, aesthetic makeovers do not simply change the object of 
transformation from one state to another.  As a mode of resolving abjection, the 
makeover is a process of repair in which the patient fixes a, perhaps related, but entirely 
distinct problem through cosmetic intervention.   It is in this way that Extreme Makeover 
operates as a form of face work.   
 
Making Over Real Lives 
 In the last ten years, reality television has saturated the television line-up.  Upon 
the airing of the first reality shows like The Real World and Survivor, critics remarked 
that within a few seasons Americans would be sick of watching themselves on TV (Huff 
2006).  They were wrong.  As of the Spring 2007 television season, NBC’s The 
Apprentice is in its 6th season, CBS’s Survivor is in its 14th season, and MTV’s The Real 
World was in its 18th season.  In 2003 and 2004 the Primetime Emmy Awards, arguably a 
reliable barometer of television culture/industry, responded to the surge of reality 
programming with two new awards for the genre—Outstanding Reality Program and 
Outstanding Reality-Competition Program.51   
                                                 
51 CBS’s The Amazing Race has won the Reality-Competition Award every year since 
2003.  Makeover shows have won in the Reality Category as well.  ABC’s Extreme 
Makeover: Home Edition was the 2005 and 2006 winner, and Bravo’s Queer Eye for the 
Straight Guy was the 2004 winner. 
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Reality television is a medium that blurs the very terms used to distinguish genre.  
Reality television is simultaneously fact, fiction, education, and entertainment (Homes 
and Jermyn 2004).  While reality television relies on the continual negotiation of the very 
terms used to distinguish one genre from another, reality television has come to employ 
two identifiable and predictable characteristics, chronicle and competition, in order to 
construct an intelligible narrative.  First, reality television chronicles the life of the cast as 
it unfolds in environments engineered by television producers.  For example, shows like 
The Real World and Big Brother capture participants’ lives over the course of a pre-
determined period of time as they live in a made-for-television mansion.  The thrill 
comes in watching cast members respond to factors that are introduced throughout the 
time they occupy The Real World or Big Brother House.  Reality television participants 
not only live their lives on camera, they also compete for prizes.  On The Apprentice, 
contestants compete for a job in Donald Trump’s empire.  Some shows rely more heavily 
on documenting events than on competition and vice versa, but almost all reality shows 
employ both strategies in order to capture television audiences.  For example, ex-
Victoria’s Secret supermodel Tyra Bank’s massive television hit, America’s Next Top 
Model, captures gangly, bitchy, teenage hopefuls as they pose their way through a variety 
of highly crafted photo shoots that “mimic” those experienced by “real” models.  The 
girls also participate in bizarre challenges that purportedly work to pedagogically 
cultivate America’s next top model (Lane and Giles, forthcoming).  As a formula, 
chronicling “reality” and capturing “competition” have made for successful television. 
In the world of reality television, makeover television is, arguably, an emerging 
sub-genre in and of itself. Not only Extreme Makeover but also television shows like 
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MTV’s I Want a Famous Face, TLC’s What Not to Wear, Fox’s The Swan, Bravo’s 
Queer Eye for the Straight Guy, Style’s Style Her Famous, and E!’s Dr. 90210 have 
created a pop culture landscape exclusively devoted to cultivating new appearances 
effected through aesthetic interventions.  Reality television has established a reputation 
for enacting the unthinkable and the crass (think: Fox’s Who Wants to Marry a 
Millionaire and its denigrated spin-off Who Wants to Marry a Midget), and makeover 
television pushes the boundaries too.  Extreme Makeover stands apart from most other 
makeover shows. As opposed to other makeover shows which rely primarily on non-
surgical interventions, it routinely employs numerous surgical interventions aimed at 
making participants unrecognizable to themselves, friends and family, and presumably 
the television audience.52   
What makes reality shows like Extreme Makeover different from cable shows of 
the 1990s that focused on cosmetic surgery is that Extreme Makeover is about the 
meaning making miracle facilitated through transformation whereas cable shows often 
                                                 
52 While FOX’s The Swan is similar to Extreme Makeover in the sense that both pushed 
the boundaries for what makeovers had previously attempted on TV, Extreme Makeover 
stands apart from The Swan for several reasons.  The Swan aired for two seasons on FOX.  
Extreme Makeover lasted for three seasons and part of a fourth.  In addition, on 
syndication on the Style network Extreme Makeover continues to reach audiences in a 
way that The Swan does not.  In addition, The Swan’s gimmicky concept included forcing 
participants to participate in a beauty pageant post-makeover.  Because Extreme 
Makeover purported simply to chronicle the process of transformation, it garnered a 
degree of respectability not afforded to The Swan.      
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demonstrated the technological miracle made possible by surgical techniques.  In other 
words, cable plastic surgery shows displayed emerging techniques to convey the 
miraculous effects afforded by modern science.  By contrast, makeover shows deploy 
science in the service of displaying the miracle of self improvement.  In each case, 
television featuring cosmetic surgery makes surgery increasingly accessible culturally, 
even if it remains materially inaccessible.  Viewers become acquainted not only with the 
“facts”—the procedures, the doctors, the bodily risks, the financial costs— but also with 
particular meanings of cosmetic surgery (Tait 2007).  Yet, makeover television 
discursively situates the audience within particular logics about cosmetic surgery—what 
such intervention means and what it makes possible.  Importantly, the television watching 
public is consuming the idea of cosmetic surgery as it is produced on reality television.  
Thirteen million viewers tuned in to the December 11, 2002 premier of Extreme 
Makeover (Huff 2006).   
Melissa Crawley (2006) argues that via plastic surgery television, people witness 
the “medicalization of real people’s everyday lives.”  But it is not simply that people 
consume medicalization in the form of television entertainment, the medicalization of the 
audience’s everyday life is also intensified.  Extreme Makeover is a show particularly 
conscious of its audience.  Experts who guide the makeovers of participants routinely 
address the audience directly.  These moves invite the viewer to intervene in her or his 
own appearance using the techniques modeled on Extreme Makeover.  This is a 
pedagogical move.  Viewers are not simply voyeurs; rather, television viewers 
themselves are objects of intervention. As a cultural object with pedagogical force, 
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Extreme Makeover instructs the audience about how to view, assess, categorize, and 
manipulate appearance.  In this way, reality television is not just entertainment.   
 Rather, Extreme Makeover instructs the audience about how to look at and 
attribute meanings to candidates’ appearance.  In an episode featuring Deshante, a 
middle- aged, black woman born with cleft palate, the announcer tells us that although we 
may think Deshante is unremarkable, she is, in fact, not.  “From a distance seemingly 
normal, but closer you see it— the deformity that has cursed her life—cleft palate.”  
Despite appearing “seemingly normal” to the untrained eyes of the television audience, 
Deshante needs intervention.  The announcer urges us to look closer, to reconsider what 
we initially see, and to redefine Deshante’s unremarkable face as a face marred by a 
“deformity.”  Extreme Makeover plays the role of aesthetic arbitrator deciding who needs 
intervention.  It does not matter that Deshante seems normal at a glance.  Extreme 
Makeover urges the audience to look closer, to see the deformity.   
Early attempts to define “reality TV” positioned “real life” and the participation 
of “real people” as central criteria towards determining if the genre truly captured 
“reality.”  Critics have denigrated reality television as a genre that purports to chronicle 
reality, but instead fashions a plastic (read: fake) reality characterized by a producerly 
aesthetic.  The question of whether reality television is real or not seems beside the point, 
rather it matters only that the program makes the “discursive, visual and technological 
claim to be ‘the real’” (Holmes and Jermyn 2004: 5).  While Extreme Makeover is 
mediated (and thereby “fake”), in the sense that it relies on a cadre of experts to enact the 
transformation, it purports to intervene in candidates’ “real” lives.  In this way, Extreme 
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Makeover shapes viewers sense of what is real, both what is possible and what is in need 
of repair.   
Each of the one-hour episodes follows the same narrative arc.  Extreme Makeover 
chronicles the experience of undergoing radical cosmetic intervention, but the show also 
engages in storytelling.  The audience meets the candidates.  Images of the participant’s 
hometown and of the candidate at work and home are juxtaposed with shots of the 
candidate in a range of settings—at the rodeo, in a dance class, at their college graduation 
party.  Intermittently, the camera often captures the candidate as they stand in front of a 
generic bathroom mirror staring at their own reflection. Audio clips from interviews with 
the candidate, their family, and friends, play over the images so that the audience hears 
about their lives.  The announcer interjects to connect the disparate images and audio so 
that a logical narrative emerges, one that emphasizes why each person needs an extreme 
makeover.  Then, we watch as they are transformed. 
 
Repair Via Extreme Makeover 
 
I imagine the producers sitting behind the camera asking: 
“When did you first notice that you are ugly?” 
“How much would you say that you hate yourself?”  
“You’re life must be very hard.  Right?” 
“Have you ever felt that your motherfatherhusbandboyfriend hated you 
because you are ugly?” 
“Do you ever want to die?” 
She cries and says that she wants to stop.  Can’t everyone see why she 
needs the makeover?   
“If you want the surgery, you will have to talk.  You will have to tell 
us your story, your very sad story.”   
 
The opening credits roll.  Images of patients and doctors fill the screen as non-
descript instrumental music plays.  One image comes after another, but for a second, each 
image freezes, and one by one we are introduced to members of the “extreme team.”  
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Doctors’ specialties are spelled out next to their pictures.  Each member of the extreme 
team has a different expertise.  Throughout, audio clips are interspersed.  These feature 
the voices of the experts, and their words foreshadow the transformation that is about to 
occur.  “Wow! You look fantastic!” “I’m here to introduce you to a rock star.” “Mission 
Accomplished!”  Precisely, what mission is it that Extreme Makeover accomplishes, or 
claims to accomplish?53  
 Not everyone is a candidate for Extreme Makeover.  To participate, one must 
prove that she is sufficiently in need of cosmetic intervention.  Given that the show is 
about making over participants’ visual appearance, it seems logical that the primary 
selection criterion would be an applicants’ looks.  Using this standard, the “ugliest” 
would be the neediest. But the narrative structure of each episode centers on explaining 
why a particular recipient, whatever their looks, needs and deserves an extreme 
makeover—and quite often, the quality or severity of one’s facial or corporeal problems 
is not the main criteria determining their ultimate success as a candidate.  My question is 
not whether or not these explanations reveal the “real” motivations of the production 
staff; rather, I am interested in the cultural work accomplished by these narratives.54   
                                                 
53 A more extensive discussion of the connotations of the word “mission” appears in the 
chapter based on my analysis of the work of Operation Smile.   
54 Excerpts from the application participants used to apply for the show appear at the 
beginning of this chapter.  Besides eliciting basic information (age, occupation, race, and 
gender), multiple questions ask applicants to explain why they need a makeover.  They 
are asked to describe what parts of their face and body they most dislike, how their 
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In each episode, a story is constructed that explains the need for radical 
intervention. Rather than introducing us to an extreme makeover candidate and letting a 
picture of the candidate, in essence the person’s appearance, speak for itself, a narrative is 
constructed wherein candidates, their families, and their friends describe in detail the 
candidate’s problems.  This “cataloguing of inadequacies” (Deery 2006:166) posits the 
makeover as a solution to a myriad of problems, most of which will not be directly 
affected by aesthetic intervention.  Candidates do identify facets of their appearance that 
they would like to change, but the thrust of the story emphasizes emotional, intimate, 
social, bodily, and financial difficulties.55  The narrative positions the makeover as not 
simply a response to a candidate’s appearance, but rather as the sole means of repairing 
the candidate’s disfigured life.    
 
Emotional Repair 
 Art is a fifty-five year old seemingly average American guy—medium build, 
brown hair, male pattern baldness.  In short, he looks like millions of middle aged men.    
Within minutes of meeting him, we find out that Art lost his wife five year ago and is 
intensely depressed.  According to the Extreme Makeover announcer, in that time Art has 
                                                                                                                                                 
appearance has affected their life.  Applicants are even asked to imagine what life would 
be like post-makeover.  
55 For the sake of brevity, I am providing exemplary examples of each kind of narrative 
deployed in Extreme Makeover.  In the episodes I have analyzed, there are multiple cases 
of each narrative I have identified, and each candidate’s story fits within the framework I 
am positing.   
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been “asleep in every sense of the word…Art needs to chart a change of course.”  The 
announcer’s words are dubbed onto images of a sullen Art pacing along the edge of a 
lake.  In Art’s case, emotional trauma is the basis for repair. Art’s salvation comes 
through an extreme makeover.  In Hollywood, Art meets with a cadre of surgeons, 
dentists, optometrists, and stylists that help craft a new visual aesthetic.  At the end of the 
episode, Art concludes, “I’d lost the winning edge and now it’s back.”  Even Art’s 
reflection post-makeover suggests that while he does look different than he did at the 
beginning of the episode, the success of the makeover lies in its ability to restore Art’s 
mental health.  
 In another episode as candidate Amy describes her life and the way she feels 
about herself, she begins to cry.  The announcer suggests, “Beneath the pock marks on 
this woman’s face, deeper scars.”  She is intensely insecure.  “Pretty is not what Amy 
sees when she looks in the mirror.”  She points to gaps in her teeth, her nose, and her 
complexion.  She tells us that as a child she was made fun of.  She used to scrape her face 
with steel wool to make her acne go away.  Her acne scars remind her of the humiliation 
she endured.  The announcer tells us that there are very few pictures of Amy growing up.  
“When I was a teenager my mother never told me I was pretty…I hated how I looked.”  
Understandably, she never accepts a compliment.  “I can’t dwell on it.  I have a life to 
live…But it’s always there.  It’s always in the back of your mind.”  After a series of 
procedures including a nose job, brow lift, and laser resurfacing, Amy declares, “For the 
first time in my life I feel like I have a beautiful smile…It really is a dream come true.”  
Her makeover has done more than change the look of her face.  The announcer 
concludes, “Amy’s life has turned around.”   
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Social Repair 
 Regina is a recently divorced, middle aged mother of two.  Like many women in 
her circumstances, she appears to have little time to devote to her appearance.  She wears 
her hair tied back.  Her wire rimmed glasses are not particularly stylish.  If she wears any 
make-up, it is not visible.  Although she does not seem to invest much in her appearance, 
she wants a makeover.  Regina explains that before her children were born, she prayed 
that her kids would not look like her.  She tells her children, “I don’t want you guys to go 
through the hurt that I went through.  People constantly talking about you all of the time.”  
In short, it is social exclusion that has led her to so desperately want a makeover.  After a 
regime of cosmetic surgery, Regina remarks, “I am the swan on the lake. I’m going to 
strut my stuff.”  Instead of being the outsider, Regina anticipates a post-makeover life 
at/as the center of the party.   
 Ray Croc spent ten year on death row, but DNA evidence exonerated him from a 
murder conviction.  Dubbed the “snaggletooth killer,” Ray was convicted of murdering a 
bartender based on a bite mark found on the dead woman’s body.  His crooked, mangled 
teeth resembled the bite mark.  The announcer asks, “Was his only crime bad looks?”  
Ray concludes that “My crooked, irregular teeth and my haggard looks, I think that led to 
the outcome of me being sentenced to death.”  Being judged based on appearance is what 
led to his imprisonment.  Now he works as an inspirational speaker encouraging others to 
look beyond appearance.  In Hollywood the announcer tells us, “The extreme team 
decriminalizes Ray’s outlaw looks.”  In addition to dental implants and a custom toupee, 
Ray receives a brow lift, upper and lower eye lift, liposuction, nose job, and laser 
resurfacing.  “Our whole goal is to give you a more innocent look,” plastic surgeon Dr. 
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Griffin tells Ray.  The makeover works as a way of erasing the social stigma of Ray’s 
criminal past, and indeed his very criminality.  And the team claims to succeed.  The 
announcer declares, “Prison took ten years from Ray.  Extreme Makeover gives ten years 
back.”    
 
Financial/Economic Repair 
 In another episode we meet brother and sister pair Bill and Kim.  Both want an 
extreme makeover.  Both cite their inability to function in public as the prime reason why 
they need aesthetic intervention.  For Bill, an extreme makeover promises to fix problems 
he has had while working as a manager at Home Depot.  “Bill’s shyness has held him 
back at work,” the announcer tells us.  Bill elaborates, “I deal with a lot of people.  It’s 
hard when I have to directly face them…I feel like they’re looking at my big lips.  I feel 
like they’re looking at my big forehead, and feel a lot of insecurities because of it, so I 
had to step down as a manager.”  One of Extreme Makeover’s star surgeons Dr. Fisher 
agrees that Bill needs cosmetic intervention, but not because he is ugly.  In a consult 
before his surgery, Bill explains to Dr. Fisher, “A lot of people tell me I look angry.”  Dr. 
Fisher replies, “You have really heavy bones that make you look very intense.”  To deal 
with Bill’s “intense” bones, Dr. Fisher suggests a collection of cosmetic procedures 
including a nose job, liposuction on his chin, an eyelift, and a sculpted brow sanded down 
in surgery.  In Extreme Makeover terms, new bones promise to make for new job 
opportunities.   
 Another episode begins by promising the audience a look at a dramatic, new 
procedure.  The announcer declares, “New weapons target the world’s most rampant 
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disease.” What’s the disease?  Acne.  Tammy’s face is red and inflamed.  She lives “her 
life in a darkened room” working as a telemarketer.  She admits that although she wants 
to be a professional dancer, she works a job where no one can see her so that “They 
[coworkers] don’t have to see me or be judging me for my appearance…I can just let my 
inside out.”  After a series of facial procedures including a brow lift, nose job, upper 
eyelid lift, and dermatological treatments, Tammy exclaims, “When I look in the mirror 
it’s definitely not the same person from eight weeks ago. I have more confidence.  I don’t 
have to hide anything.”  No more hiding means that Tammy is primed for the work she 
has always wanted to do.    
 
Intimate Repair 
  Unlike many Extreme Makeover candidates, Aimee is not looking for a partner.  
She is married to a man who tells producers in an interview preceding Aimee’s extreme 
makeover that he loves her heart and soul, not her looks.  Presumably, not many would 
love Aimee for her looks.  Upon seeing Aimee, her surgeon Dr. Moellekan admits, 
“Aimee is the most difficult case of my entire professional career.”  Her mother, echoing 
Dr. Moellekan, seems to imply that even she thinks Aimee is ugly. “I know she’s a 
beautiful person, but I’m her mother.”  But Aimee’s ugliness doesn’t matter in and of 
itself.  Aimee’s appearance matters because as her story seems to suggest, it influences 
her relationship with her husband.   He tells the camera that she has trouble being 
completely naked, suggesting that their sexual relationship is troubled.  “She’s always 
saying that she doesn’t like herself.”  And yet after a three month stay in Hollywood and 
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some fifteen cosmetic procedures, Aimee declares, “I’m ready to…walk out with 
confidence,” presumably into the bedroom with naked self assuredness.  
 Pam is a respiratory therapist, a real “girl next door” with sandy blond hair and 
non-descript facial features.  She wants a makeover for herself but also for her boyfriend.  
Even though they have lived together for three years, he has not popped the question, and 
she wants to get married.  Maybe a makeover will give him the incentive he needs?  In 
Hollywood, she gets her ears pinned back, an upper and lower eyelid lift, a nose job, 
dental work, and Botox and collagen treatments, along with a slew of body work, but 
even two weeks after surgery she is still extremely swollen.  Her recovery proceeds 
slowly, but in the end, it is all worth it.  At her big reveal, Pam’s boyfriend who is 
waiting to see her drops to one knee and proposes.  More than the makeover, she seems 
excited about the idea of her upcoming marriage.  It is what she always wanted.   
 
Bodily Repair 
 We meet Sara, shirtless, sitting on her bed.  She speaks into her home video 
camera, attempting to convince the producers why she needs a makeover.  Her left arm 
covers her right breast.  A large scar marks her chest where a breast used to be. Sara is a 
“victim of breast cancer.”  Sara has “aged ten years” during her treatment, and she has 
also developed a deep sense of fear.  “When I found out I had cancer, I was devastated 
because you think you’re going to die.”  Sara receives a number of interventions 
including a face lift, laser skin treatments, and breast implants.  Her final stop on her day 
of styling is to buy a bra.  She is whole again.     
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 “By all appearances Rachel Myer from Colorado is a normal, lovely young 
woman...but appearances like beauty itself can be deceiving,” the announcer tells the 
audience.  Rachel looks “normal,” but Rachel needs a makeover because she has 
alopecia, an autoimmune disease that results in hair loss.  “Rachel is headed to Beverly 
Hills to be beautiful, to be normal.”  In Hollywood, Rachel meets with the extreme team 
and undergoes a variety of procedures including a brow lift, facial fat injections, tattooed 
eyebrows, and laser skin treatments.  But Rachel most desires a wig that would allow her 
to go swimming and to “not worry if there was a wind storm.”  But a custom wig 
accomplishes more than diminishing Rachel’s anxiety.  According to the narration, 
“We’re [the extreme team] going to give back what nature stole.” At her reveal, Rachel 
concludes, “I feel like a person with a real head of hair.”  In a sense, the makeover has 
conquered the disease and repaired Rachel’s life.   
 
Extreme Face Work as Repair Work 
Other plastic surgery television offers the promise of a makeover based on the 
logic that a participant has earned a reward.  For example, a participant’s life of 
meaningful work earns them the reward of plastic surgery (Crawley 2006).  But Extreme 
Makeover participants are often offered surgery not as a reward, but as a form of 
compensation for suffering.56  Reality is the problem—living among people who may 
judge you—and television offers the solution.  How does cosmetic intervention help a 
candidate’s given problem?  How does a new face make for better sex?  How does a nose 
                                                 
56 The only exceptions are two “Battle of the Bulge” episodes in which three participants 
must lose weight in order to earn their makeovers.  
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job help a spouse grieve the loss of his wife?  How does laser resurfacing absolve the 
humiliation of childhood torment?  How does cosmetic surgery resolve the experience of 
breast cancer?  How does cosmetic surgery help someone get a better job?   
By framing the cosmetic facial intervention accomplished on Extreme Makeover 
as repair, Extreme Makeover imagines itself not simply as a television show about 
cosmetic surgery, but rather as an opportunity for much needed repair.  While this 
transformation is about appearance, Extreme Makeover makes constant reference to 
repair work and in the process consistently constructs the project of cosmetic 
intervention.  In essence, as the program transforms the visages of makeover candidates, 
it simultaneously transforms the notion of what cosmetic intervention can accomplish. In 
a therapeutic culture, cosmetic surgery becomes another tool in the repertoire of tools to 
save the troubled psyche, a self help device used to resolve life problems.  The intense 
narrative work invested in explaining why candidates need surgery centers on facets of 
the candidate’s lives that are not working.  Being ugly is not a sufficient reason for 
receiving an extreme makeover.  Rather, recipients’ facial appearance is made over in the 
service of transforming, or more specifically, repairing their lives.  Because makeovers 
are projects of repair, they are so often prefaced by a story of defeat or destruction. 
Extreme Makeover stories outline the financial, emotional, intimate, bodily, and social 
problems experienced by candidates. In any sociological framing, these would be seen as 
social problems. Yet the makeover works as a superficial repair mechanism: cosmetic 
solutions for a social dilemma.  I argue that the work of repair must be interrogated, 
because it is laden with assumptions about what needs fixing and what being fixed entails 
(Spelman 2003).   
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Cultural critic Brenda Weber argues that Extreme Makeover engages in the work 
of “eradicate[ing] embodied anxieties” (1).  In a sense, cosmetic surgery has always 
framed its work on appearance as an intervention in the service of psychological 
wellness.  Only after doctors convincingly argued that changing a patient’s outer 
appearance profoundly impacted a patient’s wellbeing did cosmetic surgery emerge as a 
respectable medical specialty (Sullivan 2001).  In essence, cosmetic surgery, as we know 
it, imagines itself as a sort of practiced psychiatry.  Instead of psychopharmaceuticals, 
cosmetic surgeons use scalpels.  Instead of conversation about a patient’s emotional state, 
cosmetic surgeons talk with patients about what needs changing while viewing “before” 
pictures (as if these pictures speak for themselves).  What is interesting about Extreme 
Makeover is that the show understands surgery as a means for effecting not only 
psychological wellbeing, but also improving other facets of human life including the 
financial, social, intimate, emotional, and bodily.  The story goes that one’s very life is 
made over.  In conflating a changed appearance with a changed life, life itself is reduced 
to appearance.  The aesthetic is triumphant as a register of living. 
The degree to which aesthetic makeovers can work in the service of self-
improvement or repair, writ large, is a question.  While appearance undoubtedly shapes 
of all areas of social life, is it likely that cosmetic intervention can work to repair in the 
ways the industry and patients believe that it can?  I contend that the very pain patients 
hope to resolve through surgery consumption may be reproduced because in effect, the 
cosmetic surgery industry relies on that very pain for its survival and expansion (Corvino 
2004).  While the potential for aesthetic makeovers to transform, and in effect repair, the 
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subject’s life are limited, in popular culture aesthetic transformation facilitated by 
makeovers are continually purported as the solution for whatever ails.  
 
An Extreme Makeover 
I am looking at before and after pictures.  Before and after pictures 
side by side do look amazing.  Staring and comparing, I see what the 
surgeons mean.  Softening her jaw line does make her look, well, 
“softer.” I wonder if, like her, I can get cheek implants.  Would they 
help?  Facial definition is key, even if it is effected by pockets of 
polymers or shaving sections of skull.  Biotechnofantasies make it 
possible to craft faces that maintain almost no resemblance to their 
former shape.  Before and after pictures juxtaposed make for shock and 
awe.  But a before or after picture taken by itself captures just 
another face.  One that I would look past if it was not filling up my 
television screen.   
 
Extreme makeovers take place in Hollywood, America’s center of fantasy 
production, and employ the services of many self-professed celebrity surgeons and style-
makers.  It is a biotech Cinderella story, except rather than becoming a princess, 
candidates are primed for becoming celebrities or, more precisely, looking like 
celebrities.  In fact, Extreme Makeover explicitly positions itself as a proverbial fairy 
godmother: through the magic of television (and the resources available to primetime 
shows) producers turn beasts into beauties.   
Cultural critics of Extreme Makeover take for granted that producing celebrity 
look-alikes is exactly what is accomplished (Deery 2006, Weber 2006). Weber argues 
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that “Extreme Makeover offers viewers the promise of the exceptional (coded as high-
glamour beauty) built on an economy of sameness” (1).  For Weber, the sameness 
inscribed on the bodies of makeover recipients is significantly shaped by celebrity 
culture.  But if Extreme Makeover offers the promise of celebrity exceptionalism, as I 
agree that it does, viewers might be sorely disappointed.  Promising celebrities is not the 
same as producing celebrities.   
While Extreme Makeover discursively constructs celebrity look-alikes, its 
cosmetic interventions fall far short of producing the exceptionalism of celebrity 
aesthetics.  While the techniques of intervention are undeniably extreme, the results are 
radical, though not in the ways many imagine.  The pageantry of the show obscures the 
fact that while many candidates look different at the end of the makeover, they are still 
relatively unremarkable vis-à-vis somebody famous like Angelina Jolie or Johnny Depp.   
Undoubtedly, candidates are more stylized.  Most go from wearing little or no 
make-up to a full face of professionally applied cosmetics.  Most arrive at the Extreme 
Makeover mansion in jeans and sweatshirts and leave in designer suits and gowns.  And 
surgery has erased (or at least diminished) facial characteristics conventionally defined as 
unattractive.  A scar that remains after multiple surgeries to repair a cleft palate is 
lightened.  A brow ridge is reduced.  A nose is broken and set at a straight angle. Acne is 
lasered away.  Participants look very different at the end of the process compared to how 
they looked in the beginning, but they do not look like celebrities.  Consider the 
following images reproduced from the Extreme Makeover website:   
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Figure 9. Tammy “Before” and “After” 
   
Figure 10. Anthony “Before” and “After” 
Undoubtedly, the after photographs are slick—faces are well lit, make-up is expertly 
applied, candidates are smartly posed.  These photographs are professional headshots.  
But looking closely, they resemble head shots of character actors as opposed to movie 
stars.  Think William H. Macy as opposed to George Clooney.   
Periodically, episodes include updates.  We meet candidates post-makeover who 
have returned to their “real” lives.  Not surprisingly, these candidates look significantly 
different than they appear at their big reveals and in their post-makeover glamour shots.  
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High maintenance hairdos have been traded for pony-tails.  Despite all of the surgical 
intervention, without the extreme team, candidates appear rather unremarkable.  In short, 
participants appear entirely unlike celebrities whose aesthetic is built around chronic 
exceptionalism.  And yet, even in updates, the story, as told by the announcer, remains 
one of glamorous transformation—the housewife turned starlit ingénue.   
“I look like a movie star.” 
“From the girl next door to the girl of her dreams.” 
“From snaggletooth to a draw dropping dazzling beauty.”   
“Bill looks like a movie star.”  
“A nightmare transforms into a dream.” 
Understanding Extreme Makeover as a site of cosmetic intervention that culminates in the 
production of celebrity look-alikes relies on a fantasy of cosmetic surgery that ignores the 
ordinariness of post-makeover candidates’ faces.  
While the techniques of intervention are undeniably extreme, the results are 
radical though not in the ways many imagine.  Setting aside instances in which 
consumers purchase cosmetic procedures for the purposes of inscribing classical art 
works onto their bodies as in the case of French performance artist Orlan or embodying 
animals as in the case of Seattle’s CatMan Dennis Avner, there are few examples of 
cosmetic intervention going further than what occurs on Extreme Makeover.  The level of 
intervention most candidates experience is excessive, or at the very least extraordinary.  
In each episode following a candidate’s big reveal, before and after images of the 
candidates wearing only their underwear are projected onto the television screen.  The 
announcer narrates as the images are turned revealing a side profile with a newly 
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achieved ski slope nose or a strong jaw line enhanced by a chin implant.  As the image 
shifts the announcer offers a comprehensive list of the procedures undergone.  Often, 
candidates have experienced ten cosmetic procedures.  Sometimes, they have undergone 
almost twenty.  Their entire bodies are explored, outlined, marked, magnified, cut, and 
conquered.  But if candidates are not made into celebrities, what do candidates look like 
at the end of the show?  Rather than extraordinary, the results are mundane.  Rather than 
celebrities, candidates appear like different versions of everyman and everywoman.  
What becomes clear is that Extreme Makeover is less about producing the exceptional 
and instead settles for the creation of an unremarkable face.  This is precisely what 
distinguishes face work aimed at disfigurement from cosmetic surgery aimed at 
attractiveness.  Candidates are made over into a radically different version of themselves, 
albeit an unremarkable version.  The investment in a different version of what remains an 
unremarkable face is curious.     
 
Extreme Dissociation 
The patient sits dressed in a robe, surrounded by experts poking and 
prodding at her face. Then at once, they stop.  The experts step back 
and assess the patient.  Slowly, her chair is turned around so that she 
comes face to face with her own image.  Any moment she will see herself 
for the first time.  The first time in a very long time.  For a micro-
second, they hold their breath.  We hold our breath.  She holds her 
breath.  Slowly, her eyes open.  Her jaw slacks.  Her eyes widen.  She 
sees herself for the first time in a very long time, but we cannot see 
her.  Through the awkwardly positioned wide-angled television camera, 
we cannot see the mirror or her reflection in it.  We watch the woman 
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watching herself (herself?) in the mirror.  She looks in the mirror but 
does not recognize the image reflected back.  Who is that in the 
mirror?  Surely, I think, we are about to witness a psychic break, an 
existential crisis.  Surely, this is the beginning of a science fiction 
nightmare, one in which the self will slowly, but perceptibly, begin to 
unravel.  Her facial muscles begin to tighten, and slowly she begins to 
smile.  At once she is laughing crying saying, “Oh my god. Oh my god.  
Who is that in the mirror?” Smiling and laughing—who is that in the 
mirror?  (Did you ever wave into the funhouse mirror trying to confirm 
which reflection staring back belonged to you?  How did it feel to look 
in the mirror, to not recognize your own reflection?) 
 
Depersonalization : A frightening and/or disturbing experience of not being within one's own body 
or of being in immediate danger of vanishing/separating from reality – often described as the 
sensation of living inside a dream. Although cognitive functioning remains intact, the sufferers feel 
disconnected from their sense of self and often interpret it “as if I am losing my mind.”   
“My own face in a mirror seems foreign, like I have never really seen it before this moment…” 
From DPSelfHelp.Com (a website for those “suffering” depersonalization disorder) 
 
In episodes from the last two seasons of Extreme Makeover, there are two 
climactic moments of makeover magic.  Just prior to the “big reveal” and following all 
surgical, dermatological, optical, and dental procedures, Sam Sabora, Extreme 
Makeover’s resident stylist, accompanies participants to a Hollywood hair salon where 
candidates’ hair is remade via hair cuts, hair extensions, hair coloring, custom toupees, 
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and texturization procedures.57  Some participants undergo eyebrow re-shaping and 
coloring.  Men receive old-time barber shop shaves.  Finally, Hollywood make-up artists 
apply the final touches to women’s faces58, shading the face in such a way as to 
complement the surgical transformation.  Sam and the salon workers surround makeover 
participants who sit like obedient work objects in salon chairs wearing generic drapes to 
protect their clothing from cut hair and color drips.  Together the team turns the recipient 
around to face a mirror.   
While the show is constructed around the promise of a big reveal, this much 
smaller reveal is a significant dénouement of the show.  While participants have seen 
facets of their transformation throughout the process, this is the moment when 
participants see the finished product, their new faces transformed through surgery and 
enhanced through styling for the first time.  Camera angles allow the television audience 
access to view the back of the participants’ heads, as opposed to the participants’ 
reflections in the mirror.  In effect, the audience cannot see their faces.  Rather, we watch 
participants from behind and listen to each see him or her self for the first time.  While 
the big reveal centers on the audience’s surprise at seeing participants post-makeover for 
                                                 
57 The description I offer here does not occur in the first episodes of Extreme Makeover  
These episodes only captured patients’ surgery, and candidates’ styling is done off 
camera.   And yet, patients still express sentiments that could be described using the 
language of depersonalization.   
58 Make-up is not applied to male candidates on camera, though it is likely that even male 
candidates sport make-up on their big television reveal.   
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the first time, this moment relies on the shock that candidate’s experience when seeing 
him or her self for the first time.   
While the big reveal is continually referenced as the climax of the television 
show, the moment in the salon when the participant sees and responds to their new look 
for the first time represents a momentous narrative turn.  When participants see 
themselves for the first time, many have an uncannily similar response.  Respondents do 
not immediately revel in their newfound appearance.  Initially, they do not remark that 
they are so happy to be so beautiful.  They do not admire themselves in the mirror.  
Instead, they stare at their reflection and repeat that they do not recognize the face staring 
back at them.59   
“Is that me?  Is that really me?”   
“When I look in the mirror it’s definitely not the same person from eight weeks  
ago…I could just look at myself all night and say there’s no way.”   
“It doesn’t even look like me.”   
 “Is that me?  Is that me?”   
“Who is that?  I cannot believe it. That’s me!”   
“I could just look at myself all night and say there’s no way.” 
“This is not me…This is so different…I love it!”   
 “That’s not me.  She’s beautiful.  I can’t breathe.  I can’t believe that.”  
“It’s like a different person staring back at me.”   
                                                 
59 This is the moment in which most candidates who remark that they do not recognize 
themselves make such comments.  Occasionally, these sorts of comments are voiced over 
images of the candidate riding in a limousine to their big reveal or in a final interview.   
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What is especially interesting about this moment in Extreme Makeover is that participants 
seem to delight in not recognizing themselves.  It seems as if not identifying one’s 
reflection in the mirror is indicative of a good change.  In short, this narrative turn relies 
on the celebration of depersonalization, not simply a changed appearance but a shift in 
identity.   
References to mental illnesses, particularly schizophrenia, pervade social theory 
as an evocative point of reference through which a postmodern theory of the self is 
articulated.  In clinical contexts, schizophrenia refers to a collection of disorders 
characterized by disordered thinking and speech, hallucinations and delusions, 
withdrawal of emotional expression, and compromised motor ability (Jenkins and Barrett 
2004).   Social theorists who have taken up schizophrenia to theorize postmodern 
subjectivity bracket the clinical construct “schizophrenia” in favor of a metaphorical 
schizophrenia.  And yet the clinical construct schizophrenia does not exist apart from the 
culture in which schizophrenia is identified and diagnosed.  Cultural anthropological 
accounts of schizophrenia note that onset, symptom formation, personal experience, and 
social response all vary according to the cultural context in which schizophrenia is 
produced and experienced.  In short, the clinical construct ‘schizophrenia” is a product of 
the culture in which it emerges.  It is “an instance of transgression situated at the margins 
of culture, at the very edge of meaningful experience” (Jenkins and Barrett 2004: 5).  It 
may be at the margins, but it remains within the bounds of culture, informing other facets 
of experience.   
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For Deleuze and Guattari (1983), schizophrenia is a heuristic device used to 
theorize postmodern subjectivity against modernist rationality.60  Similarly, for Frederic 
Jameson (1984), schizophrenic sensibility is a product of late capitalism, specifically the 
consumption of postmodern culture.  To approach postmodern sensibilities using 
metaphors of mental illness is not to diminish the very real experience of schizophrenia 
and other experiences characterized as mental illness.  The schizophrenia that circulates 
in postmodernist accounts crudely approximates the schizophrenia determined in the 
medical clinic.  In this way, postmodernists who employ metaphors of schizophrenia do 
not claim that the subjects in their theoretical narratives would necessarily be clinically 
diagnosed as schizophrenic (though some surely would).  While schizophrenia as a 
metaphor does not exactly work to explain the kind of sensibility depicted by Extreme 
Makeover, the general affect described by schizo theory and a detour through clinical 
accounts of depersonalization are useful for understanding what appears to be at first 
glance a curious narrative turn.   
                                                 
60 Keith Doubt’s (1996) sociological exploration of Delueze and Guattari (1983) and 
other postmodern theorists conflates the clinical object schizophrenia and the theoretical 
object schizophrenia.  Doubt is right to point out that playing with schizophrenia obscures 
the suffering experienced by those diagnosed with schizophrenia.  Yet even as Doubt 
understands the schizophrenia that circulates in these accounts as a heuristic device, he 
approaches these accounts as constructing an etiological account of schizophrenia.  It is 
obviously problematic to make the claim that schizophrenia, the clinical object, is an 
ideal model for constructing relations between the self and society, but it is Doubt who 
makes this claim on behalf of Delueze, Guattari, and Foucault.   
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In clinical contexts, depersonalization is a diagnostic category used to label 
patients experiencing feelings of “unreality,” particularly the feeling that one’s body does 
not belong to one’s self (Simeon and Abugel 2006).  It along with dissociative fugue, 
dissociative identity disorder (also known as multiple personality disorder), and 
dissociative amnesia comprise what are characterized as dissociative disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association DSM-IV-TR 2000).  This cluster of diagnoses is characterized by 
disruption in consciousness, memory, identity, and/or perception.  I am not claiming that 
Extreme Makeover produces depersonalization as it is understood in diagnostic accounts.  
Rather, like social theorists Deleuze, Guattari, and Jameson, I use depersonalization as a 
metaphor for framing the events that unfold on Extreme Makeover.  I use 
depersonalization to understand the momentary disruption in perception that is cultivated 
and fetishized on Extreme Makeover.   
 Deleuze and Guattari celebrate the schizo—the radical annihilation of an 
intelligible self and the glamour of dissociation.   “The schizophrenic process, which is 
not an illness, not a ‘breakdown’ but a ‘breakthrough,’ however distressing and 
adventurous: breaking through the wall or the limit separating us from desiring 
production, causing the flows of desire to circulate” (1983: 362).  I am reluctant to 
approach the depersonalization of Extreme Makeover as a celebratory moment.  Rather I 
am interested in questioning what it means that depersonalization is des in the context of 
Extreme Makeover.  Setting aside the ethical debates about whether or not schizophrenia 
(the metaphor or the diagnosis) should be romanticized in social theory (or if mental 
illness or disability should be metaphorized), dissociation is conceptualized as a sort of 
“breakthrough” on the television show.  
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In Keith Doubt’s (1996) sociological interrogation of schizophrenia, he argues, 
using George Hebert Mead’s (1934) framework for understanding the development of the 
self, that schizophrenia may result in limited reflexivity or, in other words, the inability to 
rely on one’s perception of oneself.   Symbolic interactionism understands the 
development of the self as an intrinsically social process that relies on a productive 
relationship between what Mead identifies as the “I” and the “me.”  For Mead, the ability 
to reflexively respond to one’s own behavior by taking into account what he terms the 
generalized other is essential to the development of a self and to social interaction.  In 
symbolic interactionism, there is no intelligible self without self reflexivity.  In 
comparison, Deleuze and Guattari approach postmodern subjectivity leaving open the 
possibility of compromised self reflexivity (a radical divorce between the “I” and the 
“me” in Meadian terms).  In other words, they argue that part and parcel to postmodern 
selfhood are moments of dissociation.  This dissociation is not the breakdown of the self 
but rather a characteristic of postmodern selfhood.  In short, postmodernism leaves open 
(and perhaps encourages) the possibility of breakdown/breakthrough.  Similarly, 
depersonalization is not the destruction of the self, but rather a process through which the 
self is continually refashioned.  
In the case of Extreme Makeover, depersonalization is staged in the presence of 
experts whose labor is invested in effecting a more desirable appearance.  Together they 
surround the participant who is turned around to face a mirror.  The makeover recipient 
does not recognize the reflection of his or her face in the mirror.  Embodiment, the 
subjective experience of living in and through a body, is characterized by fluidity and 
malleability, but malleability implies a shifting, evolving bodily subject.  Extreme 
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Makeover recipients do not seem to understand or approach their transformed bodies as 
new manifestations of their pre-surgical body.  Rather they seem to understand the post-
surgical body as an altogether different body, and in some cases, a new identity and as a 
result a different human being altogether.  In this way, the climax of Extreme Makeover 
relies on a moment of (non)recognition.  What cultural work does this moment 
accomplish?  What does it mean to look in a mirror and not recognize one’s self?  What 
does such a moment convey to the audience?  Not recognizing oneself is the test of a 
successful makeover.  A good makeover is a dramatic makeover, and in the context of 
makeover culture, the most dramatic outcome that one can hope for is for one’s family 
and friends not to recognize the makeover candidate.  This response is standard.  Families 
and friends who attend a candidate’s “big reveal” display the same reaction in every 
episode.  They revel in their non-recognition.  What does it mean to desire an aesthetic 
that is unrecognizable?  What does it mean that we do not want to recognize our faces?   
Writing about Extreme Makeover, Brenda Weber (2005) argues that pre-
makeover anxiety is expressed by participants as a dissociation of subjectivity from 
embodied experience.  This anxiety is resolved via surgery, after which candidates “claim 
a unity of identity and body, a sense that she has finally become herself” (1).  Weber’s 
analysis of Extreme Makeover is that the process offers candidates a classical (read: 
integrated and intelligible) subjectivity.  While candidates certainly express a sense of 
“becoming who they really are,” Weber ignores how this sense of self is forged through 
depersonalization.  It is not simply that the makeover offers candidates a means for 
resolving a divided self.  Rather, the makeover is investing in a moment of productive 
dissociation.  It is the moment of depersonalization that produces a sense that the 
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makeover is sufficiently dramatic and thereby a success.  The new face is not simply the 
manifestation of a buried self that is obscured by ugliness and hidden underneath 
disfigurement.  Rather, this is a much more postmodern, diffractive, and complex 
process.  A new face, one that appears so different as to be unrecognizable, becomes a 
moment so desired that depersonalization becomes fetishized.  A successful 
transformation is hardly a transformation at all but rather a radical reformation wherein a 
new face is crafted. 
 Much has been made of the way in which cosmetic surgery is an avenue for 
becoming one’s “true self” (Crawley 2006).  In this logic, cosmetic surgery is imagined 
as a tool for unearthing the authentic self that always already existed but was only 
obscured by an imperfect appearance and a corresponding lack of self esteem.  Certainly, 
this logic operates on Extreme Makeover.  Toward the end of their makeovers, 
participants often remark that they have recovered their “real” selves.  In a comment 
reminiscent of other participants’ post-makeover reflections, Pam concludes, “I’m the 
person I’ve always wanted to be on the outside and that’s completed me and made me 
whole.”  I argue that the makeover is not only a recovery project but simultaneously a 
project of (re)invention wherein something altogether new is created.  In displacing the 
old self, an entirely new future is imagined, courtesy of cosmetic intervention.  What is 
created?  What is the future that cosmetic intervention promises?  Extreme Makeover 
promises a complete displacement of the previous self, an erasure of history, a dissolution 
of old traumas.  In short, it situates a radically de-historicized self, in literal terms an 
unrecognizable face, as the ideal outcome.   
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Extreme Conclusions 
 
Cultivating Consumption 
Extreme Makeover makes a cultural narrative available that encourages projects 
of self-improvement forged through consumption towards the end of improving 
appearance.  The rhetoric goes that everything else will fall into place post-makeover.   
All self improvement narratives rely on some notion of the consumer as at least 
inadequate and sometimes profoundly deficient.  Financial guides assume that the reader 
does not know enough about economics.  Dating books assume that the reader does not 
grasp how successful social interactions should proceed.  What makes Extreme Makeover 
unique is that it approaches the participants as aesthetically inadequate, but rather than 
positing that appearance interventions will make the participant more attractive, the show 
goes much further.  In fact, the show posits that an entire disfigured life is made over as 
an effect of the alteration of appearance.  Survey data suggests that those with a more 
desirable appearance (based on conventions about what is attractive) fare better in life 
than those with less desirable visages (Langlois et al. 2000).  Appearance matters, but 
does it matter in the way that Extreme Makeover claims that it does?   
 Extreme Makeover ends a makeover declaring, “Mission Accomplished!” as if 
radical self-transformation happens via aesthetic intervention.  Whether this happens or 
not is an empirical question, but undoubtedly this is what both experts and makeover 
participants claim at the end.  As these shows continually frame psychological wellbeing, 
bodily health, along with work, family, and intimate life as fundamentally dependent on 
one’s appearance, these shows help to propagate “endless insufficiency” (McGee 2005).  
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Extreme Makeover predicates all other projects of self-improvement on a desirable 
aesthetic.  If every facet of our lives depends on our appearance, it is the most important 
facet of our selves and one worth investing incredible resources into repairing.   
Self-determination through transformation assumes that “the individual comes 
before society so any societal change is effected from the inside out” and that the “self is 
at the centre of the world” (Palmer 2004: 185).   Focusing on aesthetics forgoes any kind 
of structural analysis that locates the causes of participants’ problems in a socio-
historical-cultural context.  Subsequently, individualized intervention (i.e. face work) is 
favored rather than broader social change, and this model for transformation is readily 
available for incorporation into the audience’s lives, particularly because it is so 
compatible with contemporary American consumerist culture and the rise of the aesthetic 
register. Transformation happens through consumption (Deery 2006; Weber 2005).  
Makeovers require purchasing clothes, beauty products, aesthetic services, and cosmetic 
surgery.  Insofar as life transformation is forged through aesthetic intervention and 
popular culture, individual enhancement cannot help but solidify and exacerbate an 
aesthetic glamour culture that depends on and expands consumption (Weber 2005). 
Extreme Makeover provides viewers with language to identify bodily flaws and 
information about expensive interventions, in effect broadening the ever-expanding 
market of appearance related industries.   
 
Exploiting Vulnerability 
Reality television has been hailed as a profoundly democratic medium—for the 
people, by the people, and about the people (Andrejevic 2003).   Oftentimes, the audience 
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shapes the outcome (through voting) and/or dialogues with participants (through blogs 
and online chat sessions).  Audience members are given the opportunity to apply to 
participate in upcoming seasons.   In this democracy, though, participation is only 
possible in exchange for exposure and vulnerability.  As Andrejevic argues, participants 
do the “work of being watched.”  Reality television relies on “a form of production 
wherein consumers are invited to sell access to their personal lives in a way not dissimilar 
to that in which they sell their labor power” (6).  Reality television production seems 
democratic in the sense anyone can do the work of being watched.  Typically, shows do 
not demand that participants have any special skill, and participants are not excluded 
based on educational attainment or background.  But in the case of Extreme Makeover, 
participation relies not on a particular status (i.e. citizenship) but on a very sad story (i.e. 
vulnerability).  In this confessional culture/democracy, one trades vulnerability for the 
chance at a better life. 
Cultural critic Jon Dovey (2000) describes television that features behind the 
scenes images of plastic surgery as “trauma TV.”  Like other plastic surgery shows, 
Extreme Makeover is trauma television in the sense that it documents the bodily trauma 
of surgery, but if we think about trauma as a bodily or psychic injury often inflicted from 
an external source that compromises wellbeing, Extreme Makeover is through and 
through trauma TV.  It captures the trauma of the makeover, relies on stories of trauma, 
and arguably produces a trauma all of its own by positioning depersonalization as the 
definitive test of success.  The entire experience, not simply the surgery, could be 
understood as traumatic.  Participants often struggle alone with the effects of profound 
isolation and the pain of cosmetic interventions.   The narrative constructed and deployed 
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on Extreme Makeover capitalizes on participant’s trauma (death of a spouse, a 
miscarriage of justice, profound social isolation, memories of school yard bullying) by 
offering intervention in exchange for a detailed sensational account.  Progress is 
measured by continually invoking participants’ traumatic life stories: “A lifetime of 
heartache mended and healed.”  The desired outcome is, ironically, traumatic.  Extreme 
Makeover is devoted to disrupting participants’ identities.  The show forces a radical 
reappraisal of self by attempting to reshape participants’ appearances so that they are 
unrecognizable to themselves and to their families and friends.   
 
Producing Disfigurement  
And what of disfigurement?  Extreme Makeover participants are constructed 
through image and narrative as disfigured, but there is no escaping that most participants 
look (in their before and after pictures) like unremarkable people.  No doubt, “before” 
pictures resemble photographs of persons many would refer to as dowdy, unkempt, or 
even ugly, and “after” pictures feature faces that more closely conform to dominant 
notions of attractiveness.  But there is no self-evident facial difference that firmly situates 
the face work accomplished on Extreme Makeover as a kind of reconstructive surgery.  
Nevertheless, participants are firmly located within narratives about disfigurement 
through claims that candidates experience profound suffering and compromised lives due 
to their appearance.  The story is strikingly familiar to studies of people clinically defined 
as “grossly disfigured.”  In both cases, the face is understood and experienced as 
profoundly disabling.   
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 But what is the difference between a face marred by crooked teeth, wrinkled skin, 
or a nose with a bulbous tip and a face distorted through fire that displays the signs of 
third-degree burns?  In the world of Extreme Makeover, there is no difference.  The 
bodies subjected to extreme makeovers are disfigured discursively in the hyperreality of 
twenty-first century reality television culture.  What is the effect of framing bodies as 
disfigured that range in their relative ugliness but that are, for all intents and purposes, 
normal?  This is a site engaged in the production of disfigurement—faces that in many 
context would be thought about as normal are redefined as disfigured—and indeed 
actually disfigured through intervention.  Not coincidentally, the imperative to repair 
emerges in the same place and time as a site fully invested with the tools to intervene.  
This is a site devoted to repair, to face work, but also to the creation of its very work 
objects.  In this way, Extreme Makeover is unavoidably and simultaneously invested in 
repairing and producing “disfigurement” and expanding notions of disfigurement.    
In trying to account for the success of makeover television, Robert Thompson  
writes that “in a very real sort of way, the history of the United States is one big fat 
makeover show” (2003: B4).  In a very real sort of way, the future of the United States 
may be fashioned through makeover shows.  Extreme makeovers are a culturally 
accessible model for the formation of the self, but a self that is continually remade 
through consumption and dissociation.  Who are these selves that we are fashioning?  
What does it mean that unremarkable bodies can become defined using tropes of 
disfigurement?  What are the consequences of positioning facial appearance as a threat to 
life and positioning face work as a means for alleviating that with which we struggle?   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
SAVING FACE: THE MISSION OF FACE WORK 
 
“Changing Lives One Smile at a Time.” 
“Together, we create smiles, change lives, heal humanity.”  
Operation Smile Slogans 
 
Mission Defined 
2. b. A body of persons sent out by a religious organization to 
evangelize abroad; the enterprise or expedition on which they are 
sent. Also (esp. in pl.): the organized effort involved in 
preparing, equipping, and maintaining such bodies; freq. in 
foreign missions. 
7. a. The sending of representatives to a foreign country, esp. 
for the purpose of conducting negotiations, establishing 
political or commercial relations, watching over certain 
interests, etc.; a body of persons thus sent.  
9. a. A task which a person is designed or destined to do; a duty 
or function imposed on or assumed by a person; a person's 
vocation or work in life, a strongly felt aim or ambition in 
  life.
9. b. on a mission: determined to achieve a goal, complete a 
 etc. task, fulfill an obligation,
     From the Oxford English Dictionary 
 
A Portrait of Operation Smile 
The specter of global health crises periodically emerges in everyday American 
life.  News stories about “AIDS in Africa” appear on evening broadcasts and front pages.  
GAP t-shirts and iPods, tagged with Bono’s RED label, are bought and sold with 
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promises that a portion goes towards fighting AIDS/HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria.61  
Travel warnings circulate, promising an impending Avian flu pandemic.  In a socio-
historical moment increasingly characterized and conceived of in “global” or 
transnational terms, relationships between nations and populations are forged through 
technoscience, specifically through biomedical interventions.  Not surprisingly, cadres of 
international, medical philanthropic organizations, examples of which include Doctors 
Without Borders, the ONE Campaign, and Mercy Corps, have emerged to cure, fix, and 
treat bodies around the globe.  These organizations rely on the traffic of treatment from 
the United States to places defined as “in need.”   
                                                 
61 Product RED is a brand deployed by companies like the Gap, Converse, American 
Express, Apple, Motorola, and Microsoft to denote products that are part of the RED 
campaign.  A portion of the sales from RED products supports the Global Fund initiative.  
Founded in 2002 by Irish rock band U2’s lead singer Bono, the RED campaign is aimed 
at fighting AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis in parts of the world where rates of infection 
are increasing.  RED products are differentiated from most of the products sold by each 
participating company with a logo that identifies which products are affiliated with the 
RED campaign.  As the Manifesto published on the official website of the campaign 
indicates, the hope is to use consumption towards philanthropic ends.  “As first world 
consumers, we have tremendous power.  What we collectively choose to buy, or not buy, 
can change the course of life and history on this planet…All you have to do is upgrade 
your choice” (Product Red 2007).  In this way, the campaign markets the idea that social 
change is easy.  This chapter describes a similar sort of marketing strategy deployed by 
Operation Smile.   
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Without a doubt, many of these global health crises have incited panic because of 
the threat of massive fatalities.  In some cases, warnings predict the impending death of 
entire generations.   For example, the World Health Organization reports that AIDS/HIV 
is the leading cause of death among adults in Africa (World Health Organization 2006).  
But death is not the only global health emergency.  In fact, the specter of disfigurement 
motivates international efforts to repair the face.  These efforts are spearheaded by 
medical philanthropic organizations, the two biggest of which are Operation Smile and 
Smile Train.  Interestingly and ironically, repair of the face is understood as a critical 
intervention at the precise moment in which children in the places Operation Smile 
operates die of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and malnourishment.  In this chapter, I focus on the 
work of Operation Smile in order to interrogate the social and cultural work 
accomplished by charitable efforts geared toward the face.   
The story of Operation Smile recounted on its website and in many popular news 
media accounts about the organization begins in 1982 in the Philippines.  During a trip 
with other medical volunteers, Dr. William P. Magee, a plastic surgeon, and his wife 
Kathleen Magee, a nurse and clinical social worker, encountered “hundreds” of children 
“ravaged by deformities.”  Most were turned away.  The story is told that after 
encountering such overwhelming need, the Magees founded Operation Smile. Through 
what the organization terms “medical missions,” free reconstructive surgery is provided 
to “indigent” children to repair facial anomalies, mostly cleft lips and palates (Operation 
Smile 2007a).   
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Since 1982, the organization has conducted “missions” in 25 countries.62  Over 
100,000 children have received reconstructive surgery through the efforts of Operation 
Smile.  According to the 2006 Annual Report, the operating budget expenses (i.e. 
programming, fundraising, administrative costs) hovered around $41 million. During the 
same time period, the organization accumulated $42 million in revenue mostly through 
donations and grants.  The value of donated medical services hovered around $16 million 
dollars.  During this year, Operation Smile “changed the lives” of 9,334 children through 
medical intervention.  Perhaps, in response to the ongoing U.S. military presence in Iraq, 
the organization focused efforts on providing treatment to Iraqi children.  In 2006, 245 
Iraqi children received free reconstructive surgery through the organization.  In addition 
to providing surgical procedures, the organization devoted efforts toward increasing 
public awareness of its work by placing ads in the Financial Times and National 
Geographic (Operation Smile 2007b).  That these are the two titles in which ads appeared 
is telling.  The Financial Times is an international business paper, the British equivalent 
of the Wall Street Journal, a paper with an economically privileged readership, a prime 
audience to target for financial contributions.  By contrast, National Geographic is a 
journal devoted to educating readers about global cultures, but especially those regions 
largely unaccessed by most travelers.  The publication overwhelmingly features the 
                                                 
62Missions have taken place in Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, China, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Gaza Strip/West Bank, Honduras, India, Jordan, Kenya, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Venezuela, 
and Vietnam. 
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Global South, and this is, perhaps, not coincidental since most of Operation Smile’s 
efforts are focused on the “third world.”    
In addition to providing surgery, Operation Smile spearheads fundraising efforts, 
provides physician training and referrals, and educates American families with children 
born with facial anomalies.  Operation Smile also sponsors student-led organizations that 
build awareness about Operation Smile’s efforts in local communities and on high school 
and college campuses.  According to its website, 450 student organizations exist.  
Participating college students are invited to volunteer on medical missions as Patient 
Imaging Technicians. 
This chapter describes how the work of Operation Smile is represented through 
image and infused with meaning both on its website and in news media about the 
organization.  First, I consider how “disfigured” children are pictured, talked about, and 
deployed “before” intervention.  I ask why “creating smiles” is positioned as the “after” 
effect of face work.  I show that the imagery of a smile is deployed in the service of 
positioning surgery as an intervention that transforms miserable children into happy 
recipients and grants them what is understood as a universal facial expression.  Then, I 
consider the cultural work accomplished by Operation Smile celebrity spokespersons.  I 
argue that the juxtaposition of uncommon beauty and the grotesque body mobilizes hope 
and simultaneously reifies the very social context that makes facial difference the tragedy 
that it is.  I conclude by querying what it means to characterize face work as a “mission,” 
and I speculate about the consequences of such a framing.   
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Creating Smiles, Changing Lives 
The Operation Smile homepage is a busy website.  It is cluttered with an 
abbreviated organization mission, links to news and events, and portals to video footage 
documenting B-list celebrity Roma Downey’s participation on an Operation Smile 
mission.  The page offers a hodgepodge of possibilities—visitors can donate, volunteer, 
or, simply, learn more. Of all that appears on the homepage, the circulating “before” and 
“after” photographs of children, along with the accompanying text, constitute the central 
focus of the Operation Smile homepage.  A slideshow of such photos fills a larger space 
on the page than any other single feature, and because it continually circulates images 
and text, the feature is particularly captivating.  Like the other sites that display images of 
“disfigurement,” it also relies on voyeuristic appeal.  Children with cleft palate and lip are 
pictured, and because web surfers view these images on a computer screen, there is a way 
in which staring is made possible and almost invited.    
The rotating images and accompanying text reveal much about Operation Smile, 
particularly how it constructs and deploys particular meanings of work on faces of “third 
world” children.  Because this final site in my dissertation, wherein face work occurs is a 
not-for-profit international organization, the work is unique in particular ways.  Like the 
other sites described in this analysis, Operation Smile engages in technical work aimed at 
normalizing facial difference, but to complete this work it relies on donations and 
volunteer labor, and thus is also intensely invested in mobilizing public support for its 
missions.  The homepage feature culminates in a request for donations and in this way, 
the face work accomplished by Operation Smile is not simply conducted by the medical 
staff that volunteers for “missions.”  Rather, because the face work relies so much on 
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public investments, financial contributors and volunteers, too, become implicated in the 
organization’s work.  In this way, the face work accomplished by Operation Smile is 
technically carried out by a relatively small number of volunteers but symbolically 
carried out in the name of those invested in the project.  It begs to be asked: what is the 
work of Operation Smile? I demonstrate that the organization markets its work as the 
manufacture of smiles and that a simple smile takes on a great significance given how 
children are described and thought about prior to intervention.  In other words, children 
are depicted using “before” images but also through “before” narratives.  I describe these 
narratives prior to analyzing the significance a smile carries in this context.   
 In the fall of 2007, the Operation Smile homepage featured a rotation of 
captivating images.  “Before” pictures of six children—five year old Venezuelan boy 
Arnoldo, three year old Chinese girl Min Zhu Lei, thirteen year old Kenyan boy Brigid, 
five month old Nicaraguan baby boy Guillermo, and nine year old Vietnamese boy 
Thanh—circulated sequentially so that each visitor randomly encountered a child’s face 
and story.  Each “before” picture is a perfectly framed head shot, featuring the face of a 
child with a cleft palate or lip.  The tightly framed photographs are situated at the very 
top of the homepage, and so they fill the computer screens of most anyone visiting the 
Operation Smile website.  The photographs invite viewers to stare at each child’s 
disfigured face, while the text that alternates below each before photograph incites 
empathy:  
“Every night before I go to bed, I pray for a miracle. Will it ever come?”  
“My village is afraid of me.  My papa hides me away.  My mama cries.  
Happiness?” 
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“Fear. Shame. Sadness. Will there ever be a day when I do not have these 
feelings?” 
“They call me ‘Sut’ [which means split lip in Vietnamese]. Will there ever be a 
day they call me by my name?” 
“They point. They stare.  They call me names when will it stop?” 
“Will I ever feel like smiling with the sun shining brightly on my face?” 
     
Figure 11. Thanh Ngan “Before” and “After”63 
 
As these questions are positioned next to each child’s “before” picture, they are 
posed to the viewer as if spoken by the very child whose face appears in the photograph. 
It is not clear whether these are actual words spoken by the children, though at best they 
are a translation since it is unlikely that each child speaks English.  A moment later, the 
word “someday” flashes next to each photo.  Then, an “after” picture appears.  These 
pictures are not altogether unlike the “before” pictures.  They are tightly framed 
headshots too, but as opposed to the “before” pictures which feature dejected (in some 
cases crying) children all with cleft lips and/or palates, the “after” pictures capture 
                                                 
63 Images from <http://www.operationsmile.org/testimonials/ngan/> 
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smiling, beaming faces that contain only traces of facial difference.  Below each “after’ 
picture, the following text appears: “With your donation, you can make someday today.”   
What is this slideshow, presented to all who visit the Operation Smile homepage, 
trying to tell us?  At the most basic level, the slideshow plays on the trope of pity to 
encourage visitors to “get involved,” to type in their Visa number (Longmore 1997).  In 
this way, the slideshow is a marketing tool that strategically positions image and text 
towards the ends of soliciting empathy, financial contributions, and perhaps future 
volunteers.   While marketing is aimed at calculated ends, in this case donations, it 
simultaneously relies on and articulates meanings of disfigurement and of face work.  In 
other words, the slide show also alludes to what work will be accomplished by that $25, 
$50, $500 donation and what this work means.  With a donation to Operation Smile, a 
child will receive reconstructive surgery.  If the “after” pictures are the visual 
representation of what Operation Smile gives to children, as I argue, then the photographs 
suggest that surgery does not simply “fix” the face but rather results in a smiling face.  
But what does a smiling face connote?  Operation Smile deploys smiles to position the 
work of repairing the face as a project that restores both happiness and humanness.  That 
the face work conducted by Operation Smile can produce these ends is striking, given 
how facially variant children are described in news coverage about the organization.   
Over and over again, the costs of facial disfigurement are enumerated and the 
resulting image is quite stark.  At the most basic level, stories about the work of the 
organization establish one idea consistently—that children “suffer” from “defects,” 
“deformities,” and “abnormalities.”  This suffering takes multiple forms.  News accounts 
often offer details about how children’s lives— their physical and psychological health, 
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their relationships with other children and with their families, and their status as normal 
and thus their future—are affected by their faces.  By describing in detail how children 
suffer because of facial difference, what the work of Operation Smile accomplishes is put 
into sharp relief.  Telling “before” narratives is crucial to making sense of “after” 
narratives.   
In news accounts, physiological effects of craniofacial anomalies are referenced, 
making the “suffering” of children intelligible through the use of details and descriptions.   
The face can be, as the following news account suggests, a “huge handicap,” specifically 
producing difficulties speaking, eating, and hearing.  Images of children display visual 
difference and descriptions of children emphasize physical impairment.  In this way, the 
children are characterized as not only disfigured but also impaired. As an Africa News 
articles puts it: 
“Facial deformities are not only a physical defect but can be a huge handicap from 
an emotional level… ‘These children can’t speak clearly.  They can’t even eat 
properly because the food goes flying so they have very low self-esteem’” (Argus 
2007).  
Another account echoes these ideas: 
 “Inability to feed well eventually leads to malnutrition and then ear and chest 
infections. Also, speech defects later occur as the child grows up and there are 
also other problems such as poor mental development, social maladjustment 
among others…These kids with cleft palate can get fluid into their middle ear 
which can result in hearing loss” (Champion 2006). 
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News media describe the physical consequences of facial variance in order to give 
readers a sense of what the “costs” of disfigurement are.  The insistence that children are 
both visually atypical and physically impaired works to characterize the children as 
disfigured and disabled and thus “in need.”   
Interestingly, both accounts make connections between the physical costs of 
disfigurement and the emotional or psychological experiences of children.  In the first 
story, images of food flying from the lips of a child are used to describe both the 
physiological effects of cleft lips and palates, but also the presumed humiliation 
accompanied by such effects.  In the second, difficulties with speech are linked with 
“social maladjustment.”  Both accounts make plausible connections between the physical 
and the emotional wellbeing of children, namely that the physical impairment results in 
emotional distress.   
News accounts capitalize on children’s difficulties with social interaction.  In 
describing a child’s experience interacting at school with other children, The Irish Times 
(2007) writes,   
“The condition can cause children to be shunned.”  
Another article quotes a girl, who says,  
“‘I want to look pretty…I want to go back to school and get an education,’ said 
Sounya, who had dropped out of school because of taunts by other children” 
(Halloran 2006).   
Disfigurement is positioned as yielding difficulties both in social encounters with peers 
and in the children’s own families.  As Africa News (2007) claims,  
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“Even some parents do not want to be associated with their [the children’s] 
deformed faces.”  
More than schoolyard taunting, parents’ rejection of their children puts children’s lives 
especially at risk.   Because abject poverty characterizes the places Operation Smile 
works, food, medical care, and water are virtually inaccessible, thus children’s caregivers 
are critically important for their survival.  Stories like this intimate that intervention to fix 
the “deformity” is a child’s only hope if he or she is actually to survive, much less be 
“happy.”   
  Another article draws on an interview with an Operation Smile worker that 
repeatedly makes reference to the children’s inability to be “normal”:   
“‘These children are unable to have a normal life.  They can’t breath, eat or speak 
properly, are often not admitted in schools, and are ridiculed.  Our aim is to 
restore normal life to these children,’ said Mr. Racel Wawn, development 
director, Operation Smile India” (Bolpur 2006)   
While Wawn begins by identifying the physiological effects of cleft lip and palate, he 
quickly emphasizes that it is not simply physiological functioning that is at stake but 
rather the overall normalcy of the children toward which Operation Smile directs its 
efforts.   
 Most dramatically, descriptions of the children’s lives pre-surgery continually call 
the future into question.  In some cases, stories suggest that children with cranio-facial 
anomalies have, at best, an uncertain future.  One article describes a child who   
“cannot blow out the [birthday] candles”(Business World 2007). 
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This reference points to the functional effects of cleft lip and palate but also plays on the 
uncertainty of maturation.  If she cannot blow out the candles, did she have a birthday at 
all?   In another account, a mother is described as  
“not certain what the future held for her child” (Africa News 2007). 
Perhaps this is the case, given the outcomes described in other stories.  An Irish Times 
article offers the following: 
“Without surgery, these children in the developing world don’t stand a hope. They 
are never part of the school going population.  Many are hidden at home, and in 
some countries, they will be placed in institutions” (The Irish Times 2007). 
In this account, children’s futures are determined by several factors—the unlikelihood of 
attending school, the certainty of social isolation, and the chances of institutionalization.  
Each of these probable futures is absolutely “hopeless.”  Other stories conjure images of 
impending despair through the use of particular words.  Consider the following 
references: 
“plight of afflicted children” (Business World 2007) 
“the faces of children who would otherwise have faced a bleak and very lonely 
future” (Condren 2007) 
By characterizing the future of children with cleft lips and palates using language like 
“plight,” “bleak,” and “very lonely,” Operation Smile interventions become material 
work aimed at the face, but also the work of creating a future and a radically different 
kind of life.     
According to news accounts, children’s lives are impacted by disfigurement in 
tangible ways—they are mistreated by their families, they are alienated at school, they 
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experience physiological effects.   In short, children upon whom Operation Smile 
intervenes are described as uniformly unhappy, just as the “before” pictures of children 
on the organization’s own website often show patients crying.  Stories about Operation 
Smile infuse repair forged through facial reconstruction with meaning by describing what 
children’s lives are like pre-intervention and by focusing on specific effects of 
disfigurement.   
While descriptions of disfigurement locate children in desperate and hopeless 
circumstances, face work is positioned as the work of giving children the ability to smile.  
Considering how children are described “before” surgery, the restoration of happiness 
“after” surgery is quite remarkable.  Images on the Operation Smile website prominently 
feature smiling faces, but in press coverage about the organization and in self-promotion 
and fundraising materials, the smile also figures prominently.  Most obviously, the word 
“smile” figures in the organization’s name, and perhaps not coincidently in the name of 
another organization, Smile Train, which touts itself as the “the world’s leading cleft 
charity.”64  The name of the organization, thus, is quite revealing relative to its goal.  
Consider too other instances of the term “operation.”  The word “operation” as it 
has been used in the last fifteen years by the U.S. government in cases of military 
incursions, including Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, signifies an 
action aimed at a particular purpose.  In the first case, the goal of the operation was, in 
basic terms, to storm the desert.  A new presidential cabinet known for euphemistic 
language maneuvers termed the second military expedition in a way that positioned mass 
death and destruction in the service of “freeing” Iraqi citizens.  The terming of a medical 
                                                 
64 From <http://www.smiletrain.org>  
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charitable organization, Operation Smile, undoubtedly capitalizes on militaristic imagery.  
Like excursions to the Middle East, the work of the organization is characterized as 
calculated, organized, and directed towards a very specific goal.  The name Operation 
Smile suggests that crafting smiles is the most central target of the enterprise.    
Undoubtedly, the reference to smiles makes for a catchy tag, one that is more 
easily remembered than a more descriptive alternative, perhaps Operation Craniofacial 
Anomaly Repair.  And of course, much of the work of the philanthropic organization is 
aimed at lodging itself in the hearts and minds of potential volunteers and donors.  But 
references to smiles abound.  It is not simply the repair of facial difference but 
specifically the production of “the smile” that animates the organization’s work.  But 
what is a smile, really?   
 As Natalie Miller, Southern Africa Operation Smile regional director, quoted in a 
Sunday Times article acknowledges,  
“Together we are changing the lives of children one smile at a time” (Doke 2007). 
The reconstructive techniques employed by Operation Smile produce a change in 
appearance that could be described in terms of repair or the return of facial function.  
Instead, it is the smile that is continually evoked as the product of an Operation Smile 
intervention. At the same time that the smile is used as the principal “after” effect of 
surgery, the smile works as a shorthand, a taken for granted point of reference.  Rather 
than describing in detail how intervention affects the lives of children, accounts make 
reference to the smile as if everyone understands what crafting a smile signifies.  As one 
Africa News account demonstrates, the product of intervention is described simply as a 
smile, without a real examination of what that means:  
 233
“But when they come here they know the stigma will go and they will go back 
home with a smile, said the nurse” (Africa News 2007).  
Of course, children will return home with a changed appearance and restored facial 
function, but the smile serves as the primary way of referencing the change that has 
occurred.  The previous excerpt does make reference to the fact that stigma is averted by 
intervention.  In this way, children leave a marker of difference behind, but they also 
return home “with a smile.”   
 In fact, the smile is positioned as something one can possess.  It is, as one account 
describes: 
“the best gift you can give a child” (Franco-Diyco 2006).    
In this way, smiles are characterized as “gifts” which are “brought” or bestowed onto 
recipients, as the following excerpts indicate: 
“One campaign has literally brought smiles to faces of children” (Birnbaum 
2005). 
“Operation Smile South Africa, whose mission is to give ‘the gift of a smile’” 
(Argus 2007) 
In these accounts, the work of Operation Smile is positioned as a kind of transaction, in 
which a valued good, a smile, is given to children in need.  Setting aside the kind of 
relationship such claims rely on for the present moment, it is striking to consider a facial 
expression, a mode of communication as an intelligible object capable of being 
transferred from one to another.  The smile is described as an “after” effect and more 
specifically as a “gift,” but what kind of gift is it?   
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The meaning of a gift is not intrinsically discernible but rather determined by 
context.  Just as the gift of flowers can function as a sign of love, sympathy, or apology, 
the gift of a smile carries an ambiguous meaning in and of itself.  The smile could be a 
gift of restored facial function or a gift of a new appearance, and certainly reconstructive 
surgery produces both of these effects, but news accounts suggest that the smile is a gift 
that symbolizes a particular kind of future.  In other words, giving the gift of a smile is a 
way of talking about giving children the possibility for a happy life.  The future is 
continually invoked in these accounts, as the following demonstrates:  
“The correction of deformities makes a world of difference for these children.  It 
helps build self-confidence.  It not just creates smiles, it also paves the way for a 
brighter future” (Business World 2007).   
Another story quotes a volunteer for an Operation Smile Kenya mission, who describes 
how a relatively small amount of money can create a smile that remains for the rest of a 
child’s life.    
“‘Most of these children are only Sh15,000 from that precious smile that they will 
live with for the rest of their lives’” (Africa 2007). 
References to the smile as a gift position the smile as a gift that is so great precisely 
because it embodies a kind of durability.  Once facial structure is restored in such a way 
as to facilitate smiling, presumably a child will always be able to smile.  In this way, the 
effect of the smile extends beyond the present moment and shapes the future lives of the 
children upon whom Operation Smile works.   
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The smile is also used to reference what volunteers get from participating or 
contributing to Operation Smile.  Specifically, the smiles of children are often described 
in relation to how they make volunteers feel.    
“The danger of challenging political and religious barriers is more than 
compensated by the smiles that eventually grace the faces of thousands of poor 
children every year—children who have been stopped from attending school, who 
have been locked away, ostracized by their communities and, often, by their own 
families… but it’s the smiles that keep him [a volunteer] going back…the smiles 
are worth more than a million bucks” (Condren 2007).  
In this account, the smile acts as proof that the work of Operation Smile has been 
successful.  In particular, the smiles of children serve as a “pay-off” for Operation Smile 
volunteers, evidence that their investment has been worthwhile.  What makes the smile 
such a gratifying outcome is that it operates as a way of talking about something much 
larger than a simple smile and much more weighted than facial function.  Given the 
narrative that functions to describe the effect of Operation Smile intervention, volunteers 
have given children the gift of hope, the gift of a brighter future, and indeed what greater 
gift can one give a child?   
When used in these ways, the smile is deployed as evidence that the organization 
is accomplishing something significant.  Interestingly, the smile is made to speak for 
itself.  How a smile changes the lives of children is never explicitly articulated.  Rather 
the claim is simply that it does.  This claim relies on a shared global sense of 
understanding about what a smile means.  To understand what work the organization 
claims to be doing by crafting similes, the smile itself must be unpacked a bit.  I focus on 
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two features of the smile—its association with happiness and its status as a universal 
facial feature—to theorize what smiling signifies.   
In everyday life, a smile bespeaks happiness.  A smile is typically taken as a clear 
indicator of contentment and even joy.  Facial expression researchers would be quick to 
point out that a smile can be indicative of many emotions in addition to happiness.  As 
psychologist James A. Russell writes,  
[W]hereas a smile in the context of just having received a gift might be 
interpreted as a sign of pleasure, a smile in the context of just having 
spilled soup might be interpreted as a sign of embarrassment, and a smile 
in the context of greeting an adversary might be interpreted as an act of 
politeness (1994: 123). 
 
As opposed to this more nuanced account of what a smile means, Operation Smile 
undoubtedly relies on common associations and everyday meanings.  In the context of 
medical philanthropic marketing, “giving the gift of a smile” is akin to “bringing joy to 
the world.”   The charitable aim is obviously material.  It is an intervention on the 
physical body, surgery aimed at children’s actual faces.  Yet the intervention may be 
facial reconstruction, it is positioned as more than a material intervention.  By claiming 
that the children operated on can now smile, Operation Smile and the media outlets that 
cover their work suggest that happiness is a direct result of face work. The claim is that 
the material intervention produces an emotional, or affective, outcome.   
By so centrally focusing on the smile, the aim of the organization is characterized 
as equal parts material and non-material.  One consequence of such a claim is to infuse 
face work practiced by the organization as particularly spectacular.  Given that children 
are routinely described in tandem with suffering, the shift to happiness is quite striking, 
almost miraculous.  At the same time, happiness itself is an indefinable outcome.  What 
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precisely is happiness?  How do we know if someone is happy?  While answering these 
questions is, arguably, impossible, there is a shared sense that everyone desires happiness 
and that to be happy is one of the best results one can hope for in life.  Producing 
happiness then is no small thing.  It is both a highly valued outcome and one that is 
ineffable.  By claiming to produce something that is so beyond definition, the work of 
Operation Smile takes on an aura of wonder.  Surely, this facilitates financial 
contributions but so too does it reposition the “disfigured” face as an object in need of 
miraculous intervention.         
To claim to create smiles is also significant because smiling is often thought of as 
something that is universally human.  Those who study facial expressions claim that 
virtually everyone everywhere smiles (Ekman 1992).  It is cliché, but confirmed in the 
scholarly literature, that a smile is one of the rare universals.  The idea is that anyone 
could encounter anyone from anywhere and that each would understand (at least in a 
general sense) what a smile suggests about the other.  The fact that the smile is one of the 
rare features of human life that continues to be thought of in universal terms makes 
Operation Smile’s deployment of the smile particularly compelling.  Because the smile is 
conceptualized as a universal expression, being able to smile becomes indicative of one’s 
essential humanity.  By restoring a smile, Operation Smile gives children access to an 
attribute that is understood as universally human.  Of course, the claim to give the gift of 
a smile presumes that children did not have the ability to smile prior to intervention.  In 
this way, the granting of a smile signifies the transformation of a child’s status.  “Before” 
intervention, children are lacking a universal feature of humanity.  “After” intervention, 
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children possess this universally human trait.  Like other forms of face work, the 
intervention is imbued with human making potential.    
 Positioning the work of the organization as crafting smiles infuses it with social 
and moral significance.  First, children whose lives are characterized as profoundly 
lacking in significant relationships and burdened by emotional and physiological 
consequences, are ostensibly made happy by Operation Smile.  This transformation from 
crying and hopeless to joyfilled and hopeful is dramatic and helps to qualify work aimed 
at repairing the face as incredibly important.  In this way, deploying smiles is a critical 
move towards demonstrating the kind of transformation afforded by intervention.  At the 
same time, by restoring a smile, as opposed to any other facial expression, the face work 
accomplished by Operation Smile becomes infused with humanizing potential.  
Producing a universal expression, a smile, takes on the weight of restoring one’s 
humanity.  Because the smile carries such meanings, invoking the smile, that universal 
icon, makes the following conclusions about the work of Operation Smile possible:  
“The results are great, now he has a chance of a normal life…When they 
[volunteers] come back, they invariably say they could not believe the difference 
they were able to make.  We give people an opportunity to dramatically change a 
child’s life. The power of that is phenomenal” (The Irish Times 2007). 
As this excerpt indicates, normalcy constitutes on the work of the organization, and face 
work is imagined as “dramatic,” “phenomenal,” larger than life.   
By focusing on what children are like “before” and then describing the “after” 
effects in spectacular terms, the face work accomplished by Operation Smile is 
positioned as a shift from a life characterized by absolute dejection to one of effortless 
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joy, a transformation from non-human to universally human.   These are remarkable 
changes.  By continually visually and rhetorically picturing children in these ways 
“before” and “after” surgery, Operation Smile’s work becomes a radical mode of social 
repair wherein the work objects, in this case children’s faces, are dramatically remade 
and in the process new ways of being and experiencing the world are made possible.   
Yet, it is unclear what kind of repair is actually accomplished by the organization 
and what kind of repair is marketed by the organization.  Certainly, the organization 
understands its work as life changing, as the organization implies with their slogan 
“Changing lives one smile at a time.”  The tangible, material repair forged through 
reconstructive surgery is undoubtedly a goal, but it is not simply the face that is repaired 
but rather life itself.  Yet as the descriptions of children’s lives “before” intervention 
suggest, structural conditions, namely poverty, largely determine the quality of their 
lives.  The radical making over effected by Operation Smile is forged through 
individualistic response, specifically surgery.  It is certain that this matters for the 
children, but it remains doubtful that the future promised by Operation Smile can be 
facilitated simply through surgery since future is largely determined by economic 
structures, political arrangements, and cultural contexts.  Both news accounts and 
materials produced by the organization intimate that despair is turned to hope, that out of 
horrible circumstances life is made possible.  This is certainly a narrative that works as an 
effective marketing tool.  The question remains to what degree what is marketed reflects 
what face work actually accomplishes for the children subject to intervention. 
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Celebrities at Work 
While smiles are the primary symbol deployed by Operation Smile, celebrity 
spokespersons are also used in the service of the organization’s work.  Philanthropic 
causes and charity events have long employed entertainment to engage audience 
members with the aim of eliciting financial contributions. The annual Jerry Lewis Labor 
Day Muscular Dystrophy Telethon relies on the (declining) name recognition afforded by 
Jerry Lewis’ participation, and on performances by other B-list celebrities.  U2’s Bono 
seems to spend more time promoting his brand RED than recording pop music.  Oprah’s 
Angel Network relies on donations largely garnered through exhortations by Oprah 
herself to contribute to the fund.  In this way, celebrities accomplish the work of inspiring 
donations or philanthropic consumption aimed at alleviating social ills (Talley and 
Casper, forthcoming).  Celebrities have also often been mobilized by philanthropic 
organizations.  For example, UNICEF relies on a cadre of celebrity Goodwill 
Ambassadors including David Beckham and Susan Sarandon, while the UN has received 
attention for its work through the promotion efforts of Angelina Jolie.  In short, finding a 
celebrity who is not involved in some philanthropic or charitable cause is next to 
impossible.  It seems that the work of being famous requires good works.   
But whether celebrities are engaged in entertainment or philanthropy at any given 
moment, their role is based upon their exceptional ability to produce an emotional 
experience in their audience. In a sense, then, the charitable work of celebrities is 
startlingly similar to their work as entertainers.  And sometimes it is not altogether clear 
where the philanthropy begins and the entertainment ends.  More likely, celebrity work 
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on philanthropic causes deploys a kind of entertainment, a genre that engages audiences 
if not to act then at least to observe.   
While I remain interested in the cultural work accomplished by the recent 
explosion of celebrity sponsored philanthropy, I am particularly interested in the work of 
celebrities in relation to the issue of facial difference.  Operation Smile is not unique in 
its use of celebrities as spokespersons.  But what makes the use of celebrities curious is 
the particular focus of the organization.  Celebrity culture is inextricably intertwined with 
beauty culture.  The work of being a celebrity is, to a large degree, the work of being 
attractive.  Operation Smile is focused on repairing faces deemed ugly, and even 
grotesque.  One can hardly imagine a charity focused on alleviating world poverty, with 
Robin Leach leading a tour of “Lifestyles of the Starving and Destitute” complete with 
televised images featuring slums described in detail in Leach’s immediately recognizable 
brogue.  No doubt such a move would be deemed bizarre, and even offensive to potential 
donors and volunteers.  I argue that the participation of celebrities in the work of 
Operation Smile is similarly curious, and potentially problematic.   Inciting beautiful 
celebrities to join the cause of repairing “ugliness” seems at least curious, if not grossly 
insensitive.  I ask what particular work is accomplished by celebrities, and I show the 
consequences of deploying celebrities in the service of “third world” facial repair.    
 No doubt the most famous Operation Smile celebrity spokesperson is Jessica 
Simpson.  The blonde pop-star’s fame skyrocketed after asking her then-husband ex-boy 
band member Nick Lachey if the meat in the Chicken of the Sea can was tuna or chicken 
in an episode of their MTV reality show The Newlyweds.  Simpson makes reference to 
her work with Operation Smile in many appearances and interviews.  Curiously, the pop 
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star, who is infamous for her less than average intelligence (or perhaps merely the 
appearance of being less than competent), was invited to meet with Congress in March 
2006.  According to press releases appearing on the Operation Smile website, Simpson in 
her role as the Operation Smile International Youth Ambassador talked with senators, 
representatives, and congressional staffers to promote the work of the organization.   
Accompanying the press release is a photograph of Simpson, as usual surrounded by 
flashing cameras, but atypically dressed in a smart but rather conservative black suit, with 
her golden locks pulled into a tight bun.  Operation Smile’s logo hangs from a poster 
plastered to the front of Simpson’s podium.  In attendance with Simpson is Operation 
Smile’s founder and CEO Dr. Bill Magee, who is quoted in the same press release 
describing Simpson’s visit to Capital Hill:  
“Now more than ever, it is crucial that the United States support private sector 
programs that exhibit the truly compassionate nature of its foreign policy 
objectives.  Working closely with humanitarian organizations like Operation 
Smile, which have developed a proven track record of cross border friendships 
and trust, should be one important feature of a broader strategy to secure peace in 
the 21st Century” (Operation Smile 2006). 
Here the work of the organization is framed not simply as reconstructive surgery, but 
rather the development of international friendships and, even more important, world 
peace.  Operation Smile Ambassador Jessica Simpson facilitates this work.  Her role as 
celebrity is marshaled not only in eliciting support from Congress but also in facilitating 
international relations with people who will presumably know who she is.  But Simpson’s 
work with the organization has extended beyond the celebrity bread and butter of 
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promotion.  Simpson has participated in the hands-on work of the organization as support 
staff on a medical mission, and as such, she has acquired a sort of expertise that she also 
strategically deploys.   
For example, in 2005, Simpson participated on an Operation Smile mission to 
Kenya, during which 280 children were assessed.  Of the experience, Simpson reported, 
“My experience in Kenya with Operation Smile was incredible.  To witness the 
truly miraculous transformations in the lives of so many desperate needy children 
was both powerful and personally rewarding.” 
By directly participating in a mission, Simpson acquired the authority to speak about the 
work.  The work of celebrities in this site—through participation on missions, 
fundraising, and publicly speaking about the organization—infuses the face work 
accomplished by Operation Smile with a kind of cache or cultural legitimacy.  Their 
purpose is unique from the work accomplished by medical volunteers, fundraisers, or 
student organizers.  Celebrities both draw attention to the work of the organization and 
glamorize work in the global bio-trenches. 
 The work of celebrities is described not only on the organization’s own site but 
also in news media accounts about Operation Smile.  As the following excerpt indicates, 
the work of celebrities on behalf of the organization seems to be newsworthy: 
“‘When people come to charity events and they see a celebrity, they want to know 
why the celebrity is there,’ she says.  ‘They become interested and want to learn 
more about the charity and support the cause.’ That can have a serious effect on 
donor figures and much-needed promotion in the media.  Jessica Simpson’s role 
as international youth ambassador with Operation Smile, which provides 
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corrective surgery to underprivileged children with facial deformities, has 
generated $5.2 million in television coverage, according to the organization.  
Operation Smile founder and CEO Bill Magee says Simpson’s involvement has 
focused the world spotlight on the group” (Hellard 2007). 
In this account, “Simpson’s involvement” brings name recognition and corresponding 
global attention to the work of the organization.  While this certainly speaks to the power 
of celebrity in this socio-historical moment, it also demonstrates a way in which 
organizations aware of the interests stirred by a celebrity can use celebrity culture 
towards their own ends.    
What is striking about these accounts is not simply the way the work of celebrities 
makes for “news” but also how their charitable work is positioned alongside signifiers of 
their celebrity status.  In a Daily News article, a scandal revolving around gift bags 
packed with high end merchandise is referenced: 
“Is Jessica Simpson the Queen of Swag or—as her flack insists—Our Lady of 
Largess?  After the perky pop tart was caught with an amazing haul of freebies 
during last week’s MTV Video Music Awards—tens of thousands of dollars 
worth of jewelry, clothes, high-tech electronic gadgets and a $50,000 Chrysler 
convertible—Simpson’s damage control guru, Rob Shuter, vowed that she’ll 
donate her VMA gift bag to Operation Smile” (Grove 2006). 
Simpson’s public relations consultant spins the story, and Simpson’s questionable 
behavior towards charitable ends by publicizing her donation to the organization.   
 Stories about celebrities consistently make reference to that which distinguishes 
celebrity life from the everyday.  Specifically, celebrities’ exceptional appearances and 
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their access to glamour and luxury culture are described and capitalized on.  In the 
following article entitled “Mariah Is Just Smiles Better,” Mariah Carey’s participation at 
a fundraiser is noted via reference to her spectacular smile:   
“Here’s sexy singer Mariah Carey flashing her gnashers for Operation 
Smile…She looked stunning at the New York charity bash for kids with facial 
deformities” (Daily Star 2006). 
The irony that Carey already has a great smile and that the organization works in the 
service of children, some of whom are not physiologically able to smile, goes unnoticed.  
Even brief asides rely on celebrity culture to describe the work of the organization:   
“Actress Roma Downey attends an unveiling party at the Lladro boutique in 
Beverly Hills” (Los Angeles Times 2006). 
Lladro is a Spanish company that produces high end porcelain.  The event Downey 
attended marked the launch of the Utopia Collection, from which a portion of sales 
benefited Operation Smile.  Prices of the small figurines that represent such concepts as 
love and friendship range in price from $250 to $1000 on the collectibles market.  The 
associations among Operation Smile, Roma Downey, and Lladro porcelain work to lend 
meanings to each.  Operation Smile acquires some cultural cache from its association 
with celebrities and luxury goods, and at the same time Roma Downey and Lladro 
porcelain become affiliated with good works. 
. Stories of celebrities’ charitable involvements often capitalize on how the 
celebrity, as opposed to children, has benefited from their participation.  In a Daily Star 
account, Simpson’s curvaceous body, no doubt a quality that lends her an air of 
Hollywood glamour, is briefly described.  This reference to a celebrity signifier is 
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followed by a quotation from Simpson, which hinges on how her charitable work makes 
her feel, namely humbled:  
“But caring Jessica has to cover up her curves for a special mission-meeting high 
ranking US politicians.  ‘I was part of her work for charity Operation Smile which 
helps disfigured youngsters to get facial surgery…To entertain is what I know 
naturally.  But to go into Congress and talk on behalf of a charity is incredibly 
humbling’” (Partasides 2006). 
Another story chronicles Simpson’s various roles as a celebrity—entertainer and product 
endorser are named:   
“The 25-year-old blond singer/reality star/Pizza Hut spokeswoman is the 
International Youth Ambassador for Operation Smile, a nonprofit medical charity 
that repairs facial deformities for Third-World children.  Of all the good works 
needed in this world, how did Simpson pick this project?  Her hairdresser’s 
nephew had a cleft palate…Our star is smaller in person (aren’t they all?) and 
dressed like a proper lobbyist—black pantsuit, pearl earrings, hair tucked 
conservatively in a loose bun…She talks about observing the surgery of a little 
girl on a trip to Africa last fall.  ‘It was a very spiritual moment,’ she says, ‘and 
made me realize the purpose of life is to go through it smiling.’ She calls plastic 
surgeon Bill Magee, founder of the charity, an ‘angel.’  Rep. Trent Franks (R-
Ariz.), who has had 10 operations for his cleft palate, says, ‘Maybe God sends 
people like Jessica to the earth to make everyone smile.’ Magee says it’s time to 
stop ‘paying lip service’ and give some sorely needed funding to the cause.  He 
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calls it a ‘serious day’ and Simpson a ‘serious woman’” (Argetsinger and Roberts 
2006). 
She describes her experience as a “spiritual moment” which she claims worked to reveal 
the purpose of her life.  In a sense, then, the story of her philanthropy is about her.  No 
wonder that the story quickly moves towards an insistence that Simpson is a “serious 
woman.”  In this way, celebrities’ involvement with Operation Smile lends them 
credibility.  Clearly, celebrities benefit from their participation with philanthropic causes 
like Operation Smile.  But what are the consequences of mobilizing celebrities towards 
the ends of alleviating disfigurement?   
The unique status of celebrities, and I would argue their aesthetic, infuses the 
work accomplished by celebrities on behalf of Operation Smile.  Celebrities’ bodies have 
long been pictured next to bodies of the sick.  Princess Diana’s work in AIDS wards in 
the initial years of the HIV/AIDS crisis typifies the charitable work of high-profile 
celebrities.  In photo-ops documenting celebrities’ hospital visits, the presumably healthy 
and vibrant body of the celebrity is positioned next to the ill and dying patient.  The 
contrast puts into sharp relief both what it means to be healthy and conversely what it 
means to be sick.  Likewise, the juxtaposition of the celebrity face (which is to a large 
degree their claim to fame) with the faces of children with craniofacial anomalies confers 
a particular significance to the disfigured face.  Specifically, the celebrities’ own face is 
proof positive that the face can make or break a life.  Because it is no secret that the 
celebrity would likely not be famous if he or she looked otherwise, they are walking 
reminders of the intense importance of appearance.  The very faces of celebrities serve as 
evidence of how important the face is.  If the celebrity face makes success possible, then 
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positioning it next to a disfigured face suggests that facial difference threatens one’s 
access to a life worth living.  Thus, celebrities are living proof that “Changing Lives One 
Smile at a Time” is not only possible, but that in fact a smile is necessary for a changed, 
and presumably better, life—even for impoverished “third world” children.    
 As aestheticization increasingly characterizes everyday life, celebrities are 
integral to this process.  Through endorsements of products associated with improving 
appearance and constant information provided by the stream of celebrity news coverage, 
we are well acquainted with, and encouraged to undergo, the work required to look like a 
celebrity.  At the same time, tolerance for bodily flaws has undoubtedly declined.  
Whether consumer culture created these needs or simply responded to our ever-
increasing preoccupation with all bodily flaws, Americans are engaged in more “body 
projects” than ever (Brumberg 1998).  Things deemed natural, attributed to aging, or 
simply ignored twenty years ago are now subject to an array of interventions.  As 
feminists scholars interrogating men and women’s relationships with our bodies have 
well demonstrated, celebrities are key figures in the making of beauty culture (Bordo 
1993).  Celebrities’ bodies are images available for modeling, like human clay.  These 
bodies are reference points for what the body might become; they are central figures in 
making attractiveness take on the significance that it does in American life.  Thus, one 
consequence of the juxtaposition of celebrities with the faces subject to intervention is 
that emulation may be mobilized. Because the celebrity’s body is already 
overdetermined, a referent that so many hope to approximate, it works as a standard or an 
ideal point of reference.  Children will not necessarily and, in fact, probably will not 
leave surgery beautiful or glamorous.  The face work practiced by Operation Smile is not 
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aimed at inscribing the celebrity aesthetic, yet the philanthropic work of the organization 
continually relies upon beauty culture.   
 If ideas about what constitutes an acceptable body and how bodies might be made 
better have changed in conjunction with the rise of celebrity glamour culture, celebrity 
involvement in philanthropic work aimed at appearance implicitly positions 
disfigurement far outside of acceptability.  Celebrities like Jessica Simpson, Roma 
Downey, and Billy Bush, then, work towards opposite ends.  As Operation Smile 
spokespersons, they raise awareness and mobilize support for the reconstructive surgery 
used to normalize faces.  Simultaneously, as extraordinarily attractive celebrities, they 
intensify beauty culture.  The celebrities’ looks signify what they do because they are 
embedded in a cult of appearance, a hierarchy of aesthetic, a systematic privileging of 
attractiveness.  And much of their look is made possible by the products and services 
offered and capitalized on by glamour culture.  Their look is expensive, highly desired, 
and requires ongoing maintenance.  In this way, the look of a celebrity is a rare 
commodity, and one that cannot be attained by the children subject to Operation Smile 
interventions.  In short, celebrities are a key part of the cultural landscape that makes 
disfigurement the tragedy it is often thought to be.  In a socio-historical moment where 
beauty has never been more important, the costs of being ugly have never been so great.  
We must ask: What can the celebrity do for disfigurement, when so much of her or his 
work is always already invested in the stigmatization of ugliness?   
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The “Mission” of Operation Smile 
Operation Smile deploys the word “mission” to describe its technical work.  
Designating the travel as a “mission” infuses the work with particular connotations, often 
religious, for a mission relies on certain kinds of relationships.  As the epigraph to this 
chapter reveals, the word mission describes travel wherein “missionaries,” 
representatives, or evangelists are sent from one place to another place, a “foreign” place, 
a place occupied by the Other.  By characterizing its work as a mission, Operation 
Smile’s face work is framed as purposeful but also as work that relies on traffic between 
“haves” and “have-nots.”  The smile is a “gift” in the context of a mission only because 
Operation Smile volunteers, specifically those from privileged “first world” countries, 
possess the resources, technical know-how, and presumably generosity to bestow the 
offering.  It is a relationship forged through and reliant upon differential power 
dynamics—global economic, political, and cultural forces.     
If we do not take the terming of Operation Smile’s work as a “mission” for 
granted, what is revealed?  What does a critical sociology of missions tell us?  
Sociologist, Robert L. Montgomery (1999) describes the area of study in this way:  
[T]he sociology of missions may be defined as a comprehensive 
sociological study of the spread or diffusion of religions…What makes 
sociology of missions distinct from other sociological studies of religions 
or religious growth is its focus on the crossing of socio-cultural borders by 
religions.  In short, the sociology of missions is simply the sociological 
study of religions and ideologies in their diffusing activities, not simply 
through migration, but primarily as they have spread across sociocultural 
boundaries by propagation or dissemination (2).   
 
In defining a “sociology of missions,” Montgomery provides a framework for knowing a 
mission when we see one.  Ultimately, a mission is constituted by three factors.  First, a 
mission is aimed at the diffusion of religion, but also, as Montgomery notes, at the 
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circulation of ideologies.  Second, the dissemination of religion and ideology takes place 
across “socio-cultural borders,” including but not limited to geopolitical borders.  Finally, 
“propagation,” as opposed to passive diffusion, is the means for transmitting religion and 
ideology.   
Operation Smile’s work qualifies as a mission in each of these ways.  Most 
obviously, the organization’s work takes place across geographic and cultural borders.  
Operation Smile engages in biomedical work that unfolds across the borders of the 
“developed” and “developing” worlds, between the global North and the global South, 
between “America” and the “rest of the world.”  These are relations between places but 
these places are simultaneously characterized by varying degrees of privilege.  In this 
way, a distinction between where the work takes place and where the people that conduct 
this work come from structures the relationships among the recipients that occupy this 
site.  In addition, the organization’s work mimics a religious mission in that the activities 
are directly organized around a central task, namely the eradication of congenital facial 
anomalies.  
Perhaps most crucially, Operation Smile disseminates an ideological formation.  
Specifically, the organization conceptualizes facial disfigurement in particular ways and 
requires recipients to subscribe to this worldview.  Operation Smile is a “troubled person 
industry,” which understands its work as generosity to people in need (Gusfield 1989).  In 
an examination of programs related to deafness, Harlan Lane (1997) argues that a 
troubled person industry, like those organizations dominated by hearing professionals 
who “provide services” to the Deaf, “seeks total conformity of the client to the 
underlying construction of deafness as disability” (158). Operation Smile demands the 
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same sort of conformity to expectations about what disfigurement means. It relies on a 
subjectivity saturated with suffering, an identity determined by the horror of facial 
difference.  As opposed to the work of organizations that are premised on a disability 
rights model that calls into question the trauma or suffering of disability, Operation Smile 
continually characterizes the children’s lives as intrinsically tragic, and participantss 
subscribe to this notion.  Take as evidence the kinds of comments recipients and their 
parents make to news media about life “before” intervention.   
Operation Smile medical missions resemble traditional religious missions in basic 
ways, though the following questions remain: to what degree do Operation Smile 
missions function like traditional missions, and what might be the consequences of 
structuring medical interventions on the mission model?  In his book Mission in Today’s 
World, theologian and missionary Donal Dorr (2000) identifies five functions of 
contemporary missions.  Missions facilitate dialogue, evangelization, inculturation, 
struggle for liberation, and reconciliation.  Rather than speculating about if the 
organization does or does not enable these practices, I want to briefly describe what each 
of these functions might look like in the mundane activities of medical missions in order 
to raise questions about the possible consequences of Operation Smile’s work.   
For Dorr, the notion of dialogue is intended to interrupt the notion that missions 
are simply about “doing” for others and are, additionally, about listening and sharing.   In 
the context of a medical mission, such conversation might take place via a consultation or 
in the downtime of recovery.  Dorr translates evangelization into “bringing the good 
news.”  For Operation Smile volunteers, bringing good news might be constituted 
through describing the hope and promise offered by technological intervention, 
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specifically, and the Global North, more broadly.  Relatedly, inculturation involves the 
processes through which a culture embodies the good news.  By surgically shaping 
children’s faces, it seems as if Operation Smile quite literally facilitates inculturation.   
Dorr emphasizes three levels at which liberation must occur—economic, political, and 
cultural-religious.  Certainly by offering free medical intervention, Operation Smile 
“liberates” recipients from the limits of poverty.  Finally, reconciliation involves a move 
towards forgiveness and understanding.  It is the work of acknowledging that a 
relationship has been forged through inequality, and perhaps violence.   
But Operation Smile is not the Catholic Church.  It does not deal in holy water, 
blessed beads, and devotional candles.  Operation Smile deals in surgery, anesthesia, and 
radical shifts in subjectivity and status.  The Christian missionary project has long been 
criticized as ventures that propagate colonialism (Neill 1966).  Conversion sometimes 
comes at the costs of destroying local culture, perpetuating relative powerlessness in 
global economic structures, and rampant geopolitical Othering.  It remains a question to 
what degree the mundane work of Operation Smile medical missions produces similar 
outcomes.    
In particular, it is unclear what the consequences of liberation or reconciliation 
forged through a medical mission might be.  Is liberation constituted through self 
reliance, or is liberation conceptualized as being freed from one’s present circumstances?  
In the case of the latter, what circumstances do missionaries hope the liberated will 
embody?  If the unspoken assumption is that those liberated through missions will be 
empowered to be more like their missionaries, Operation Smile may facilitate “a 
liberation” that is in effect a solidification of the economic, political, and cultural 
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relations between the Global North and the Global South.  In thinking through the 
consequences of the reconciliation, it seems important to distinguish reconciliation from 
reparation.  While reconciliation relies on naming inequality, it is ultimately forged when 
that injustice is let go.  By contrast, reparations involve the sustained acknowledgement 
of victimization and relative powerlessness through compensation.  Reparation 
remembers who did what to whom.  Medical missions offered in response to global 
inequality and/or the related guilt of privileged “first-worlders” may forge a sense of 
reconciliation that is accompanied with a kind of forgetting that perpetuates the structural 
inequalities at play.   
If the missions of Operation Smile function in the ways contemporary religious 
missions do, the consequences of this work are critically important to understand if 
intervention is to unfold in responsible and ethical ways.  Understanding the 
consequences of mission work requires thinking through the mission from all sides.  At 
the most basic level, the mission requires someone “going” on a mission and someone 
“receiving” a mission.  To be sure, “receiving” a medical intervention on behalf of a 
mission situates one in a relatively powerless position, but there are consequences too for 
those that go on missions and for the societies that missionaries come from.    
While I intend to further explore these ideas through ethnographic research 
conducted during an Operation Smile mission, I offer a preliminary analysis here.  
Missions are directed at social problems in such a way as to minimize the complexity of 
the issue.  A mission is bounded.  There is a beginning and an end, a task to be 
completed, and a plan for completing it.  Simplification of social problems is not unique 
in charitable ventures, but there are consequences.  Missions provide missionaries with 
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the pleasure of “helping.”  In this way, the mission directly benefits the missionary, but 
the satisfaction derived by the missionary is often concealed by a narrative that 
overwhelmingly focuses on how “good works” benefit the needy.  The mission of 
Operation Smile is enticing not only because it is described as so meaningful, but also 
because it seems so easy. 
The “Quick Facts” feature on the Operation Smile website seems to suggest that 
the “fix” for facial difference is so simple relative to other health issues:   
“For $240 Operation Smile can change a child's life by giving the gift of a 
surgery…In a little as 45 minutes, one cleft lip surgery can change a child's life 
forever” (Operation Smile 2007a).   
While repair of the face is seemingly suspect at the precise moment in which children in 
the places Operation Smile operates are dying of structural inequities, facial intervention 
is positioned both as critical and as more simple.  It is described as life-changing, but at 
relatively little cost and little time.  Children are helped, but they are helped without any 
radical restructuring of economic relationships, as would need to happen, for example, to 
provide drugs to children in the world suffering from HIV/AIDS.  Children’s lives are 
changed, and at the same time no political alliances must be dissolved or erected, as is 
needed, for example, to make Iraqi children safe from U.S. sponsored bombings.  
Children are given the gift of a future, but not by reassessing policy which keeps U.S. 
borders closed to those seeking entry for education or asylum.  If charity is desired but 
not at any real costs to those positioned as gift givers, then the work of Operation Smile is 
a perfect mission, at least for the missionaries.  The consequences for recipients have yet 
to be determined.   
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 Disfigurement operates in a particular way throughout the work of Operation 
Smile to infuse repair with social and moral significance.  The disfigured faces of 
children subject to Operation Smile interventions are described using stigmatized terms.  
Disfigurement operates as an unambiguously tragic, perhaps the most catastrophic state 
of human existence, and the face is positioned as exceptionally significant, making 
intervention on human visages crucial.   Yet in the site of Operation Smile, the faces are 
those of children around the globe.  In this site, repair happens across borders, such that 
intervention is more like a form of charity than a procedure purchased by a medical 
consumer or a technological innovation which positions the patient as a collaborator of 
sorts in the making of a new intervention.  The faces upon which Operation Smile 
operates are resolutely Other.  But like the other sites included in this account, fixing the 
face takes on a much more significant weight than simply improving appearance.  It may 
be a 45-minute, $250 operation, but it—like so many other interventions aimed at 
children in the developing world— is imbued with the discursive force of “life changing” 
and human making work.    
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CHAPTER 7 
 
AT FACE VALUE 
 
“Ugly people are just beautiful people with horrible facial deformities.” 
bathroom graffiti in The Villager, a dive bar in Nashville, TN 
 
The Flesh Becomes Human 
 This is a story of repair, an analytic exercise towards understanding how we cope 
with trauma superimposed onto and embedded within one of the most precious parts of 
our physical selves, our faces.  We are at a cultural crossroads, professing to our children 
and our students and ourselves that the inside is more important than the outside, and yet 
simultaneously we consume services and products that promise to make our outsides 
better, like addicts desperate for one perfect high.  If our faces, as we have seen, are 
imbued with our very being—our identities, our histories, our truths—what does the 
repair of faces come to signify?  What desires and hopes infuse the work of repairing the 
human face?   
 In Catholic lore/creed, the moment in which the Father, deep male consciousness, 
lifts a communion wafer (water, flour, and salt) into the air circulating above the altar, 
bread becomes body.  The story of the Last Supper is recounted and the words of Jesus 
Christ are repeated, “Take this all of you and eat it, this is my body.”  And in that 
moment, as an altar boy rings a tiny bell, a miracle occurs. Transubstantiation is not only 
a ritual; it is a technology in which wheat becomes flesh, and the mundane becomes 
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sacred.  As a lapsed Catholic, thirteen years of parochial schooling in the making, I 
remember the desire saturating that moment.  Miracles are hot.  They are dramatic and 
earth shaking, and true for those who believe.  A miracle can be defined as making that 
which is impossible real.  We know we have witnessed a miracle when we can reach out 
and touch the ineffable. 
 Face work is the work of transubstantiation.  It is the work of making that which 
is not configured as human, human. What is more sacred in this world?  If we seek to 
understand why—why anyone spends tens of thousands of dollars to make the face 
perceptibly more feminine, why death in exchange for a face is, in fact, ethically 
justifiable, why celebrities become mobilized around the “tragedy” of cleft palate, why 
some trade public humiliation on television for the chance to be less ugly—we need only 
to consider our desire for technologically mediated self-improvement.  Who has not held 
out hope for the slightest intervention—a haircut, a moisturizer, or even a facelift? How 
much more so, then, for the techno-intervention that holds the potential to humanize?  For 
those defined as disfigured, face work animates the hope that life can be better and elicits 
desire for future embodiment, new subjectivities.  Face work, like transubstantiation, is a 
miracle of sorts.  But it may not be the only mode of humanizing the facially disfigured in 
the 21st century.    
 Throughout this thesis, I have argued that face work is so much more than 
reconstructive surgery aimed at repairing faces defined as disfigured.  The work of fixing 
the face is always the work of humanizing the abject, those defined as so close to the 
margins.  At each site I studied, the work of fixing the face is imbued with particular 
kinds of social and moral significance.  In the case of face transplantation, a recipient’s 
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disfigured face is replaced with an altogether new face, and this is positioned as “life 
saving work.”  In the case of facial feminization, a face that bespeaks masculinity is 
surgically revised to signal unremarkability, and the new face makes passing and 
consequentially a public life as female possible.  In the case of Extreme Makeover, a face 
that compromises romance or work is remade, premising a life worth living on a 
particular kind of surgically altered visage.  In the case of Operation Smile, congenital 
facial anomalies are amended, restoring facial function and a smile, which comes to 
signify a future.  To be human is to have a face, an intelligible face, and so ultimately 
face work is about repairing and normalizing faces in the service of restoring humanness.  
It is the cultural and material work of making the non-human human.  But what are the 
consequences of this particular arrangement?  If we do not take repair of disfigurement at 
face value and instead try to understand the work it accomplishes not simply corporeally 
but culturally, as I have done here, what are we left with?   
In this final chapter, I turn to critique, a project distinct from criticism.  As 
Margrit Shildrick (2005) argues,  
Critique is not destructive per se. Its purpose is to expose the shortcoming, 
the unreflective assumptions, the hidden contradictions and elisions of 
hitherto unchallenged structures; to bring them into question but not to 
make them unusable…The point is that things could always be otherwise, 
and that the answers we give ourselves—often the basis for far-reaching 
actions—must never be allowed to settle, to take on the timeless mantle of 
absolute truth or moral right or universality. (my emphasis, 9).   
 
This is the mode of critique that I have employed throughout this account.  My intent has 
not been to demonize the skilled surgeon or mock the hopeful patient.  Rather, my hope 
and strategy is to deploy questions with the end of demonstrating that things could be 
otherwise, more specifically better.  Procedures that improve the quality of life could be 
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distributed more democratically.  Cultural assumptions that incite painful, expensive, and 
risky repair might be dismantled, opening up the possibility for “choosing” intervention 
in a less coercive context.  Our ways of seeing and categorizing humans as abled and 
disabled, ugly and beautiful, “okay” and “in need” might be interrogated to reveal that 
who people are is to a large degree constituted by how we think about who people are.  I 
ask and answer questions with the hope of producing all of these effects.  I do not ask 
questions with the intention of dismissing the interventions I have interrogated in the 
preceding pages.  This, unfortunately, has been the perhaps unintended consequence of 
some social critiques of medicine, science, and technology.  Denunciation has too often 
masqueraded as questioning.  Put another way, as  bioethicist Arthur Frank (2004) does, 
the critical intervention I pose is less about offering guidelines for practice and more 
about “open[ing] up the discourses in which people—both professionals and potential 
patients—are able to think about how their actions affect themselves and their 
communities” (19).   
Before offering my own critique, I want to counter a common refrain that appears 
in response to normalizing interventions: the call to not intervene, to reject medical 
practice, to instead focus on social change.  As a sociologist, I want to query this 
response as a quick fix or a lazy logic that has come to dominate some bioethics 
assessments and social critiques of science and medicine.  What, I ask, are the costs of 
rejecting intervention in favor of social change?  At the same time, I do not want to 
suggest that things need be as they are or that suffering is inevitable.   
In addition, I consider here several consequences of deploying face work in the 
service of humanizing.  I question the work of facial repair in relation to bodily trauma, 
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and I ask what happens to our bodily histories when work is directed towards repairing or 
“returning” the body to a mythical past, a body pre-trauma, a body unmarked.  I conclude 
by thinking about the animating effects of unremarkability, and I argue that, rather than 
beauty, so many of us simply desire to be taken for granted as human.   
How does a conclusion about the political and ethical ramifications of face work 
simultaneously take into account the coercion embedded in the imperative to repair, the 
immense hope contained in the possibility of face work, and a social climate so hostile to 
facial difference?   I understand the task of the medical sociologist, the disability studies 
scholar, and the writer of the body to complicate the understanding of intervention as 
unambiguously optimistic and to hold intact the suffering of bodily difference without 
reifying variance as necessarily tragic.  The point, then, is not to conclude by identifying 
which interventions are ethical or politically preferable under certain conditions.  Rather 
my aim is to comprehend the politics of biomedical intervention in relation to suffering 
and hope.   
 
The Politics of Non-Intervention, The Promise of Social Change 
 With the rise of institutionalized, professionalized bioethics, the necessity, 
feasibility, and ethics of biomedical interventions of all kinds have been interrogated and 
contested (Franklin and Roberts 2006, Stock 2002).  Concerns that particular medical 
interventions are unethical, coercive, exploitative, or otherwise unsatisfactory have given 
way to skepticism about biomedical intervention more broadly.  These critiques routinely 
take social context into account, revealing the ways in which social norms, 
institutionalized power, and corporate structures feed the imperative to intervene.   Take, 
 262
for example, the case of infant male circumcision (Aggleton 2007).  Because, as critics 
suggest, circumcision serves no purpose other than to surgically inscribe social norms 
about genital appearance, intervention is characterized as unethical.  From this 
perspective, a more reasoned and ethically justifiable response is to challenge social 
dictates to circumcise male infants rather than intervening medically.  This is a critical 
challenge, not only to medical practice but to society writ large.  It is a position made 
possible by employing a particular logic; critics question the motivations for intervention 
and conclude that intervention should be avoided in favor of interrogating and reworking 
social norms.   
In the last two decades, it has become almost theoretically cliché to interrogate 
bodily intervention and conclude that social institutions and discursive structures inspire 
intervention and thus intervention should cease.  Sometimes explicitly but often 
implicitly, critics argue that social change is more favorable to biomedical intervention 
(Kessler 1998, Sullivan 2004).  In a sense, then, the ethical tensions and anxiety 
surrounding science and technology are dealt with by concluding that intervention should 
be avoided.  This is ultimately, I contend, a technophobic response.  Because medical 
intervention lives in society, there is no intervention outside of social embeddedness.  In 
addition, criticisms sometimes premise non-intervention on the vulnerability of those 
subject to intervention.  While vulnerability is certainly important to consider in assessing 
the ethics of medical practice, it is oftentimes precisely the intervention at stake that aims 
to address the very vulnerability critics point to.  These facts make calls for non-
intervention particularly curious and unwieldy.  At the same time, rejecting intervention 
in favor of widespread social change reads as euphoric.   
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An impasse has emerged between the knowledge and practice of medicine and the 
critiques articulated by scholars due to opposing commitments (Rosengarten 2005).  One 
group relies on a stable notion of the real, and the other is invested in deconstructing the 
possibility of an existing matter.   Accounts of medical science have very often created a 
division between critical scholars and medical practitioners.  What kinds of medical 
practice and what kinds of intellectual accounts would emerge out of a generous 
collaboration?  Drawing on Haraway (1991), Rosengarten articulates a compromised 
constructivist position.  The body does not simply come into being through social 
practice.  Rather, the body takes form at the “intersection of bodies, knowledges, 
treatments and associated tests, and social practices” (86).  Is there a politics of 
intervention that simultaneously holds what an intervention might promise and queries 
the context in which interventions are deemed necessary in the first place?   
Critique of medical practice is part of the intellectual project both in the sociology 
of health and medicine and in bioethics.  At the same time, each discipline is aimed at 
different ends.  Bioethics is charged with articulating normative positions (DeVries and 
Subedi 1998, Kuhse and Singer 2006).  Interventions and the ways in which these are 
deployed are designated as either ethical or unethical, albeit through a range of 
perspectives and orientations.  In essence, for bioethicists the question is: under what 
conditions could or should an intervention be used?  By contrast, sociology is relentlessly 
non-normative.  Sociologists of health and medicine typically engage in mapping 
exercises that display the embeddedness of an intervention and thus the problematics of 
normative judgments.  For sociologists the question is: at what costs to individuals and to 
society do medical practices proceed?  In both disciplines, dissatisfaction with medical 
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practice sometimes results in conclusions that celebrate the promise of social change.  I 
want to think about the limits of such a response.   
The case of face transplantation is particularly useful for illustrating how calls for 
non-intervention in favor of social change operate in response to face work.  In the AJOB 
accounts, some contributors employ technophobic logic when trying to come to grips 
with the question of whether or not to pursue face transplantation.  I query these logics 
and raise three questions of significance to intellectual projects aimed at critiquing and 
assessing medial practice.  First, does understanding why interventions work in the ways 
that they do necessarily make an intervention ethically untenable?  Second, if not 
precisely because of the experience of suffering, upon what basis do we intervene?  And 
third, how is the call for social change itself a practice that relies on and reproduces 
differential power dynamics and continued suffering?    
Several AJOB responses argue that the cultural desire for attractiveness is so 
compelling that the work of repairing the face is always infused with socially derived 
expectations.  Several critics go so far as to claim that the desire for face transplantation 
is constituted in conjunction with socio-cultural dynamics that stigmatize disfigurement.  
Thus, in this framing, there is no possibility for ethical face transplantation.  As Huxtable 
and Woodley (2004) write,    
“The patient might be influenced or even coerced by our beauty-fixated society 
and as such there may be less invasive and certainly less risky means of 
improving both society’s and disfigured individuals’ reactions to facial 
disfigurement” (507).   
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In this critique, rather than surgery, the solution proffered is a complete social overhaul.  
It is not the face that needs fixing, rather it is “the society” that deems the face abject that 
needs fixing.  Such “solutions” are common.  Sociologists have long dismissed 
individualized solutions in favor of social change, but we rarely outline the processes by 
which social change will be effected.  Thus, it is not altogether clear how such work 
would be accomplished. 
Other responses conclude similarly that intervention should be avoided, but by 
way of a varied logic.  Some accounts suggest that the suffering experienced by those 
with facial difference makes potential recipients too vulnerable for face transplantation.   
In these accounts, suffering becomes the grounds upon which repair is withheld, and 
potential patients are imagined as psychologically fragile, desperately hopeful, potentially 
unreliable, and unfoundedly optimistic.  Consider an excerpt that appears in Butler et al.’s 
(2004) response: 
“This process [recipient selection] would involve identifying those patients who 
would have functional benefit and who also had realistic expectations of the 
procedure.  The patient would have to be determined and resolute in adhering to 
the prolonged rehabilitation and the need for chronic immunosuppression.  The 
patient must be robust enough to cope with these challenges and the psychological 
effects involved” (16).   
Their insistence that potential patients be “realistic,” “determined,” and “robust” suggests 
that some patients are not realistic, not determined, and not robust.  These are presumably 
“bad patients,” but what makes them bad is not their “condition” per se, but rather their 
desire for repair.  The response continues,  
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“Ironically, it may be that people who have well-developed coping strategies and 
good social skills cope well with disfigurement, while those who find life 
generally more challenging, also cope poorly with disfigurement.  The concern 
for us as clinicians proposing this complex procedure is that this group might also 
cope poorly with face transplantation; thus, the very group who might benefit most 
are those who are least likely to cope with the procedure, particularly if the 
results fall short of their expectations” (my emphasis, 17). 
It is ironic, indeed, that suffering is simultaneously the grounds upon which critics base 
arguments for and against face transplantation.   
These responses are not only technophobic.  They also employ tautological 
reasoning—because potential patients are “disfigured,” they are not able to consent to the 
surgery.  By implication, the surgery is unethical because candidates are disfigured.  Not 
only is this a logically untenable position, it works to situate potential consumers of 
medical technologies as always already inadequate for assessing those technologies.  
Strong’s (2004) contribution demonstrates such logic:  
“Potential recipients are likely to be psychologically vulnerable because of their 
disfigurement.  Affective factors may compromise their ability to weigh risks and 
benefits autonomously and to have realistic expectations about the success of the 
transplant” (13).   
In essence, Strong argues that because potential patients might want the procedure too 
much, they are incapable of providing informed consent.  Psychologist Nicola Rumsey 
employs a similar logic arguing,  
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“These [those most distressed about their disfigurement] are the people most 
likely to seek a face transplant, yet they are also the more psychologically 
vulnerable and less well equipped to deal with the rigors of complex surgery, 
uncertain outcomes, and demanding postoperative treatment regimens” (23).   
Desire for technology becomes the criteria upon which to deny the technology, and 
recipients’ ability to consent is questioned in light of the suffering they may be 
experiencing.  If the experience of disfigurement becomes the grounds upon which to 
deny technologies aimed at repairing the face, it is unclear then what the “solution” to 
disfigurement is. Additionally, given that in the United States so much medical 
intervention is located within consumer structures, why, in the case of face 
transplantation, is desire for consumption indefensible?  
The impetus to not intervene demands as much critical attention as the 
compulsion to intervene.  Upon what grounds is intervention resisted?  Who gets to say 
that a desired intervention should not be made available?  Why isn’t suffering precisely 
the grounds upon which informed consent can be given?  What might bioethics 
understand about face transplantation if it were read through suffering rather than outside 
of it?  In a health care system characterized by a free market model of supply and 
demand, why does a patient’s desire for face transplantation preclude him or her from 
being an “ideal candidate”?  In what cases are long and difficult solutions, namely social 
change, reasonable and ethical alternatives to biotechnological interventions?  These are 
questions not posed often enough, but they are the questions that to be asked of self-
reflexive, feminist, and/or critical accounts of science and technology.  If theory has 
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fallen into a rut, dominated by predictable logics, then these questions are important for 
exposing the assumptions that undergird “critical” accounts.    
Importantly, calls for non-intervention vary according to context.   Some 
interventions, like those practiced by Operation Smile, are taken for granted in ways that 
“extreme makeovers” are not.  Some bodies seem to be positioned as “really” defective 
and thus “in need,” while other forms of intervention are taken up as “elective” and thus 
not necessary.  To be sure, repair of cleft lip and palate may facilitate physiological 
functioning, but functioning itself is not the linchpin upon which claims for non-
intervention rest.  As I demonstrated, critics encourage non-intervention in the case of 
face transplantation, even as those faces are surely most “in need” of intervention relative 
to functioning.  In this case, innovation seems to animate fear that results in a rejection of 
biomedical intervention.   
Another factor seems to inspire non-intervention.  The children upon whom 
Operation Smile operates are innocent by the very fact of their youth, and they are poor 
and disenfranchised relative to global operations of politics and economics.  They are, by 
most standards, deserving.  By comparison, the faces that circulate in the narrative of 
Extreme Makeover belong to those whose very participation is premised on their inability 
to cope.  While their faces do not look altogether different from those of the audience, 
extreme makeover candidates are presented as desperate, inappropriately so.  Facial 
feminization is aimed at male-to-female transsexuals, a group who remain the object of 
widespread cultural mockery and, in some cases, loathing.  Face transplantation is aimed 
at repairing “severe disfigurement,” cases in which public personhood is significantly 
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compromised because of appearance.  The common story is that potential recipients are 
repulsive to the general public.   
How is it that the children of Operation Smile unequivocally deserve intervention 
and the “psychopathological,” the transsexual, and the severely disfigured do not?   It is 
not simply that functionality works to justify some forms of normalization and invalidate 
others; rather, there is a way in which the most devalued, the most stigmatized, the most 
inhuman get positioned as not deserving.  The call for non-intervention rests on such an 
assumption.  It rests on valuing social change, ostensibly change aimed at the already 
human, more than the change an intervention might produce in a single life.  When 
change is aimed at a life that is fundamentally devalued, it can be easily dismissed in 
favor of a kind of progress that extends the suffering potentially alleviated by medical 
intervention.  In some cases, a single life is deemed to matter, and in other cases, it is not.  
The ways in which the call for non-intervention rests on privileging some lives at real 
costs to others must be named and critiqued.  This is not a logic upon which theoretical 
projects can continue to operate if bioethics and/or the sociology of health and medicine 
are at all interested at understanding in the service of alleviating suffering.    
In the case of bioethics, these questions matter for articulating a normative stance; 
and in the case of sociology of health and medicine, these questions matter in mapping 
the consequences of particular interventions.  There are consequences, too, of suggesting 
social change as the solution to what ails us.  And at the same time, however, I do not 
dismiss social change out of hand.  Perhaps more than anything else, this project reveals 
the ways in which living with facial difference is untenable not because of something 
intrinsic to the face but rather something endemic to society.  The solution clearly 
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involves restructuring how “we” look at bodies and assign these bodies differential value, 
redefining what constitutes the “grotesque” body, and interrogating how people are 
expected to navigate bodily difference.  Radical social change is needed, but it is deep 
social revision that may be long and hard in the making.   
What shall be done in the meantime?  What of Isabelle Dinoire who has a life 
made possible by the transplant that gave her back a face?  What of the woman who 
approached me at IFGE claiming that her life was infinitely better after facial 
feminization surgery?  What of Thanh Ngan whose crying face occupies the Operation 
Smile homepage?  What of Extreme Makeover’s Ray Croc, the “snaggle tooth killer,” 
who is trying to start a new life after spending years on death row?  It is the either/or that 
is so problematic.  It is the call for ceasing intervention in favor of social change that is so 
problematic.  Dismissing intervention brackets the possibility of improving lives now.  It 
is true that improving life via face work carries consequences, but I remain hesitant to 
reject this possibility altogether when the social change needed may not come in Dinoire, 
Ngan, or Croc’s lifetimes.             
 
The Imperative to Erase 
In the case of facial trauma, as in the case of an animal attack or a car accident, 
face work relies on a notion of the face as it existed before the trauma.  Face work 
becomes a way to return the face to its pre-trauma state or some close proximity. But in 
the case of congenital anomalies, what is the reference point for face work?  What face is 
it that interventions for cleft palate return the face to since there was no face pre-existing 
the atypical?  This is one way in which face work aimed at faces congenitally marked by 
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features defined as undesirable is unique.  While the language of such surgical 
intervention may be characterized by notions of repair, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and 
restoration, face work is a generative or productive intervention.  Whether in the case of 
trauma or congenital difference, face work creates a face that does not pre-exist medical 
intervention.   
 No face pre-exists the medical intervention that shapes it.  There is no surgery that 
returns the face to its prior state—the younger, the slimmer, the unburned, the unmauled.  
And yet, face work (along with other cosmetic interventions) is couched in these very 
terms.  Face work is sold, consumed, understood, researched, and enacted as if this is 
precisely what it does—that it “recovers” the face.  Instead, as I have shown here, face 
work is a kind of surgical, technical, and cultural erasure, in which experience is erased in 
favor of the face that does not bespeak aging or, perhaps more importantly, trauma and 
fetal development.  If the face is so important to us for all the reasons that we know it is, 
then face work accomplishes the incredible by erasing the parts of our history and 
experience that make themselves known by bearing witness on our bodies.  The narrative 
and practice of recovery and repair obscures the replacement central to face work.  There 
is a difference between making something more functional or more pleasing and 
transforming that thing into something different.  The difference between these aims is 
striking when the something being repaired or replaced is the human face.   
 That which marks our bodies speaks of something true, something undeniable and 
inescapable.  Sighted people see these marks.  What would people know about us if they 
knew something about our trauma or embryological path?  Bodily marks call for 
storytelling, an answer to the ubiquitous question, “What happened to you?”  And 
 272
storytelling is revealing.  In the case of fetal development, congenital anomalies reveal 
that we were born imperfect, that our lives are characterized by difference.  Our bodies 
have always been marked.  Yet, to have never been considered normal is very different 
than to have been normal and to become abnormal.  As Arthur Frank writes, “Scars do hit 
us like a brick, as they connect immediate persons to imagined forms of suffering and 
thus render that suffering tangible” (Frank 2004: 28).  The trauma on our bodies tells the 
story of where we have been and what we have encountered.  Erasing these embodied 
stories obscures part of what makes us who we are.   In this way, the desire for face work 
embodies the desire for erasure.   
Biotechnological interventions like face work rely on and mobilize hope.  They 
promise that, through bodily interventions, life can be better.   Techniques of intervention 
mobilize hope, but often the access to a better future is conceived of as solely accessible 
through particular interventions.  Thus, choosing an intervention, hoping for repair, is 
always already embedded in coercive discursive structures which rely on the imperative 
to repair.  Face work becomes not simply one mode of coping, but the presumed mode of 
negotiating bodily difference.     
 Positioning interventions as humanizing is potentially insidious for this very 
reason.  If a technology or a practice possesses the power to make one human, is there a 
way of opting out?  If humanity hangs in the balance, how does normalization rely on 
coercion?  If normalization is deployed as a necessary intervention, then the assumption 
remains that there is no other way to live.  As Clarke et al. (2005) argue, 
biomedicalization is facilitating radical reappraisals of what constitutes life.  These 
transformations are not simply raising questions to be answered; rather, the work of 
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humanizing is something that is increasingly part of the work forged through medical 
practice and technologies.  Face work calls into question how we conceptualize life and 
death.  What is at stake is not our heartbeat, our respiration, our nourishment. In this case, 
what is at stake is the face, which depending on one’s perspective might be just a face, or 
it might be everything.  It might be what makes humanness possible.   
 But is face work the only means of imbuing humanness?  In 2002, the National 
Portrait Gallery in London debuted a series of portraits by artist Mark Gilbert.  The 
paintings captured disfigured faces “before,” “after,” and “during” interventions aimed at 
normalizing these faces.  According to the website of Saving Faces, a United Kingdom 
organization that commissioned the works, those painted by Gilbert reported that the 
experience of being painted was “cathartic” (The Facial Surgery Research Foundation 
2007).  It was the experience of being captured precisely because of, rather than in spite 
of, disfigurement that elicited such an emotional, and presumably healing, response.  
Could the experience of being treated as a valued aesthetic object because of one’s face, 
and all its difference, work as a mode of repair?    
 On the New York University sponsored Literature, Arts, and Medicine blog, artist 
Laura Ferguson writes in an article entitled “Towards a New Aesthetics of the Body,”  
As an artist, I understand that fixing, healing, transforming an abnormal 
body into a more normal one, is what gives doctors satisfaction, a sense of 
accomplishment - that it is their form of creative expression. But the result 
is that there is no alternative paradigm offered to patients, no 
acknowledgment that an unusual body might be okay the way it is – that 
there doesn’t have to be a ‘fix.’  I realize that the idea of deformity having 
its own beauty, without the need of fixing or altering, is a radical one. But 
I believe in an alternative vision of aesthetics in medicine, one that gives 
more value to process, to empathetic connection, than to fixing or curing. 
Art is a good place to look for an alternative aesthetic: a place where the 
less-than-perfect body can be shown to have its own kind of beauty, grace, 
sensuality, originality” (Ferguson 2007).  
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Ferguson’s work captures the beauty of her own body.  It is a body marked and devalued, 
in particular contexts, by scoliosis.65  Ferguson does not seem to suggest that “fixing” be 
dismissed altogether, but she does call for a new “aesthetics in medicine,” one that leaves 
open the possibility of alternative beauties.  Imagine a body desired for its originality, for 
the ways in which life and biology have made themselves visible on the body.  Imagine a 
face longed for because it embodies a vision of the self in all its trauma and suffering.   
 
Making Not Ugly 
 So much intellectual inquiry has focused on the work invested in making the body 
beautiful, but what of making the body not ugly?  The work of making the body not ugly 
is aimed at both grotesque bodies and bodies already unremarkable.  It is not simply the 
disfigured face, but rather all of our faces that are subject to attempts at erasing ugliness.  
The work of making not ugly stands in sharp contrast to making the body beautiful.  
Rather than inscribing the most desirable attributes onto the body, as is so clearly the case 
in cosmetic surgery, the work of making the body not ugly attempts to erase those 
features of ourselves that situate us precariously close to the abnormal.  It is not simply 
being beautiful that pervades our everyday aesthetic practices.  Many are unambiguously 
aimed at erasing ugliness.  For example, eyebrows that grow together meeting over the 
bridge of our noses are plucked, waxed, and lasered in an attempt to avoid a uni-brow.  
Concealer and pressed powder and bronzer together do more than define faces into more 
                                                 
65 Scoliosis describes the condition wherein the spine displays curvature from side to 
side.     
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beautiful structures.  These are tools for hiding pores, obscuring lines, evening skin tone.  
Imperfect teeth are whitened, with bleach and flashes of light, sometimes in attempts to 
make a beautiful smile, but just as often in attempts to reduce yellowing or graying, so 
that flaws are less noticeable.  Hair is cut and colored, straightened and relaxed not purely 
in an attempt to be beautifully tressed but also in an attempt to make our hair less ugly—
less frizzy, less gray, less blah—than it would “naturally” be.  Sometimes better is not 
more beautiful.  Sometimes better is less ugly.    
In erasing the abject, we inscribe unremarkability.  Like the Extreme Makeover 
participants who desire the moment of unrecognition—the moment at which the 
reflection in the mirror is unrecognizable—in our attempts at unremarkability we desire 
to disappear, to become more like the taken for granted, to erase that which threatens to 
mark us as different.  The collective fantasy is that our bodies might be made beautiful, 
which is ultimately a desire that would mark us as separate and unique.  In our continual 
attempts to identify what beauty is, we routinely find that much that is beautiful is a sharp 
departure, an aesthetic outlier from the average.  To be beautiful is to be different and 
unusual.  And yet while we may hold onto the fantasy, the dream and wonder about what 
is might be like to be so beautiful, so distinct, we fiercely hold onto another fantasy, 
though this one so often goes unnamed.  It is the fantasy that we will be good enough, 
and that those facets of our appearance which make us different and thus dangerously 
close to the margins might be erased.  As opposed to a fantasy about standing out, this is 
a fantasy about blending in, about embodying an aesthetic so unremarkable that no one 
notices us at all.  What does it mean that we so desperately desire to be unremarkable, to, 
in a word, disappear?   
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Beauty and ugliness exist, then, in an uneasy tension.  Of course, each informs the 
other.  In the same way that black denotes the presence of all color and white the absence, 
beauty and ugliness stand in sharp contrast to one another and yet entirely depend on the 
other for their respective significance.  Beauty and ugliness are contextual.  We know 
beauty when we see it, partially because we have some looming sense of what is ugly.  
But there is much to be learned by analytically separating out attempts towards producing 
beauty and techniques aimed towards obfuscating ugliness.  Our desire to be beautiful is 
a desire infused with cultural discourses and practices related to youth, ablebodiness, 
gender, race, and class, and this desire is continually forged through commercial culture, 
through material and experiential consumption.  Yet this desire is also informed by 
notions of uniqueness and rarity.  Most of us know that there is only so much that we can 
do.   
In contrast, the work of making the body not ugly is a never-ending project.  It is 
a Sisyphean task.  The stone will not stay atop the mountain.  Aging, bodily trauma, and 
aesthetic fashions are not fixed, and thus the work of not being ugly is an ongoing and 
impossible project.  We may be finished for today, but tomorrow is another day complete 
with another set of problems—new freckles, fine lines, solar damage, car wrecks, 
standards of bodily care.  The specter of disfigurement, specifically, and ugliness, more 
generally, is so overwhelming because it is always there, threatening to affect our bodies 
with every passing day, with every risk encountered.  Relative then to our everyday lives, 
the feat of being not ugly looms large, and the ways in which the specter of ugliness 
inspires consumption (including consumer debt), self loathing, and postmodern 
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sensibilities must be queried in the same way that the fantasy of beauty has been 
dismantled.   
The question of ugliness matters for us all, but it particularly matters for those 
with bodies unambiguously ugly as defined by our collective norms of bodily 
appearance.  We know that we are not all equally beautiful, but we are also not all 
equally unremarkable.  We all wrestle with ugliness, but as this inquiry into the work of 
repairing the face demonstrates, this struggle is disproportionately stacked against those 
with facial difference.  The stakes are much higher.  The possibilities for unremarkability 
are much lower, and thus the specter of ugliness not only looms for those with facial 
difference but it infuses everyday life.  In assessing these technologies, these mechanisms 
of face work, these interventions aimed at repair, it is essential to recall that interventions 
are simultaneously coercive, compelling, and desired.   
Rather than dismissing face transplantation as a technology too risky for potential 
recipients while too advantageous for those who continue to innovate it, rather than 
criticizing Operation Smile for investing in appearance rather than sustenance, rather than 
exposing Extreme Makeover as a circus in which participants are the clowns, rather than 
focusing on the violence inflicted on the faces of male to female transsexuals undergoing 
facial feminization, I empathetically ask: what forces make choosing these interventions 
compelling, what structures make appearance so essential, what pleasure and hope is 
there to be had in  repair?  It is these questions that help us understand why face work 
means what is does and what consequences emerge out of processes aimed at fixing the 
face.  I am left with rage that only some choices seem possible in the 21st century, despair 
that some lives are defined as lives not worth living, fascination about what we have 
 278
made technologically possible, and compassion for those of us desiring by whatever 
means possible to be fully human.    
 
Coda 
At the end of this narrative, I am reluctant to conclude by endorsing or 
demonizing face work, or even by offering a framework that differentiates between the 
ethical and necessary moments of intervention and the unethical and gratuitous.  I 
conclude acutely aware of how intervention varies according to context—that the 
specificities of the faces involved matter and that procedures technically identical carry 
different meanings for patients, practitioners, and societies depending on the particulars.  
I end with some sense that the desire to be unremarkable is profound, and despite what I 
know are problematic means towards this end, I am reluctant to definitively reject what 
so many hope for.  And mostly, I finish this story with a sense that despite the ways in 
which embodiment is socially mediated and thus shaped by forces not unique to any 
particular individual, bodily experience varies to such a degree that attempts to 
communicate across experience inevitably fail.   
If there are any facts of life, they are that all humans breathe, consume, and 
excrete, though even these functions are mediated socially and technologically.  
Language, geo-political locations, familial context, and personal narrative vary, but all 
humans are embodied.  This is universally true, but even in the face of the only universal, 
there is no there there.  Even the universal experience of breathing varies dramatically.  
Some breathe with the aid of ventilators.  Some breathe through transplanted lungs.  
Others breathe air saturated with pollens.  Some are allergic, and others are not.  Bodily 
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experience varies so dramatically that it is certain that even those bodily experiences 
shared by all humans are experienced differently.  This is the paradox of bodily 
experience and the source of tension that makes a politics of bodily intervention so 
complicated.  The fact is the only thing common to all humans is that we inhabit a body, 
and yet bodily experience differs profoundly between human creatures.  Culture, ability, 
aesthetics, and trauma imprint the common body, marking and making each one in ways 
entirely different from the other.  Utterly common, yet incomprehensibly different.    
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